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Серия основана в 2012 году

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Кафедра английского языка № 1



Серия основана в 2012 году

О.А. Кравцова, Е.Б. Ястребова

АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

**МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ
И ЗАРУБЕЖНОЕ РЕГИОНОВЕДЕНИЕ**

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Цель настоящего учебного пособия (Часть I) — развитие коммуникативной компетенции, необходимой для использования английского языка в учебной, профессиональной и научной деятельности. Состоит из двух модулей: “Язык для специальных целей” (ESP) и “Язык для академических целей” (EAP).

Адресовано студентам четвертого курса факультетов и отделений международных отношений и зарубежного регионоведения.

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ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ

Настоящее учебное пособие (Часть 1) предназначено для работы в первом семестре выпускного курса бакалавриата по направлениям подготовки “Международные отношения” и “Зарубежное регионоведение”. Цель пособия — формирование профессиональной коммуникативной компетенции, а также академической компетенции, необходимой для использования английского языка в учебной и научной деятельности.

Учебное пособие состоит из нескольких частей. “Книга для студентов” (Student’s Coursebook) включает два модуля: “Язык для специальных целей” (ESP) и “Язык для академических целей” (EAP Corner); “Книгу” дополняют “Хрестоматия для чтения” (The Reader) и “Рекомендации для студентов” (The Manual).

“Книга для студентов” (Часть 1) состоит из трех уроков. Темы уроков (UK: *From Empire to Democracy*; US: *From Democracy to Empire?*; *Europe at the Crossroads*) достаточно традиционны для данных направлений подготовки. При этом принципиальным отличием настоящего пособия от всех подобных является упор на профессионально ориентированные виды деятельности: поиск и обработку информации, выступления и дискуссии, дебаты.

Каждый урок “Книги для студентов” начинается с *Road Map* (“Дорожной карты”), в которой указаны наиболее значимые для будущей профессиональной деятельности виды работ в данном уроке; все остальные задания в каждом разделе подчинены задаче их успешного выполнения.

Разделы *Reading* и *Listening* модуля ESP развивают умение извлекать информацию из разных источников; большое внимание уделяется анализу письменного и устного текста по таким параметрам, как смысл, модальность, логика построения аргументации, основная мысль, языковые средства воздействия на адресата. Разделы *Speaking* и *Speak Up* развивают умения профессионально ориентированной устной речи. В разделе *Speaking* предлагаются два важных задания — презентация в формате power point — выполняется один раз в семестр и *Debate* (в уроке 3 формат *Verbal Joust*). В *Speak Up*, который является логическим продолжением разделов *Reading* и *Listening*, акцент сделан на умении выступать с краткими сообщениями и обмениваться мнениями в формате свободной дискуссии.

Раздел *Vocabulary Practice, Revision* и задания на составление списков тематической лексики в разделах *Listening* и *Follow Up* способствуют расширению словаря профессионально ориентированной лексики: студенты должны использовать ее при выполнении заданий в разделах *Speak Up* и *Speaking (Debate)*, а также в разделе *Integrating Core Skills*. Последний раздел предполагает также актуализацию всех речевых умений (чтения, восприятия на слух, письма и устной речи).

“Хрестоматия для чтения” предназначена для самостоятельной работы студентов по поиску необходимой информации для подготовки кратких сообщений в рамках раздела *Speak Up*, дискуссий и дебатов.

“Книга для студентов” предлагает три учебные траектории: базовую, основную и продвинутую. Первая обязательна для всех студентов, включая иностранцев; вторая¹ предназначена для тех, кто претендует на оценку не ниже “С”, то есть для большинства студентов; третья² ориентирована на наиболее сильных и амбициозных студентов.

¹ Помечена знаком



² Помечена знаком



■ Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

Модуль *EAP Corner* содержит несколько разделов, каждый из которых может использоваться выборочно и автономно в зависимости от индивидуальных потребностей студентов. Раздел *Brushing Up Reading Skills* направлен на совершенствование навыков чтения, в первую очередь его быстрых видов (просмотрового и поискового), а также ознакомительного и изучающего. Раздел *Mastering Listening Skills* способствует развитию умений воспринимать и фиксировать информацию, понимать эмоциональный настрой адресанта. Развитию логического мышления — исключительно важного для успешного как академического, так и профессионального общения — посвящен раздел *Developing Logical Thinking Skills*. Все задания по развитию умений письменной речи содержатся в разделе *Writing* данного модуля.

Текстовый материал в *Reading, Brushing Up Reading Skills* и *The Reader* аутентичен и современен, отличается жанровым и стилистическим разнообразием; в качестве источников использованы аналитические статьи из качественной англоязычной прессы и главы монографий современных авторов. Отдельные статьи были сокращены, в текстах эти сокращения показаны квадратными скобками [].

Материал для разделов *Listening* и *Developing Listening Skills* доступен на сайте www.youtube.com по указанным в заданиях ссылкам. В модуле *ESP* он тематически тесно связан с текстами в *Reading* и удачно их дополняет; в модуле *EAP Corner* используется видео материал для совершенствования умений и навыков академического общения.

The Manual содержит практические советы по выполнению наиболее значимых заданий: презентаций, выступлений в дебатах, написанию собственного текста (эссе, обзор, аннотация, резюме).

Автор концепции учебного пособия — Е. Б. Ястребова. В «Книге для студентов» модуль *ESP* написан О. А. Кравцовой, модуль *EAP Corner* — Е. Б. Ястребовой; «Хрестоматия» составлена О. А. Кравцовой, «Рекомендации для студентов» — Е. Б. Ястребовой. Тексты для *Lead-in* в уроках 1–3 и *Reading* 3 урока 1 в Книге для студента подобраны Е. Б. Ястребовой; она же составила раздел *Integrating Core Skills*.

Авторы выражают благодарность Е. М. Зелтынь и Г. П. Легкодух за разрешение использовать материалы (текст *The Vices of our Virtues* и задание «Comment on the notions expressed by Robert J. Samuelson») из учебника «Английский для будущих дипломатов». — М.: МГИМО (У) МИД России, 2005, а также К. В. Бобылевой за предоставленную статью *How good a democracy is Britain?* и лексические упражнения (*Vocabulary Exercises 1–3*) (*Reading* 1 урока 1).

МЕТОДИЧЕСКИЕ УКАЗАНИЯ ДЛЯ ПРЕПОДАВАТЕЛЕЙ

Уважаемые коллеги!

Общее представление о структуре изучаемого курса «Язык для специальных целей» (ESP) дает выдержка из примерной модульной программы кафедры английского языка №1 МГИМО (У) МИД России, которая приводится после Предисловия.

В первой части Предисловия дано описание цели, назначения, структуры пособия и его главной отличительной черты — акценте на профессионально значимых видах деятельности. Исходя из последнего, рекомендуется начинать работу над каждым уроком с изучения *Road Map* и ознакомления с содержанием урока и предлагаемыми траекториями его освоения. Студентам выпускного курса целесообразно предоставлять большую степень самостоятельности, поэтому обязательным является заполнение индивидуального плана

(см. *The Manual*), благодаря которому студенты не только планируют свою работу над уроком, но и берут конкретные обязательства по срокам и видам выполняемых заданий.

Важно: независимо от траектории, выбранной студентом, задания в *Road Map* являются итогом работы над материалом урока. Рекомендации по выполнению основных видов заданий даны в *The Manual*, и их необходимо внимательно изучить как студентам, так и преподавателям.

Прочие рекомендации по работе с пособием состоят в следующем.

1. Работа над языковыми умениями и навыками не ограничивается систематическим выполнением заданий в разделе *Vocabulary Practice* и *Revision*; надо поощрять студентов максимально (но уместно!) использовать новую лексику в речи.

Задание на составление списков тематической лексики, предназначенное для третьего уровня, позволяет рационально использовать различные языковые возможности студентов: более сильные студенты составляют списки, а употреблять их в речи должны стремиться все.

2. Для развития умения работать с большим объемом текстового материала целесообразно привлекать тексты из "Хрестоматии для чтения". Практика в быстром чтении предполагает выполнение соответствующих заданий в аудитории на время, а задания на изучающее чтение выполняются дома с использованием словарей и последующей проверкой по *Comprehension Assignments*.

3. Задания на аудирование могут выполняться как в классе, так и в режиме самостоятельной работы, однако работа с ними в аудитории позволяет одновременно обучать и контролировать работу каждого студента.

4. Развитие речевой компетенции предполагает совершенствование навыков как устной, так и письменной речи. Первое реализуется через общение на английском языке на всех этапах занятия и включает практику как в подготовленной, так и в неподготовленной речи (задания в *Lead-in*, *Listening*, *Speak Up*, *Follow Up* в разделах *Reading*). Навык письменной речи совершенствуется при выполнении заданий в модуле *EAP Corner*, раздел *Writing*, при этом выбор заданий, подготавливающих студентов к написанию собственного произведения, определяется потребностями конкретной группы и отдельных студентов.

5. Задания в *EAP Corner* выполняются выборочно по рекомендации преподавателя отдельными студентами или всей группой. Однако задания в разделе *Developing Logical Thinking Skills* целесообразно выполнять всем студентам, а в разделе *Writing* задания "Write a summary, an essay, a survey report" обязательны для всех!

Кульминацией работы над уроком, синтезом всех приобретенных знаний и умений являются *Debate* и проектное задание в *Integrating Core Skills*.

Образцы контрольных и экзаменационных заданий, параметры и критерии оценок даны в Приложении.

Авторы выражают благодарность рецензенту Е. Н. Солововой и преподавателям за полезные замечания, пожелания, возникавшие в процессе работы над пилотным вариантом пособия.

Авторы

Уважаемые студенты!

На IV курсе вам предстоит совершенствовать языковые и речевые навыки, необходимые для профессионального (ESP) и академического (EAP) общения. Упор на язык профессии определяет темы и лексику, предлагаемые для изучения, а также виды учебных заданий. Настоящее

- Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

пособие предоставляет вам возможность высказать свою точку зрения по самым актуальным международным проблемам (раздел *Speak Up*), принять участие в дебатах (раздел *Speaking*), выполнить различные проектные задания по интересующим вас темам (*Integrating Core Skills*).

Модуль *EAP* в каждом уроке позволит вам на новом уровне совершенствовать навыки быстрого чтения и восприятия речи на слух, а также научит вас приемам логической аргументации, необходимым для ведения любой дискуссии, обоснования своей точки зрения в эссе и логичного изложения содержания статьи в резюме.

Важным моментом является то, что вы сможете в определенной степени сами определять свою учебную траекторию, выбирая интересующие вас задания при заполнении индивидуального плана (*The Manual*). При этом вы несете ответственность за своевременное и качественное выполнение взятых на себя обязательств.

Вам придется больше, чем на предыдущих курсах, работать самостоятельно, в частности, читать большое количество дополнительных текстов, как предлагаемых в учебном пособии (*The Reader*), так и найденных вами в печатных изданиях и на интернет-ресурсах, что позволит вам развить навыки аналитической работы с различными источниками информации.

Надеемся, что работа с учебным пособием окажется интересной и полезной для вас!

Авторы

ВЫДЕРЖКА ИЗ ОБРАЗОВАТЕЛЬНОЙ ПРОГРАММЫ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ “ИНОСТРАННЫЙ ЯЗЫК (ВТОРОЙ)”

“АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК”

УРОВЕНЬ — “БАКАЛАВРИАТ”
ФГОС ВПО 3-го ПОКОЛЕНИЯ

Настоящая программа по курсу (дисциплине) “Английский язык”, модуль “Язык профессии” предназначена для студентов *продолжающего потока* факультета международных отношений по направлению подготовки 031900 — “Международные отношения”, и 032000 — “Зарубежное регионоведение”.

Квалификация (степень) — “бакалавр”.

Основной практической целью обучения английскому языку в качестве второго иностранного на факультете МО является формирование *иноязычной коммуникативной компетенции* для использования английского языка в профессиональной деятельности на международной арене, в познавательной деятельности и для межличностного общения.

Уровень владения иноязычной компетенцией для четвертого года обучения — С1.

МОДУЛЬ “ЯЗЫК ПРОФЕССИИ–7”

Задачи:

Развитие речевой, языковой, социокультурной, аналитической и информационной компетенций как составляющих профессионально ориентированной коммуникативной компетенции.

Содержание:

Знания:

Общественно-политическая лексика.

Ситуативная и коммуникативная обусловленность употребления слов и устойчивых словосочетаний. Экспрессивно-модальные оттенки. Прямое и переносное значение лексических единиц. Синонимия. Экспрессивные оттенки синонимов.

Антонимия. Лексико-грамматические особенности британского и американского вариантов английского языка. Стили речи современного английского языка. Стилль книжной речи (публицистической, художественной литературы, деловой корреспонденции и т.п.)

Знание правильных логических приемов аргументации.

Знание политических реалий в пределах изучаемых тем.

Языковые умения и навыки:

1. умение выбирать соответствующие языковые средства для выполнения определенного коммуникативного задания;
2. умение интегрировать в речь новые лексические единицы, образуя правильные свободные сочетания в различных ситуациях академического и условно профессионального общения.

■ Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

Речевые умения и навыки:

1. умение читать специальные и общественно-политические тексты, используя разные виды чтения¹ (просмотровое, поисковое, ознакомительное, изучающее);
2. умение воспринимать на слух монологическую и диалогическую речь носителей языка по профессионально ориентированной тематике;
3. умение продуцировать монологическое высказывание (сообщение, публичное выступление, доклад) в общественно-политической и социально-культурной сферах общения в непосредственном контакте с аудиторией, комбинируя монологи всех изученных видов (описание, повествование, рассуждение, объяснение, убеждение);
4. умение участвовать в диалоге (беседе, дискуссии, дебатах), правильно пользуясь формулами речевого этикета и
5. умение создавать письменные произведения по общественно-политической тематике (эссе, резюме, обзоры).

Информационно-аналитические умения и навыки:

1. умение самостоятельно работать со справочным материалом и специальными словарями;
2. умение обрабатывать большой материал информации, выбирая главное;
3. умение анализировать, сравнивать, делать выводы.

Предметно-лексические темы:

1. Великобритания: традиции и современность.
2. Американские ценности вчера и сегодня.
3. Настоящее и будущее европейской интеграции.

Формы организации учебной деятельности студентов:

Индивидуальная, парная, групповая работа. Проектная работа в командах.

Форма контроля

Экзамен включает:

1. написание резюме статьи по социально-политической тематике (300–350 слов) без словаря. Время выполнения — 90 мин;
2. устное высказывание продолжительностью 3–4 минуты на заданную тему (время подготовки — 10–15 минут) с последующим обсуждением в парах (вопросы, комментарии).

Объекты контроля

1. языковая компетенция
2. умения в области чтения и переработки информации
3. умение передавать содержание статьи по профессионально ориентированной тематике в сжатой форме и своими словами
4. умение делать краткое сообщение–рассуждение
5. умение слушать собеседника, анализировать его/ее аргументацию и опровергать его/ее доводы.

¹ В качестве ориентира предлагается скорость быстрого чтения в формате IELTS — 300 слов в минуту

UNIT I

UK: FROM EMPIRE TO DEMOCRACY

THE ROAD MAP FOR UNIT I

SPEAKING

DEBATE

*Holding a debate on a politically relevant topic
(for details see p. 36)*

TERM PRESENTATION

*Making a power point presentation based on one's analysis of
an issue relevant to the topic (Britain: From Empire to Democracy)
(for details see p. 31)*

INTEGRATING CORE SKILLS



PROJECT WORK

*Doing research as a team and presenting results
(for details see p. 38)*

LEAD-IN

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. Do you think Britons should be proud of the British Empire?
2. What, in your view, is the legacy of the Empire?

THE BRITISH EMPIRE'S LEGACY

(Based on Conclusion Chapter from *Empire. How Britain Made the Modern World* by Niall Ferguson. Penguin books LTD, London, 2004)

TEXT A

Skim the text and find out what, according to the author, the British Empire contributed to the world.

The British Empire is long dead; only flotsam and jetsam¹ now remain. What had been based on Britain's commercial and financial supremacy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and her industrial supremacy in the nineteenth was bound to crumble once the British economy buckled under the accumulated burdens of two world wars. The great creditor became a debtor. In the same way, the great movements of population that had once driven British imperial expansion changed their direction in the 1950s. Emigration from Britain gave way to immigration into Britain. As for the missionary impulse that had sent thousands of young men and women around the world preaching Christianity and the gospel of cleanliness, that too dwindled², along with public attendance at church. Christianity today is stronger in many of her former colonies than in Britain itself.

It cannot be denied, however, that the imperial legacy has shaped the modern world so profoundly that we almost take it for granted. Without the spread of British rule around the world, it is hard to believe that the structures of liberal capitalism would have been so successfully established in so many different economies around the world. Without the influence of British imperial rule, it is hard to believe that the institutions of parliamentary democracy would have been adopted by the majority of states in the world, as they are today. India, the world's largest democracy, owes more than it is fashionable to acknowledge to British rule. Its elite schools, its universities, its civil service, its army, its press and its parliamentary system all still have discernibly³ British models. Finally, there is the English language itself, perhaps the most important single export of the last 300 years. Today 350 million people speak English as their first language and around 450 million have it as a second language. That is roughly one in every seven people on planet.

Of course no one would claim that the record of the British Empire was unblemished⁴. On the contrary, I have tried to show how often it failed to live up to its own ideal of individual liberty, particularly in the early era of enslavement, transportation and the 'ethnic cleansing' of indigenous⁵ peoples. Yet the nineteenth-century Empire undeniably pioneered free trade, free capital

¹ Flotsam and jetsam — rubbish floating in the water after a ship has been wrecked and rubbish washed on to the land

² To dwindle — diminish gradually in size, amount, or strength

³ Discernible — able to be seen, noticed, or understood

⁴ Unblemished — without any faults or mistakes to spoil your reputation or record

⁵ Indigenous — originating in and characteristic of a particular region or country; native

movements and, with the abolition of slavery, free labour. It invested immense sums in developing a global network of modern communications. It spread and enforced the rule of law over vast areas. Though it fought many small wars, the Empire maintained a global peace unmatched before or since. In the twentieth century too it more than justified its existence, for the alternatives to British rule represented by the German and Japanese empires were clearly far worse. And without its Empire, it is inconceivable that Britain could have withstood them.

TEXT B

Find the author's arguments supporting his claim about the British Empire promoting

- *free capital flow*
- *free trade*
- *free labour*



There would certainly not have been so much free trade between the 1840s and the 1930s had it not been for the British Empire. Relinquishing¹ Britain's colonies in the second half of the nineteenth century would have led to higher tariffs in their markets, and perhaps other forms of trade discrimination. The evidence for this need not be purely hypothetical; it manifested itself in the highly protectionist policies adopted by the United States and India after they secured independence, as well as in the tariffs adopted by Britain's imperial rivals France, Germany and Russia in the 1870s and after. Britain's military budget before the First World War can therefore be seen as a remarkably low insurance premium against international protectionism. According to one estimate, the economic benefit to the UK of enforcing free trade could have been as high as 6.5 per cent of gross national product. No one has yet ventured to estimate what the benefit to the world economy as a whole may have been; but that it was a benefit and not a cost seems beyond dispute, given the catastrophic consequences of the global descent into protectionism as Britain's imperial power waned² in the 1930s.

Nor would there have been so much international mobility of labour — and hence so much global convergence of incomes before 1914 — without the British Empire. True, the United States was always the most attractive destination for nineteenth century migrants from Europe; nor did all the migrants originate in the colonising countries. But it should not be forgotten that the core of the US had been under British rule for the better part of a century and a half before the War of Independence, and that the differences between independent and British North America remained minor.

It is also worth remembering that the significance of the white dominions as destinations for British emigrants grew markedly after 1914, as the US tightened restrictions on immigration and, after 1929, endured a far worse Depression than anything experienced in the sterling bloc. Finally, we should not lose sight of the vast number of Asians who left India and China to work as indentured³ labourers, many of them on British plantations and mines in the course of the nineteenth century. There is no question that the majority of them suffered great hardship; many indeed might well have been better off staying at home. But once again we cannot pretend that this mobilisation of cheap and probably underemployed Asian labour to grow rubber and dig gold had no economic value.

¹ To relinquish — to give up, abandon, surrender

² To wane — to decrease gradually in size, decline, approach an end

³ Indentured — наемный

Consider too the role of the British Empire in facilitating capital export to the less developed world. Although some measures of international financial integration seem to suggest that the 1990s saw greater cross-border flows than the 1890s, in reality much of today's overseas investment goes on within the developed world. In 1996 only 28 per cent of foreign direct investment went to developing countries, whereas in 1913 the proportion was 63 per cent. Another, stricter measure shows that in 1997 only around 5 per cent of the world stock capital was invested in countries with per capita incomes of 20 per cent or less of US per capita GDP. In 1913 the figure was 25 per cent. A plausible hypothesis is that empire — and particularly the British Empire — encouraged investors to put their money in developing economies. The reasoning here is straightforward. Investing in such economies is risky. They tend to be far away and more prone¹ to economic, social and political crises. But the extension of empire into the less developed world had the effect of reducing such risks by imposing, directly or indirectly, some form of European rule. In practice, money invested in a *de jure* British colony such as India (or a colony in all but name, like Egypt) was a great deal more secure than money invested in a *de facto* 'colony' such as Argentina.

Speak Up

Say whether you agree or disagree with the author's opinion and give your reasoning.

TEXT C

Read the text in detail and decide whether the author makes a convincing case for the (British) Empire as a form of government.



For all these reasons (see text A), the notion that British imperialism tended to impoverish colonised countries seems inherently problematic. That is not to say that many former colonies are not exceedingly poor. Today, for example, per capita GDP in Britain is roughly twenty-eight times what it is in Zambia, which means that the average Zambian has to live on something less than two dollars a day. But to blame this on the legacy of colonialism is not very persuasive, when the differential between British and Zambian incomes was so much less at the end of the colonial period. In 1955 British per capita GDP was just seven times greater than Zambian. It has been since independence that the gap between the coloniser and the ex-colony has become a gulf. The same is true of nearly all former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, with the notable exception of Botswana.

A country's economic fortunes are determined by a combination of natural endowments (geography, broadly speaking) and human action (history, for short); this is economic history's version of the nature-nurture debate². While a persuasive case can be made for the importance of such 'given' factors as the mean temperature, humidity, the prevalence of disease, soil quality, proximity to the sea, latitude and mineral resources in determining economic performance, there seems strong evidence that history too plays a crucial part. In particular, there is good evidence that the imposition of British-style institutions has tended to enhance a country's economic prospects, particularly in those settings where indigenous cultures were relatively weak because of thin (or

¹ Prone — having a tendency, inclined

² Nature vs nurture debate — the phrase "nature and nurture" in its modern sense was coined by the English Victorian polymath Francis Galton in discussion of the influence of heredity (nature) and environment (nurture) on social advancement

■ Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

thinned) population, allowing British institutions to dominate with little dilution. Where the British, like the Spaniards, conquered already sophisticated, urbanised societies, the effect of colonisation were commonly negative, as the colonisers were tempted to engage in plunder rather than to build their own institutions. Indeed, this is perhaps the best available explanation of the ‘great divergence’ which reduced India and China from being quite possibly the world’s most advanced economies in the sixteenth century to relative poverty by the early twentieth. It also explains why it was that Britain was able to overhaul her Iberian rivals: precisely because, as a latecomer to the imperial race, she had to settle for colonising the unpromising wastes of Virginia and New England, rather than the eminently lootable cities of Mexico and Peru.

But which British institutions promoted development? First, we should not underestimate the benefits conferred by British law and administration. A recent survey of forty-nine countries concluded that ‘common-law countries have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protection of investors’, including both shareholders and creditors. This is of enormous importance in encouraging capital formation, without which entrepreneurs can achieve little. The fact that eighteen of the sample countries have the common-law system is of course almost entirely due to their having been at one time or another under British rule.

A similar point can be made about the nature of British governance. At its apogee in the mid-nineteenth century, two features of the Indian and Colonial services are especially striking when compared with modern regimes in Asia and Africa. First, British administration was remarkably cheap and efficient. Secondly, it was remarkably non-venal. Its sins were generally sins of omission, not commission. This too cannot be wholly without significance, given the demonstrable correlations today between economic under-performance and both excessive government expenditure and public sector corruption.

The economic historian David Landes recently drew up a list of measures which ‘the ideal growth-and-development’ government would adopt. Such a government, he suggests, would

1. secure rights of private property, the better to encourage saving and investment;
2. secure rights of personal liberty ... against both the abuses of tyranny and ... crime and corruption;
3. enforce rights of contract;
4. provide stable government ... governed by publicly known rules;
5. provide responsive government;
6. provide honest government ... (with) no rents to favour and position;
7. provide moderate, efficient, ungreedy government ... to hold taxes down (and) reduce the government’s claim on the social surplus.

The striking thing about this list is how many of its points correspond to what British Indian and Colonial officials in the nineteenth and twentieth century believed they were doing. The sole, obvious exceptions are points 2 and 5. Yet the British argument for postponing (sometimes indefinitely) the transfer to democracy was that many of their colonies were not yet ready for it; indeed, the classic and not wholly disingenuous twentieth-century line from the Colonial Office was that Britain’s role was precisely to get them ready.

It is a point worth emphasising that to a significant extent British rule did have that benign¹ effect. According to the work of political scientists like Seymour Martin Lipset, countries that

¹ Benign — favourable, beneficial

were former British colonies had a significantly better chance of achieving enduring democratisation after independence than those ruled by other countries. Indeed, nearly every country with a population of at least a million that has emerged from the colonial era without succumbing to dictatorship is a former British colony. True, there have been many former colonies which have not managed to sustain free institutions: Bangladesh, Burma, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe spring to mind. But in a sample of fifty-three countries that were former British colonies, just under half (twenty six) were still democracies in 1993. This can be attributed to the way that British rule, particularly where it was 'indirect', encouraged the formation of collaborating entities; it may also be related to the role of Protestant missionaries, who clearly played a part in encouraging Western-style aspirations for political freedom in parts of Africa and the Caribbean.

In short, what the British Empire proved is that empire is a form of international government that can work — and not just for the benefit of the ruling power. It sought to globalise not just an economic but a legal and ultimately a political system too.

Speak Up

Look more closely at the countries/regions you may be studying and say whether the author's claims are, in fact, true. Supply facts to support your view.



LISTENING 1

Richard Gott on the legacy of the British Empire

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KvR0pTZvGQ&index=4&list=PL6D312E28AF131F80

VOCABULARY

Slaughter — to kill (people or animals) in a cruel or violent way, typically in large numbers

Indigenous — native

Conscript (army) (adj) — enrolled compulsorily, drafted

To put down — to use force to stop a protest or an attempt by people to take power away from a government or leader

Subject (peoples) (adj) — being under the power or sovereignty of a ruler, government

Proselytize — to induce someone to convert to one's faith

Straitjacket — something that limits someone's freedom to do something

PRE-VIEWING

Before watching the video suggest the Russian equivalents for the words above.

What do you expect the speaker's position on the legacy of the British Empire to be?

VIEWING

While watching the video put down the names of the former British colonies the speaker mentions. In what context does he mention them?

POST VIEWING QUESTIONS

1. What, in Richard Gott's opinion, should the British Empire be blamed for?

2. In what ways was the British Empire violent?
3. What facts and statistics does Richard Gott support his arguments with?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION

Compare Richard Gott's and Niall Ferguson's (the Lead-in texts) views on the legacy of the British Empire. Is either of them unbiased? Which of them, in your opinion, makes a more compelling case?

READING 1

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. How would you define a democracy?
2. What are the types of democratic government in the modern world?
3. What are the main features of Britain's democracy?
4. Based on the title, do you expect the article to focus on the strengths or deficiencies of Britain's democracy?

Skim the text to decide whether you guessed correctly.

HOW GOOD A DEMOCRACY IS BRITAIN?

Professor Stein Ringen
University of Oxford
February 2007

The answer to this question is: not very good! Of course Britain is a democracy and a solid one, but there are many solid democracies and in this family British democracy is of only mediocre quality.

In my book *What Democracy Is For* I rank twenty-five of the most respected democracies in the world according to their quality on a scale from 8 (high quality) to 0 (low quality). In that ranking, Britain is on level 3. The best quality of democracy is found in some of the smaller countries with political cultures of egalitarianism, such as in Scandinavia (Norway and Sweden are on level 8 and Iceland on level 7). In Europe, Italy ranks the lowest, on level 0, and France and Germany are on level 3 and 4 respectively. The two great model democracies, those of the British Westminster model and of the United States with its pioneering democratic constitution are both in the bottom range of the ranking.

This is not where British democracy should stand or be expected to stand. The Westminster Model has very much going for it. It is embedded in an ancient and firm culture of liberty. It has evolved organically out of British history and experience and was never invented or imposed. Parliament is a model of careful and pragmatic deliberation. The press is robustly free and radio and television of the best anywhere, including in political scrutiny. Governance is stable, effective and by and large honest.

We should therefore expect British democracy to compare favourably with democracy anywhere else. In fact, however, it does not. Among the world's solid democracies, Britain com-

pares unfavourably. In spite of all it has going for it, it turns out to compare badly in democratic quality.

Democratic deficit in Britain

My concern here is neither with non-democracy nor with weak and second-rate democracies. I am interested in the solidly established democracies and with differences in quality within this exclusive family. I can therefore take some things for granted that I do not have to bring into my comparisons, principally that civil and political rights are established. Even in this the solid democracies are not fully equal but the differences are marginal. In Britain these rights are certainly enshrined in the political and social order and there is no need to question the system on this account. That is very much part of what British democracy has going for it.

However, freedom depends on more than civil and political rights. It is now widely recognised in political philosophy that values such as freedom and justice rest not exclusively on rights but also on the means to make effective use of rights. For freedom, rights are basic but in addition the individual needs to be in command of a modicum of physical and human capital to be able to live as the master of his or her life. The protection of freedom, then, is a complicated matter of good government. Citizens depend on governance for the effective protection of liberty and rights, for the regulation of economic and social life for equality of opportunity, and for protection against at least extreme deprivations in the resources of freedom. While in all solid democracies citizens enjoy basic civil and political rights, there is a great deal of difference between them in the effectiveness of governance measured against the modern understanding of freedom.

Now back to Britain and the experience of the Britons in the delivery of security of resources. British democracy displayed a burst of energy in the aftermath of the Second World War. The British people had fought through the war together. An idea of social justice had emerged which came to be seen, at least in part, to be what the war was fought for. This idea was articulated in particular in the Beveridge Report on social security. It was an idea of *universal* social protection, and idea about extending to *everyone* the protection it is the purpose of democracy to deliver. This idea was put into effect in the great reforms of the late 1940s: family allowance, social security, income support and above all the National Health Service. Here was a democracy performing at its best. In the NHS, that was displayed magnificently. Health care in Britain pre-NHS was a shambles. There were areas where it was excellent: good, free and universally available. But about half of the population did not have access to a family doctor and the poor mostly had to pay for health care.

With the NHS the government cut through the rot, nationalised the whole system of hospitals, brought all General Practitioners into the national service, and abolished inequality by giving everyone the access the privileged had had previously. In hindsight, this was an astonishing achievement, and an astonishingly democratic one.

However, if we look more carefully at those reforms and how they evolved, we find that British democracy was not able to sustain that once-in-a-lifetime democratic burst.

First, the NHS was never able to deliver what was promised. It immediately ran into deep financial problems and has ever since been cash strapped. By the end of the century, the effects of accumulated underinvestments were visible in poor standards, inefficiency, low morale within the service and low confidence in the population. British democracy proved unable to maintain its own creation. It is possible that the NHS is presently being revitalised with new investments, but the jury is still out on this and I for one remain sceptical.

Second, no similar effort materialised in that other great area of British inequality: education. The situation here was the same as in health care, or worse. A minority of children, here a small minority, the children of the rich, had access to excellent schooling in private schools behind a wall of high fees, while the majority of children languished in second-rate, underfunded and underperforming public schools. It is conspicuous that British democracy, at the time when the need to follow through from rights to resources was so well understood in health care, was unable to mobilise the same understanding and resolve in education. As a result, the British school system remains to this day deeply undemocratic and school policy limited to perpetual tinkering with the public sector with no inclination or ability to break down the inequality of the private-public division.

Third, in spite of impressive welfare state reforms the system that emerged proved incapable of affording the population that most basic of democratic protections: protection against poverty. Poverty rates in Britain, both among the elderly and among children, have remained high. It was thought that the post-1945 welfare reforms would finally overcome poverty. When that anticipation failed, British democracy, instead of reforming again, settled down to an embarrassing acceptance of persistent poverty among affluence. It is a matter of record that poverty rates in Britain were exceptionally high by European comparison all through the second half of the twentieth century. It is the proud boast of the present government that it is on the path to abolishing poverty, at least among children, but that boast is premature. It is trying to do so with the help of carefully engineered means-tested benefits¹. We have enough knowledge from social policy theory to say that this strategy can reduce poverty, which it is indeed doing, but that it cannot eradicate it, that it is arbitrary in its effects because it is never target efficient — as was put dramatically on display by the Parliamentary Ombudsman in the scandal of out-of-control overpayments and underpayments of tax credits in Britain in 2004–5 — and that it comes at the price of indignities and harassments reminiscent of the old poor-law regime. In the best European welfare states poverty has been eradicated — so we know it can be done. But British democracy remains on the defensive in poor relief because it has been unable to mobilise the resolve and resources to put itself on the offensive.

These are examples of the democratic deficit in British governance: its potential is not realised in delivery. British democracy should do better but there is not enough force in the system to carry through to the difficult matter of delivering protections in all relevant forms to all citizens.

The democratic deficit is understood and recognised in the population. Voting participation is low and falling, in particular in local elections. Membership in political parties is in free fall. Confidence in the democratic institutions is low and falling, as is documented in repeated British and comparative value surveys. So low is now confidence in democracy that in spite of local democracy having been all but killed off — and in spite of citizens being far more interested in local than in national issues — there appears to be little or no demand or appetite in the population for this crucial building block in the democratic architecture to be restored.

Political commentators sometimes suggest that trends towards disenchantment with politics are evidence of “new values”, such as individualism or post-materialism. But there is little evidence in favour of that interpretation. Democratic values are adhered to as strongly as ever. Where the matter has been examined, from Costa Rica to Norway, citizens are better informed about political and social issues and as interested as ever. They are *not* turning “apolitical” but

¹ A **means-tested benefit** in the United Kingdom is a payment available to people who can demonstrate that their income and capital are below specified limits. It is a central part of the Welfare state in the United Kingdom.

they *are* becoming more critical. If interested and informed citizens are more critical it is not because they are ignorant or indifferent, it is because they are making judgements. Their critical judgements come from their experience of shortcomings in the democracies they value. It is no good blaming citizens; they are good enough. There is a crisis of trust across the democratic world, but not because citizens are abandoning established values or in other ways failing. Citizens *do* trust less, but not because they are becoming less trusting. They trust less because their democracies are less worthy of trust.

Where to reform

In the British case two reforms present themselves as particularly urgent, both now under debate high up on the political agenda.

First, there is a need to re-invent local democracy. Devolution is well and good but does not reach local democracy and could contribute to further weakening it. What is needed is what a Smith Institute study calls *double devolution*, not only to regions but also to proper local units. Britain needs more and smaller local political entities — municipalities — with more decentralised responsibility and authority. British democracy needs many more elected politicians to represent citizens' interests. There are possibly too many members of Parliament but certainly too few elected politicians locally. This is a big order, a matter of reinvention. As it is now, Britain does not have proper local units to devolve democracy to.

Second, political parties should be freed from dependency on big money and made answerable to members. It is time to put a full stop to all private donations to political parties and campaigns — from individuals, from businesses, from unions, even from candidates' own pockets — and make political parties economically dependent on members. It is not enough to make political donations "transparent"; it's too late. Nor is it enough to limit the size of donations, for example to £50 000 as has been suggested. The narcotic of free money has numbed political sensitivities. Here, now, today — in fact and not only possibly in the future — the political use of money is destroying the people's democracy, in Britain near as much as in the United States. Democracy does not need mega-expensive politics. The money that circulates ends up in the pockets of advertisers, consultants, pollsters and advisors represents a gigantic subsidy to a class of political hangers-on. Professional politics is top-down politics and contributes to increasing the distance between citizens and their representatives. It would improve democracy if political budgets were cut and members given power in parties. There are no compelling reasons why rich individuals, businesses and organisations should be allowed to use their wealth to undermine the protection ordinary people should have from democratic governments.

These reforms are practical and doable. They are issues under consideration and firmly established on the political agenda. British democracy has much going for it and should do better. These two reforms would revitalise British democracy, infuse it with citizenship pressure for performance and lift it from mediocre to high quality.

Notes

1. The 1942 report on ***Social Insurance and Allied Services***, known commonly as the **Beveridge Report** was an influential document in the founding of the welfare state in the United Kingdom, published in December 1942. It was chaired by William Beveridge, an economist, who identified five "Giant Evils" in society: squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and disease, and went on to propose widespread reform to the system of social welfare to address these. The Report

■ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

came in the midst of war, and promised a reward for the sacrifices undertaken by everyone. Highly popular with the public, the report formed the basis for the post-war reforms known as the Welfare State, which include the expansion of National Insurance and the creation of the National Health Service.

- Electronic Data Systems ran the Inland Revenue's tax and National Insurance system from 1994 to 2004. In 2003, the launch of a new tax credit system led to over-payments of £2 billion to over two million people. EDS later paid £71.25 million in compensation for the disaster.

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. *In pairs, discuss how you understand the phrases/clauses below. If still in doubt, discuss the phrases as a class.*

- ... the United States with its pioneering democratic constitution ...
- The Westminster Model has very much going for it.
- ... to be in command of a modicum of physical and human capital to be able to live as the master of his or her life ...
- With the NHS the government cut through the rot ...
- ... the jury is still out on this ...
- ... with the help of carefully engineered means-tested benefits.
- ... this strategy ... is never target efficient ...
- ... its potential is not realised in delivery.
- ... there appears to be little or no demand or appetite in the population for this crucial building block in the democratic architecture to be restored.
- The narcotic of free money has numbed political sensitivities.

B. *Answer the questions on the text.*

- What is a solid democracy according to the article?
- What makes Britain's democracy deficient?
- What spheres of British life does the author look at to substantiate his position?
- How does the population of Great Britain react to the democratic deficit?
- What political reforms are called for, in the author's opinion?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

- What, in your view, are the criteria of the effectiveness of democracy?
- Do you share the author's opinion that the British democracy is deficient?
- How feasible do you think the suggested reforms are?

FOLLOW-UP

Make a three-minute statement

- to compare one of the solid democracies mentioned in the text with the British democracy. Focus on the healthcare system, education, and welfare system OR
- to comment on the other aspects of Britain's democracy.



Use texts from the Reader or readings that you find yourself.

Compile a list of Topical Vocabulary necessary to speak on the issue (to be shared in class).



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 1

Ex. 1. a) find words in the text to match the definitions below, reproduce the context they are used in;

b) give the words they are formed from or their derivatives;

c) suggest their Russian equivalents;

d) use the words in sentences of your own.

1. of only average quality; not very good
2. a belief in human equality especially with respect to social, political, and economic affairs
3. to have a specified place within a grading system
4. to implant (an idea or feeling) so that it becomes ingrained within a particular context
5. to transfer or delegate (power) to a lower level, especially from central government to local or regional administration
6. minor and not important; not central
7. to express (an idea or feeling) fluently and coherently
8. clearly visible; attracting notice or attention
9. firm determination to do something
10. an emotion involving pleasure, excitement and sometimes anxiety in considering some expected or longed-for good event
11. the state of having a great deal of money; wealth
12. tending to remind one of something; suggesting something by resemblance
13. a feeling of disappointment about someone or something you previously respected or admired; disillusionment
14. evoking interest, attention, or admiration in a powerfully irresistible way; not able to be refuted; not able to be resisted
15. fill; pervade; instill (a quality) in someone or something

Ex. 2. Continue the strings of collocations, translate them. Make up a sentence with one collocation from each list.

1. solid, _____, _____, _____ **democracy**
2. **marginal:** differences, _____, _____, _____
3. **conspicuous:** _____, _____, _____, _____
4. to mobilize, _____, _____, _____, _____ **one's resolve**
5. **affluent:** society, _____, _____, _____, _____
6. **compelling:** reasons, _____, _____, _____, _____

Ex. 3. Fill in the gaps with the words from Ex. 1 and Ex. 2.

1. In "Beyond Good and Evil", Nietzsche _____ his disdain for conventional morality where he described Christian standards as a "slave morality".

■ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

2. _____ is the position that equality is central to justice. It is a prominent trend in social and political philosophy.
3. To make a _____ argument requires tact, knowledge and the ability to see both sides of the debate.
4. We have a duty to _____ voters with confidence that their votes will be counted, that their voices will be heard.
5. He increased their courage and strength in every hardship, lightened their burdens and strengthened their _____.
6. For inward investment flows, Britain _____ third behind the US and Germany.
7. Many anthropologists agree that fundamentally the economy is _____ in culture and does not exist as an independent sphere of activity.
8. The Scotland Act 1998 _____ the power to the Scottish Parliament to make primary legislation on all matters not reserved to the UK Parliament, as long as these comply with EU requirements and European human rights law.
9. Unlike the Battle of Midway, which historians regard as a pivotal moment in World War II, historians regard the Battle of Debrecen as of _____ importance.
10. A _____ politician is economical with the truth, a great politician is praised for telling the truth.
11. Company executives achieved _____ success at high-speed team building events.
12. Cultures can achieve _____ either by wanting little and producing little or wanting much and producing much.
13. At least compared to Western Europe, Minsk was still _____ of Old Russia.
14. Failure to ratify the Treaty signalled the European electorate's _____ with the EU and the process of enlargement.

READING 2

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. In what European countries are there regions striving for independence? What makes them do it?
2. What, in your opinion, determined the outcome of the Scottish independence referendum?

Look through the text to find out what the reasons behind the Scots' decision to stay within the UK might have been.

DON'T LEAVE US THIS WAY

Why we hope the people of Scotland will vote to stay in the union

Jul 12th 2014 | *the Economist*

<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21606832-why-we-hope-people-scotland-will-vote-stay-union-dont-leave-us-way>

BRITAIN does not feel like a nation on the verge of cracking up. Many have clutched patriotic flags and wept this summer — but most of them were fans of the England football team, distressed by its rapid exit from the World Cup, not activists demonstrating for and against the break-up of their country. Yet a 307-year-old union, which once ruled a third of humanity and still serves

as a role-model to many, could be on the verge of dissolution, because the people of Scotland will vote on independence in a referendum on September 18th.

Opinion polls suggest the Scots will decide against leaving, but it is the nationalists who have fire in their bellies, and Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), is a strong finisher. Even a narrow victory for the status quo would be the biggest blow to the United Kingdom since 1922, when the Irish Free State was born. The campaign has been a bad-tempered one, marked by growing Scottish anger at English complacency and indifference while English resentment of Scottish whingeing and freeloading has risen: only a strong vote for the union will bury this issue.

If the Scots vote to leave, they should of course be allowed to, with Britain's blessing. A desire for self-determination is a strong basis for a claim to nationhood, and there is no reason to think that an independent Scotland would be a disaster, any more than an independent Ireland has been.

But *The Economist*, itself a product of the Caledonian liberalism of Adam Smith and David Hume, hopes the Scots will decide to stay. That is partly because we believe that a break-up would benefit nobody: on most measures the certain costs for people on both sides of the border far outweigh the uncertain gains. But it is also because much would be lost. Despite the occasional appearance of muddle, there is a point to the union, and one about which liberals should feel passionate.

Red, white and rather blue

Strong arguments are needed to justify a step as big as breaking up a nation. Scottish nationalists argue that an independent Scotland would be more prosperous and more democratic.

On economics, the nationalists say that Scots will be £1,000 a year better-off per head if they go it alone. That number, however, is based on implausible assumptions about the oil price, Scotland's debt burden, demography and productivity. The British government's estimate that Scots would be £1,400 a year better off per head if they stay in is based on more realistic assumptions. Scotland's population is older and sicker than the British average, and productivity 11% lower than that of the rest of Britain. As a result, the state spends around £1,200 more per head on Scots than on the average Briton. Depending on what happens to the oil price, North Sea oil could more or less cover those costs in the short term, but the oil is running out.

It is, of course, possible that independence would cure Scotland's entitlement culture¹ and revive its entrepreneurial side. If either of its two dominant parties — the SNP and Labour — were disciples of Adam Smith that would be plausible. But their statist philosophies are more likely to drive Edinburgh's fund managers, Aberdeen's oil-services engineers and other talented Scots south. Independence would also impose one-off costs: a new Scottish state would have to set up an army, a welfare system, a currency and much else.

You stole my soul and that's a pain I can do without

The argument that an independent Scotland would be more democratic is a stronger one, for Scotland and England have grown apart. Two generations ago, there were nearly as many Conservative MPs as Labour ones in Scotland, but the Scots have not forgiven the Tories for the impact of Thatcherism on their heavily industrial economy. Nationalist protesters recently donned panda outfits to remind David Cameron, the Conservative prime minister, that there are more pandas in

¹ The term "entitlement culture" suggests that many people now have highly unreasonable expectations about what they are entitled to.

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Edinburgh zoo (two) than there are Tory MPs in Scotland (one). Encouraged by devolution under Tony Blair and cash from Westminster, Scottish social policies have diverged from English ones. University education is free for Scottish students, but not English or Welsh ones; the state pays for a higher proportion of old people's care in Scotland than it does in England and Wales; Scotland has not followed England in freeing schools from bureaucratic constraints.

Yet healthy democracies are flexible enough to deal with regional differences, of which there are plenty within the rest of Britain. The north-east of England and Wales, which both vote Labour, also rail against the Westminster government, just as the Tory stockbroker belt does when Labour is in power. Some of the southern impositions that nationalists object to, such as a "bedroom tax" designed to nudge subsidised tenants out of unnecessarily large houses, are relatively trivial. Others, like Margaret Thatcher's poll tax, are historical.

Nor does Britain's political set-up deprive the Scots of power. The last two British prime ministers, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, were born north of the border. Scotland has a disproportionately large number of MPs at Westminster. Edinburgh already has an independent legal system and its parliament has power over a wide range of policy areas, including health, education and housing. Its leaders have not exercised their right to vary income tax: that hardly suggests a Scottish administration straining at a leash held tight by Westminster.

A democratic, peaceful, well-governed nation state is a blessing which should not be casually thrown away. That is a strong negative case against change. But there is also a positive argument, to which the campaign against Scottish independence has struggled to give voice: the idea of union.

The United Kingdom embodies the belief that people with distinct histories and identities can live together, and that their diversity makes their culture, their economy and their polity stronger. Tellingly, most members of ethnic minorities describe themselves as British rather than English or Scottish; they instinctively recognise the capacious, liberal identity — one which rests not on narrow nationalism, but on an enlightened concept of nationhood — that the union offers. In a world plagued by ethnic hatred, cultural prejudice and religious violence, that venerable idea should count for more than the real but fleeting disappointments and sense of alienation that the Scots have experienced in recent decades.

If this ideal were undermined by Britain's dissolution, and the country's voice itself were weakened, the *amour propre* of Britons would not be the only victim. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a big noise in the IMF, the G7 and the European Union, Britain can make itself heard in support of values such as human rights, democracy, freedom of speech, the rule of law and clean government that are threatened by the rise of states and ideologies that do not share them. If Scotland were to push off, neither it nor residual Britain would have as much influence as they do today, and the world would be the poorer for it.

Although this newspaper believes that, for all these reasons, the union is worth preserving, we also think it needs changing. As a political expression of liberal values and attitudes, it would be more credible if it were not so centralised. The devolution of powers to Scotland has been a mild extortion racket; and elsewhere the flow has gone to Westminster rather than away from it. But if diverse peoples are to be bound together, they must be given plenty of slack. So instead of trying to buy Scottish votes with more cash, Mr Cameron should devolve far more power to all Britain's cities and regions.

States cannot easily split their way to happiness, and working out how to accommodate differences can improve them. It makes them more tolerant, pluralist and open, and teaches central

governments how to relinquish power. When nations cannot bear to hold together, they must of course separate. But Britain has not reached that point. Scottish nationalists like to say, cheerfully, that their nation is capable of standing on its own. It certainly is. That doesn't mean it should.

Notes

1. **Caledonian** is a geographical term used to refer to places, species, or items in or from Scotland, or particularly the Scottish Highlands. It derives from Caledonia, the Roman name for the area of modern Scotland.
2. **Adam Smith** (16 June 1723 — 17 July 1790) and **David Hume** (26 April 1711 — 25 August 1776) — Scottish philosophers and economists, the key figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. Adam Smith laid the foundations of the classical free market economic theory.
3. **Alexander Elliot Anderson Salmond** (English pronunciation: /'sɑmænd/; born 31 December 1954) is a Scottish politician who served as the fourth First Minister of Scotland from 2007 to 2014. He was the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) for over twenty years, having served for two terms, firstly from 1990 to 2000 and subsequently from 2004 to 2014. Politically, Salmond is one of the foremost proponents of Scottish independence, repeatedly calling for a referendum on the issue. The day after the 2014 independence referendum, at which a majority of the Scottish people voted to remain as part of the United Kingdom, Salmond announced his intention not to stand for re-election as leader of the SNP at the SNP National Conference in November, and to resign as First Minister thereafter. He was succeeded in both capacities by Nicola Sturgeon.
4. **Anthony Charles Lynton Blair** (born 6 May 1953) is a British Labour Party politician and philanthropist. Blair served as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007. He was the Member of Parliament (MP) for Sedgefield from 1983 to 2007 and Leader of the Labour Party from 1994 to 2007. Blair led Labour to a landslide victory in the 1997 general election, winning 418 seats, the most the party has ever held. The party went on to win two more elections under his leadership: in 2001, in which it won another landslide victory, and in 2005, with a reduced majority. In the first years of the New Labour government, Blair's government introduced the National Minimum Wage Act, Human Rights Act and Freedom of Information Act, and carried out devolution, establishing the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly, fulfilling four of the promises in its 1997 manifesto.
5. **James Gordon Brown** (born 20 February 1951) is a British Labour Party politician who was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Leader of the Labour Party from 2007 until 2010. He previously served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Labour Government from 1997 to 2007. Brown has been a Member of Parliament (MP) since 1983, first for Dunfermline East and currently for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath.
 After initial rises in opinion polls following Brown becoming Prime Minister, Labour's popularity declined with the onset of a recession in 2008, leading to poor results in the local and European elections in 2009.
 On 10 May 2010, Brown announced he would stand down as leader of the Labour Party, and instructed the party to put into motion the processes to elect a new leader. On 11 May, he officially resigned as Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party. He was succeeded as Prime Minister by David Cameron, and as Leader of the Labour Party by Ed Miliband.
 Later, Brown played a crucial role in the campaign surrounding the Scottish independence referendum of 2014, galvanizing support behind maintaining the union.

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6. **stockbroker belt** (Human Geography) *Brit* — the area outside a city, esp. London, in which rich commuters (who traditionally vote for the Conservative Party) live
7. **amour propre** — a sense of one's own worth; self-respect, from French 'love of oneself'
8. **extortion racket** — a criminal offense of obtaining money, property, or services from a person, entity, or institution, by use of intimidation or threats (here used metaphorically)

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. *In pairs, discuss how you understand the phrases/clauses below. If still in doubt, discuss the phrases as a class.*

1. ... a 307-year-old union, which once ruled a third of humanity and still serves as a role-model to many;
2. ... it is the nationalists who have fire in their bellies;
3. ... a narrow victory for the status quo;
4. ... Scottish whingeing and freeloading;
5. It is, of course, possible that independence would cure Scotland's entitlement culture and revive its entrepreneurial side.
6. But their statist philosophies are more likely to drive Edinburgh's fund managers, ... and other talented Scots south.
7. Independence would also impose one-off costs ...
8. ... that hardly suggests a Scottish administration straining at a leash held tight by Westminster.
9. The devolution of powers to Scotland has been a mild extortion racket ...
10. ... the flow has gone to Westminster rather than away from it.

B. *Answer the questions on the text.*

1. What are the Scottish nationalists' arguments in support of Scotland's independence?
2. How does the article refute the arguments?
3. Why, according to *the Economist*, is the union worth preserving?
4. In what way should the union be changed?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Do you think the tone of the article is condescending to the Scots? If so, can you prove it?
2. Does the article make a compelling case for retaining the union?
3. Why do you think the Scots voted 'no' to independence from the UK?
4. Do you think the results of the referendum are a missed opportunity for Scotland?

FOLLOW-UP

Make a three-minute statement on

- a) the reforms the UK government will have to carry out after the Scottish referendum OR
- b) the history/feasibility of similar referendums in other countries



Use texts from the Reader, readings that you find yourself, and the video below.

Compile a list of Topical Vocabulary necessary to speak on the issue (to be shared in class).



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 2

Ex. 4. a) find words in the text to match the definitions below, reproduce the context they are used in;

b) give the words they are formed from or their derivatives;

c) suggest their Russian equivalents;

d) use the words in sentences of your own.

1. the act of breaking up an organization, institution, etc. so that it no longer exists
2. a feeling of satisfaction with a situation or with what you have achieved, so that you stop trying to improve or change things — used to show disapproval
3. a feeling of anger or displeasure about someone or something unfair
4. to be more important or valuable than something else
5. difficult to believe and therefore unlikely to be true
6. something that you think is true although you have no definite proof
7. something that limits your freedom to do what you want
8. to prevent someone from having something, especially something that they need or should have
9. to cause pain, suffering, or trouble to someone, especially for a long period of time
10. lasting for only a short time, brief
11. to accept someone's opinions and try to do what they want, especially when their opinions or needs are different from yours
12. to let someone else have your position, power, or rights, especially unwillingly

Ex. 5. Continue the strings of collocations, translate them. Make up a sentence with one collocation from each list.

1. **fleeting:** moment, _____, _____, _____
2. **plagued by:** disease, _____, _____, _____
3. **implausible:** theory, _____, _____, _____
4. **to deprive of:** civil rights, _____, _____, _____
5. **to relinquish:** control, _____, _____, _____
6. political, _____, _____, _____ **constraints**

Ex. 6. Fill in the gaps with the words from Ex. 4 and Ex. 5 or their derivatives.

1. Cambodia is now formally a democracy, but the country is _____ by corruption and poverty.
2. Her Majesty the Queen paid a _____ visit to Heaton Chapel yesterday on her way to opening the new Co-op building in Manchester.
3. We hear that his Lordship possesses no other powers _____ the dispute between Great Britain and the United States than those mentioned in the act of the British Parliament.
4. It is not entirely _____ that George Bernard Shaw's Henry Higgins could identify a speaker's origins within a mile or two, or within a street or two in London.

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5. A Tunisian court has _____ the party of deposed President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, ousted on 14 January.
6. The Constitution placed no religious _____ on the separate states, restricting clearly and specifically the federal Congress from making law on or interfering with religion.
7. The benefits of isolated outdoor smoking areas _____ the negative effects that this kind of controlled smoking would have on the general student population.
8. A year later, South Korea fell into crisis with Asia's other former tiger economies. While Korea's meltdown had myriad causes, it mostly boiled down to _____.
9. In the same year the Webster-Ashburton treaty between Great Britain and the United States was concluded, but England did not thereby _____ her claim of the right to search American vessels.
10. Nearly all of the estimates of «harm» concerning Ed Snowden's actions were based on the faulty _____ that he «took» (and revealed) every document he ever «touched» while at NSA — somewhere around 1.7 million.
11. The PATRIOT Act violates the personal privacy of all American citizens. It has _____ the citizens of this country of some of the basic rights that were promised to them in the Constitution.
12. Forcing young people to vote when they feel such a deep aversion to the political class may actually serve to reinforce a deepening _____, rather than to engage them in a positive manner.

LISTENING 2

David Cameron's Statement on Independence Referendum Result

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ana1J6t0ZII>



PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS

1. Do the constituent parts of the UK have similar rights?
2. What did the Scottish devolution of 1998 consist in?
3. Why did the Scots hold an independence referendum in 2014?

VIEWING

Watch the video and answer the following questions:

1. When did the Scottish national party come to power?
2. Why didn't the British Parliament prevent Scotland from holding a referendum?
3. What is the significance of the referendum results?
4. What promises did the central government have to make to Scotland before the referendum?
5. How does this affect the other parts of the UK? What reforms are to be carried out?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTION

Do you think the Scottish Independence Referendum proves that the British democracy is solid and resilient?

SPEAKING

TERM PRESENTATION

Each student is expected to make a 10-min power point presentation on one of topics studied this term (the UK, the USA, the EU).

If you decide to make one on the UK, choose a politically relevant topic and prepare a presentation. Guidelines are to be found in the Manual.

READING 3

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. How many monarchies are there left in Europe?
2. Why do you think the British retain this form of government?

Look through the text to find out if the reasons you came up with coincide with those cited by the author.

MONARCHY

(From *Acts of Union and Disunion* by Linda Colley. Profile Books LTD, London 2014)

British official language identifies monarchy as the most vital act of union, and as an enduring one. The very name of this state “The United *Kingdom*”, makes clear the centrality of the Crown, and conveys a sense of permanence. The national anthem, too, focuses on the Crown and underlines its endurance.

In his famous commentary on the constitution, the Victoria journalist Walter Bagehot offered a detached, often a sardonic analysis of the monarchy, but he accepted that the institution was a resilient one. Monarchy, Bagehot suggested, benefited from being a relatively easy political system for people to understand. And the appeal of a royal family of the British type was particularly tenacious, he argued, because it virtually guaranteed ‘nice and pretty events’ at regular intervals, and held up a glamorous mirror to emotions and choices that were widely shared and familiar. As we were reminded in July 2013¹ this still holds true.

Yet Bagehot also recognised that it was inappropriate to place too much stress on royal continuities. Privately he believed that support for the monarchy might well decline as access to education in the UK became more widespread, and he speculated that such a falling away of support was likely to happen sooner in Scotland than in England. Whatever you think of this, in one respect Bagehot was right. To understand how and why monarchy mattered here, one needs to look not just at tradition and custom, but also at disjunctions and at change over time.

A patchwork of different kingdoms existed throughout these islands from the early Middle Ages. England became a single kingdom in the tenth century, while a single king was able to control most of Scotland by the thirteenth century. Wales and Ireland, however, were more fragmented and conflict-ridden, experiencing multiple and competing rulers. And although successive English kings tried to conquer the outer zones of the British Isles, it was, in fact, a Scottish king —

¹ Prince George, the son of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and third in line to the throne, was born

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James VI — who finally effected¹ a Union of Crowns, bringing under his single rule in 1603 his own kingdom, Scotland, the kingdoms of Ireland and England, and the principality of Wales.

In the short term the Union of Crowns produced neither royal stability nor unity. In 1643 James's son and successor, Charles I, was executed in public and Britain became briefly a republic. Monarchy returned in 1660; but in 1688 a grandson and namesake of James was driven off the throne to be replaced by a Dutch prince William of Orange and his wife Mary². There was another change of dynasty in 1714, when the English-born Queen Anne died without direct heirs, and was replaced by George of Hanover, a German prince³. As all this suggests, the apparent antiquity of monarchy in these islands masks considerable discontinuities in terms of evolution and the dynasties involved.

At the same time, while monarchy has often functioned as a *national* cement and emblem, it has also served to connect all or sections of these islands with other parts of the world. The British Empire, for instance, pivoted ideologically and organisationally on the monarchy. In legal theory, anyone born in the British monarch's dominions anywhere in the world — regardless of religion, race or ancestry — was potentially a British subject, who owed the monarch allegiance and was owed protection in return. The present Queen's position as head of the Commonwealth is in part a pale survival of this previous system and theory of empire-wide British subjecthood.

The sovereign of the United Kingdom is also Supreme Governor of the Church of England, from the late seventeenth century the monarchy was widely viewed as a guarantor and symbol of the prominent Protestantism of Great Britain as a whole, and of the Protestant supremacy in Ireland. It was because the House of Hanover was a Protestant dynasty that most Britons — though not all — were prepared to accept its import and accession to the British throne in 1714. Moreover, as Britain subsequently increased in power and wealth, it became more common for men and women to view it as a new Israel, a chosen land.

Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the idea that the monarchy was integral to Britain's providential destiny and prosperity ceased to be identified so powerfully with Protestants, and was strengthened by a course of events. In harsh reality the British monarchy was the beneficiary of successive global crises that were almost entirely outside its control. Had the United Kingdom been defeated and/or invaded during the Napoleonic Wars before 1815, or had it been overwhelmed in the First World War or the Second, then monarchy here — as in many other parts of Europe — might well have collapsed or been irredeemably tarnished. As it was, victory in all three of these massive conflicts helped to secure the monarchy's existence, and bestowed⁴ on it a kind of superstitious attraction and charisma.

British monarchs reigning for especially long periods have contributed to political stability, and shaped opinion in another respect. They have helped to conceal from their nominal subjects the full disturbing extent of change, or at least helped them to sustain it. Thus the sheer length of Queen Victoria's reign — from 1837 to 1901 — almost certainly made it easier for some British and even Irish men and women to come to terms with what was then an unparalleled rate of urban, demographic and technological change. Elizabeth II's reign, which commenced in 1952, is almost as long as Victoria's, and she too has served to conceal change by way of her own apparent changelessness. Never in history has a polity given up ruling as many diverse parts of the globe as

¹ To effect (formal) — to cause (something) to happen, bring about

² the sister of James II

³ The German dynasty assumed the English name of Windsor in 1917

⁴ To bestow sth on/upon sb (formal) — to give someone something of great value or importance

rapidly as the United Kingdom has been obliged to do since 1952. Some of its inhabitants, however, may have found this brutal descent from global power easier to bear — and even possible to ignore — because of the present Queen's reassuringly durable reign.

There may be further changes in the future for the monarchy to strive to gloss over. As we have seen, in the past, individual monarchs often ruled over different and distinct kingdoms, and helped to forge connections between them. We may be on the verge of the revival of this system. The First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, has said that if Scottish voters opt for the independence in the 2014 Referendum, he wants the House of Windsor to act as monarchs of Scotland. This would be in tandem with, but distinct from, their role as head of state of the rest of the United Kingdom.

If in the future a member of the House of Windsor does serve as a sovereign of an independent Scotland — while also maintaining his or her state in England, Wales and Northern Ireland — this will merely underline monarchy's capacity to cover over sharp political change and to create a semblance of continuity where little really exists.

Notes

1. **Walter Bagehot** (/ˈbædʒət/ 3 February 1826 — 24 March 1877) was a British journalist, businessman, and essayist, who wrote extensively about government, economics, and literature. In 1867, Bagehot wrote *The English Constitution*, a book that explores the nature of the constitution of the United Kingdom, specifically its Parliament and monarchy. It appeared at the same time that Parliament enacted the Reform Act of 1867, requiring Bagehot to write an extended introduction to the second edition, which appeared in 1872.
2. **James VI and I** (19 June 1566 — 27 March 1625) was King of Scotland as **James VI** from 24 July 1567 and King of England and Ireland as **James I** from the union of the Scottish and English crowns on 24 March 1603 until his death. The kingdoms of Scotland and England were individual sovereign states, with their own parliaments, judiciary, and laws, though both were ruled by James in personal union.
3. **Victoria** (Alexandrina Victoria; 24 May 1819 — 22 January 1901) was Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland from 20 June 1837 until her death. From 1 May 1876, she used the additional title of Empress of India.

Victoria was the daughter of Prince Edward, Duke of Kent and Strathearn, the fourth son of King George III. Both the Duke of Kent and King George III died in 1820, and Victoria was raised under close supervision by her German-born mother Princess Victoria of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld. She inherited the throne at the age of 18, after her father's three elder brothers had all died, leaving no legitimate, surviving children. The United Kingdom was already an established constitutional monarchy, in which the sovereign held relatively little direct political power. Privately, Victoria attempted to influence government policy and ministerial appointments. Publicly, she became a national icon, and was identified with strict standards of personal morality.

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. Read the following statements from the article "Why does the UK love the monarchy" by Mark Easton and "The Royal Family is a Bargain for Britain" by Gerald Warner. Decide which of these correspond to the ideas expressed by Linda Colley.

1. ... we [Britons] retain... affection for a system which appears to be at odds with the meritocratic principles of a modern liberal democracy.

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2. ... the 1950s were ... a period in which the country [UK] was anxious about how global, institutional and social change might threaten its identity.
3. ... the values and traditions which underpinned family and community life were also changing rapidly.
4. Monarchy represented a bulwark against rapid and scary change.
5. As colonial power and the riches of empire declined, there was an increasing desire to define greatness as something other than wealth and territory. Britain wanted to believe it was special.
6. The monarchy is living history, a pageant of our past that remains relevant in the present and will continue to do so in the future. Constitutionally, it is the guarantor of stability ...
7. Although the monarchy undoubtedly represents value for money, its true worth cannot be expressed in financial terms.
8. It [monarchy] is the personification of the [British] nation, the embodiment of the national identity.

B. *Answer the questions on the text.*

1. What, according to Walter Bagehot, made the British monarchy a perfect political system?
2. When, in his opinion, was support for the monarchy likely to decline?
3. Has the monarchy provided continuity and stability throughout the country's history?
4. In what ways did the crown cement the nation before the 19th century?
5. What part did the monarchy play in the evolution of the British Empire?
6. What was the effect of Britain's victory in the major wars of the 19th-20th centuries on the monarchy?
7. In what way have the long-reigning monarchs (Queen Victoria, Elisabeth II) contributed to the political stability in the country?
8. What would have been the significance of the British monarch serving as a sovereign of independent Scotland (should Scotland have become independent)?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Do you agree with the author's opinion that the British monarchy has survived because it has always provided the people with a sense of stability and security?
2. Does the British monarchy have anything else going for it?
3. Do you think it is likely to be abolished in a foreseeable future?

FOLLOW-UP

Make two lists of arguments: one supporting and the other opposing the retention of the monarchy in Great Britain.

Explain which position on the issue you find more persuasive.

Use the text above, texts from the Reader and the video below.

Compile a list of Topical Vocabulary necessary to discuss the issue (to be shared in class).



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 3

Ex. 7. a) find words in the text to match the definitions below, reproduce the context they are used in;

b) give their synonyms;

c) suggest their Russian equivalents;

d) use the words in sentences of your own.

1. able to become strong, happy, or successful again after a difficult situation or event
2. continuing to have a lot of influence for a long time
3. to guess about the possible causes or effects of something, without knowing all the facts or details
4. coming or following one after the other
5. to depend on or be based on one important thing, event, or idea
6. loyalty to a leader, country, belief, etc.
7. after an event in the past
8. forming a necessary part of something
9. to defeat completely and decisively
10. to make or become less valuable or respected (Participle II in the text)
11. unusually large, powerful, or damaging
12. a particular form of political or government organization, or a condition of society in which political organization exists
13. to develop something new, especially a strong relationship with other people, groups, or countries
14. a situation, condition etc. that is close to or similar to a particular one, usually a good one

Ex. 8. Continue the strings of collocations, translate them. Make up a sentence with one collocation from each list.

1. **to forge** a union, _____, _____, _____
2. **tenacious** tradition, _____, _____, _____
3. **successive** governments, _____, _____, _____
4. **to tarnish** reputation, _____, _____, _____
5. **semblance of** democracy, _____, _____, _____
6. **massive** increase, _____, _____, _____

Ex. 9. Fill in the gaps with the words from Ex. 7 and Ex. 8, the words they are formed from or their derivatives.

1. Ronald Reagan's reputation was _____ when the public learned in late 1986 that members of the President's National Security Council staff had engineered an arms sale to Iran.
2. The greatness of our nation rests on our ability _____ a union out of our differences and our ability to respect and value our differences.
3. The success of the anti-vandalism policy _____ on prevention, community engagement, timely detection and reporting.
4. Egypt may have reinstated a _____ of democracy, but that is all. It is likely to be some years yet before its people again enjoy the right to vote and freedom to express their opinions.

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5. A _____ political system is essential for political stability and internal security, which in turn are vital for economic development.
6. For many centuries, humans have _____ that there might be planetary systems around other stars and that there could be extraterrestrial life there.
7. Nelson Mandela's perseverance and _____ fight against oppressive rule led to the eventual liberation of the people of South Africa, and the birth of the Rainbow Nation.
8. The problem with the Egyptian economy, historically, has been the inability of _____ rulers to develop a long term economic strategy.
9. In 1970 a student protest on the campus of Mississippi's Jackson State University led to a _____ confrontation with local police authorities.
10. As a unique _____, Europe contains a certain set of opportunities and constraints for political and economic cooperation.
11. Republican Congressman Steve Scalise was _____ elected to replace outgoing Mr. McCarthy as House majority whip.
12. Heavily outnumbered, the insurgents were _____ by the British army, and the rebellion was crushed within the week.
13. One objection to legal pluralism is that it creates uncertainty: it is not immediately obvious which law applies and some conflicts of law may have to be decided by political means. But pluralism as a general principle is _____ to democracy.
14. Party organizations prefer closed primaries because they promote party unity and keep those with no _____ to the party from influencing its choice.

SPEAKING

DEBATE

Prepare and hold a debate on the chosen topic.

Team work

Decide on the topic (see Appendix), on the roles (the judge, the "for team", "the opposing team", the leader of each team). For guidelines see the Manual. Decide what research you will have to do to win the debate.

Individual work

*Do the research you've been assigned.
Revise the debate format (see the Manual).*

Team work

Final preparation: share the information you've gathered and the statements you've prepared for the debate.

Class work

Debate the issue in class.

LISTENING 3

Price of Royalty

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xx6mTakGbfA>



VOCABULARY

1. **Revenue** — the income of a government from taxation and other sources, appropriated for public expenses.
2. **Austerity** — an economic policy by which a government reduces the amount of money it spends by a large amount.
3. **Spin** (in public relations) is a form of propaganda, achieved through providing an interpretation of an event or campaign to persuade public opinion in favor or against a certain organization or public figure.

PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS

1. Do you think the British monarchy is a profitable institution?
2. Who covers the expenses of the Royal family?

VIEWING

Watch the video and do the assignments that follow:

a) correct the wrong statements.

1. Over 90 per cent of Brits believe the Royal family brings in a lot of money via tourism.
2. According to the UK's national tourism agency, the annual revenue from monarchy-related tourism is 500 million pounds.
3. Republicans claim the monarchy costs Great Britain 30 million pounds annually.
4. The support for monarchy in Great Britain has risen by 20% since 2006.
5. Four million pounds was spent on renovating a house for Prince William.
6. The head of state in the Republic of Ireland costs the country half as much as the Royal family costs the British.

b) answer the questions.

1. Why is the figure for the official expenditure of the Royal family lower than the actual expenses?
2. Do the costs of maintaining the Royal family affect people's attitude to the monarchy?
3. Apart from expenses, what other argument against monarchy do Republicans provide (in the video-clip)?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Can you come up with any other arguments against preserving the monarchy?
2. What are the most common arguments for retaining the monarchy in Great Britain?
3. Which arguments are more compelling, in your view?



INTEGRATING CORE SKILLS



PROJECT WORK

“UK — RUSSIA RELATIONS: THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE.”

Team work

Form a team, choose the leader. Discuss with the rest of your group what particular aspect of UK-Russia relations (episodes that had a serious impact on the relations, either positive or negative; crucial moments in history; factors that unite or separate the two countries, future prospects) you are going to focus on.

Individual work

Do your part of the research; prepare to share the data with the rest of the team.

Team work

Pool your findings and prepare a power point presentation of the results of team research and conclusions for the rest of the class.

Class work

Present the results of the research.

VOCABULARY AND GRAMMAR REVISION

Ex. 10. Fill in the gaps with prepositions if necessary.

1. First Year academic advising is integral _____ the success of every student who enters the university.
2. If the legislation is not passed, the government is likely to impose economic constraints _____ those hospitals that do not comply with its policies.
3. With their state sovereignty impaired and their social wealth plundered or destroyed, the Chinese people were deprived _____ the basic conditions for survival.
4. The balance pivots _____ the support of three Senate Republicans and several centrist Democrats who hashed out the Senate bill late last week.
5. The Yuan Dynasty, founded by the nomadic Mongolians, was the shortest of all of China's dynasties and eventually relinquished its land _____ farming peoples.
6. Anecdotal evidence, especially from the media, suggests that the host population (in New Zealand) is not willing to accommodate _____ the cultural differences of immigrants.
7. Members of both Houses of Parliament are required by law to take an oath of allegiance _____ the Crown before they take their seats in Parliament.
8. The devolution of power _____ Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has allowed them to determine their own political and economic priorities.
9. The US Army's harsh crackdown on media criticizing Washington's policies is reminiscent _____ Nazi Germany's secret police Gestapo, an analyst writes for Press TV.
10. Renoir's works were infused _____ much colour and light, reflecting life around him.
11. Poverty and income inequality are deeply embedded _____ the structure of its society and the country is characterized by weak government and political instability.

12. The disenchantment of young people _____ politics results in massive democratic deficits in all aspects of life.

Ex. 11. Fill in the gaps with suitable words.

Today, Britain is a very different country than it was in 1) _____ 1970s. It is more comfortable and much more tolerant 2) _____ different personal lifestyles, even as it is less tolerant 3) _____ extreme political views. 4) _____ all, it is vastly more prosperous. It is true that the 5) _____ of the current economic crisis are far-reaching and serious: many people who considered themselves comfortably 6) _____ have found that their 7) _____ of living is increasingly hard to sustain. The squeeze on living costs is 8) _____ felt by a large 9) _____ of the population. At the 10) _____ time, the disproportionate rewards being enjoyed by those at the very top are 11) _____ more visible and more pronounced than ever. This is a 12) _____ more unequal society than it was 40 years ago. Nonetheless, all this is happening from what is by any historic standards a very high base of material security.

There is extensive historical 13) _____ that once they pass beyond a certain level of material prosperity democratic societies are very 14) _____ to experiment with alternative forms of government. The costs of the disruption are not 15) _____ any possible reward.

Ex. 12. Translate into English using Active Vocabulary.



1. Эта ситуация **напоминает** день, который навсегда **врезался** в мою память.
2. Плюрализм является **неотъемлемым** принципом демократии, в противном случае это только **подобие** демократии.
3. Если политик не способен **чётко формулировать** свои взгляды, то это **посредственный** политик, чьи успехи будут **минимальны**.
4. **Самодовольство** британских политиков привело к **бросающемуся в глаза разочарованию** молодых британцев в политике, которое проявляется в их нежелании участвовать в выборах.
5. Некоторые историки считают, что британское владычество **вселило** в покоренные народы, **лишенные** элементарных прав, **чувство негодования и обиды**, которое не прошло до сих пор. Другие полагают, что, несмотря на то, что репутация (record) Британской империи не является **безупречной (незапятнанной)**, британское правление **принесло** бывшим колониям **больше пользы**, чем вреда.
6. Европейцам удалось **создать** новую форму **государственного устройства**, при которой государства **отдают** часть суверенитета наднациональным (supranational) институтам. В последнее время стало ясно, что этот союз не такой **прочный**, как казалось раньше.
7. Ежегодно британские войска **подавляли происходившие одно за другим массовые** восстания в разных частях империи.
8. Сторонники республиканской формы правления в Великобритании считают, что **преданность** короне иррациональна и **держится на** ностальгии и привычке.
9. **Предположение**, что шотландцы могут проголосовать за независимость, еще недавно казалось **невероятным**.
10. Нигерия, где **свируется** лихорадка Эбола (the Ebola Virus Disease — EVD), **занимает** 110 место в Глобальном индексе инноваций, рейтинге стран мира по показателю уровня развития передовых технологий.

Ex. 13. Complete the second sentence so that it has a similar meaning to the first sentence, using the word(s) given. Do not change the word(s) given.

1. He's a writer, but he often makes spelling mistakes. (**BEING**)
In _____ a writer, he often makes spelling mistakes.
2. However hard Matt tried, he didn't succeed. (**MATTER**)
Matt didn't succeed _____ he tried.
3. Tom didn't feel like going out. (**MOOD**)
Tom _____ out.
4. Harry is taking his camera on holiday. He might want to take some photos of wildlife. (**CASE**)
Harry is taking his camera on holiday _____ to take some photos of wildlife.
5. The plot was complicated, but I enjoyed the film a lot. (**THOUGH**)
Complicated _____, I enjoyed the film a lot.
6. Sam bought a computer as he intended to work from home. (**VIEW**)
Sam bought a computer _____ from home.
7. Sophie was a demanding boss because she was such a perfectionist. (**BEING**)
_____ was a demanding boss.
8. It was stupid of the government to try to break the strike. (**SHOULD**)
The government _____ to break the strike.
9. In the USA only a few people have heard of our products. (**ENTIRELY**)
Our products are _____ in the USA.
10. Refunds cannot be given under any circumstances. (**NO**)
Under _____ be given.
11. It's my parents' twenty-fifth wedding anniversary next Saturday. (**MARRIED**)
My parents _____ next Saturday.
12. Phil claimed that he had no involvement in the pensions scam. (**DENIED**)
Phil _____ in the pensions scam.

EAP CORNER

BRUSHING UP READING SKILLS

TASK 1

Scan the text to find the words in italics. Why do you think these words are italicized?

TASK 2

Read the article more thoroughly. Add more key words to the list below. Compare your list with that of your partner.

Key words: empire, decline, fall...

History in Retrospect

Historians have usually been kind to the British decision to wind down their empire without protracted resistance and often contrasted it with the 'dirty' wars waged by the French in Indochina and Algeria. A pervasive historical myth (enthusiastically endorsed in political memoirs) suggests that the British excelled in the practice of 'managed decline': the pragmatic adjustment of imperial ambition to shrinking resources. It was certainly true that they were extremely reluctant to resist mass political movements, whether in India after 1945 or in Africa after 1959. But they were much less unwilling to use military force where the odds were more promising and the incentives were greater: as in Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya. Nor was it true that British leaders quickly adjusted their vision of Britain's place in the world to its reduced physical power and economic potential. The reverse was the case for much of the time. The supposed apostle of pragmatism, Harold Macmillan, was anything but. His grandiose scheme for preserving British world power betrayed a flawed understanding of European politics and (much more understandably) almost no comprehension of the complex realities of African politics. []

In fact, the long series of 'misjudgements' — the false hopes of India, the false expectations in Africa, the vision of Britain as the third world power, the economic grand strategy built around the survival of sterling, the struggle to keep the Middle East *imperium* (the real cause of Suez*), the dream of an enduring but somehow inexpensive world role ('Britain's frontiers are on the Himalayas') — reveal something more interesting than the wisdom of hindsight. They suggest that *predicting* historical change is a hazardous business: there are too many factors at play and far too much noise to decode the correct signals. They remind us especially that empires rarely decline at a predictable speed and even more rarely along a predicted path. The Ottoman Empire, to take an example at random, suffered a long series of setbacks from the mid seventeenth century. It was widely despised as the 'sick man of Europe'. Yet it only broke up after 1918 at the end of an arduous military struggle against two of the world's greatest powers. The second example is even more salutary. Less than a decade before its sudden collapse, the Soviet Empire was regarded as an impregnable power and immune from the strains that dented American confidence in the aftermath of Vietnam. Its fall astonished the world. So it was hardly surprising that British leaders did not predict Britain's future correctly.

The final thought that might strike us is that *explaining* why empires collapse is often no easier than predicting their fall. Perhaps the most straightforward cases arise from defeat on the battle-

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field — although explaining defeat may be part of the problem. The cases most often invoked fall into four groups: external defeat or geopolitical weakness; ideological contagion (зараза, заразная болезнь) and the loss of legitimacy; domestic enfeeblement at the centre of the empire — the loss of political will and economic capacity; and colonial revolt. Although it is sometimes attractive to see one cause as decisive (thus nationalists usually favour the effects of revolt), this rarely convinces — and certainly not in a large complex empire like that of the British. It might be better to see the break-up of empires as a kind of unraveling, in which failure in one sector sets up intolerable strains in others parts of the system. Adjusting to these creates further unpredictable stresses, until the whole system breaks up or is absorbed piecemeal (по частям) into a stronger successor. The argument in this book is that in the case of the British the long fuse was lit by their great geostrategic defeats of 1939–1942. Thereafter the whole balance of their system was badly upset, its legitimacy corroded, and the terms of collaboration with their clients and subjects decisively (if not immediately) altered. After 1945, British leaders struggled in vain to correct the imbalance, not least the fatal imbalance that shifted the burdens of empire so much more on to Britain itself. They planned to relieve the main stresses by conceding self-government and sometimes independence while preserving a prime influence in the old zones of rule. They were heartened by signs that their efforts were working and misled by the caution of their opponents and rivals. Until 1960, it was still possible to think that much of the fabric (in its most decentralized form) would still hold together. The threads had been loosened, not finally severed. But with one final tug (of economic and geopolitical change) all the connections were broken and the whole fell to pieces. It only remained to re-imagine the future — and invent a new past. (782 words)

/from Unfinished Empire by John Darwin. Penguin Books. London. 2012/

Notes:

1. **Harold Macmillan** — a British politician in the Conservative Party, Prime Minister from 1957–1963.
2. **Suez** — the Suez crisis — an invasion of Egypt in late 1956 by Israel followed by Britain and France. The aims were to regain Western control of the Suez Canal and to remove Egyptian President Nasser from power.
3. **'Britain's frontiers are on the Himalayas'** — Harold Wilson's statement (1965) meant to support India against China. **Harold Wilson** is a British Labour Party politician, Prime Minister from 1964–1970, 1974–76.

WRITING A SUMMARY: COMPRESSING AND PARAPHRASING

TASK 1

Look through the text again and separate important (underline) from unimportant (cross out) information. Start with crossing out the information in brackets and that introduced by 'for example', etc. phrases. Put the parts you do not understand within [] and find out what they mean.

The beginning of the text is done for you.

Historians have usually been kind to the British decision to wind down their empire without protracted resistance and often contrasted it with the 'dirty' wars waged by the French in Indochina and Algeria. A pervasive historical myth (enthusiastically endorsed in political memoirs) suggests that the British excelled in the practice of 'managed decline': the pragmatic adjustment of

imperial ambition to shrinking resources. It was certainly true that they were extremely reluctant to resist mass political movements, ~~whether in India after 1945 or in Africa after 1959~~. But they were much less unwilling to use military force where [the odds were more promising?] and the incentives were greater: as in Malaya, Cyprus and Kenya.
[the odds were more promising?] — there were better chances of success

TASK 2

Write down the main ideas of the text; make sure there is no repetition. Compare the list with that of you partner.

TASK 3

Paraphrase using different techniques:

a) suggest synonyms for the following

fall shrinking to excel: reluctant incentive to reveal	defeat, loss of power, dramatic decline	hazardous enfeeblement to severe to alter decisive tug	
---	---	---	--

b) change the word class

Noun to Verb		Verb to Noun	
adjustment comprehension misjudgement comprehension expectation		to suggest to reveal to predict to explain to corrode	

c) paraphrase the sentences and phrases

1. His (Harold Macmillan's) grandiose scheme for preserving British world power betrayed a flawed understanding of European politics and almost no comprehension of the complex realities of African politics.
2. Predicting historical change is a hazardous business: there are too many factors at play and far too much noise to decode the correct signals.
3. ...the long fuse was lit by their great geostrategic defeats of 1939–1942.
4. It might be better to see the break-up of empires as a kind of unraveling, in which failure in one sector sets up intolerable strains in others parts of the system.
5. Adjusting to these (strains) creates further unpredictable stresses, until the whole system breaks up or is absorbed piecemeal (по частям) into a stronger successor.
6. ...to relieve the main stresses by conceding self-government and sometimes independence while preserving a prime influence in the old zones of rule.

TASK 4

Write a descriptive summary (~250–300 words) of this extract from the book ‘Unfinished Empire’ by John Darwin. You are expected to refer to the author but not too often!

Peer reading

Read a classmate’s summary and suggest corrections if necessary. Start with the questions below.

1. Does the summary accurately represent the author’s ideas and key points (the author’s emphasis)?
2. Is it written in the writer’s OWN words? Are quotation marks used if the author is quoted?
3. Are any minor details or new (not the author’s!) ideas included?
4. Is it the right length?

Pay attention to style, grammar, spelling, and punctuation.

DEVELOPING LISTENING SKILLS

Listening for general understanding, for specific information and emotional charge.

Watch the video “Magna Carta and the Emergence of Parliament” (Stories from Parliament) and do the tasks below.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qj2vpp9Wf4>

PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS:

1. What do you know about Magna Carta?
2. Do you know the meaning of these words:
a rebel, a traitor, to seize (land, control), parchment, futile?

TASK 1

Listen for the main ideas: read the questions below before you start, then answer them.

1. What conflict arose in England in 1215 and what was its cause?
2. Who were the participants in the conflict?
3. What demands did the rebels make?
4. What is the greatest significance of Magna Carta?

TASK 2

Listen for specific information in order to answer the questions below.

1. When was Magna Carta signed?
2. How many rules did it contain?
3. How many rules did King John agree to publicly in the film?
4. Which of the rules did he agree to (choose from the list below)?

1	Any punishment must fit the crime	
2	A committee of 25 barons that could meet and overrule the King if they believed he defied the Charter	

3	No free man can be seized or imprisoned without charges	
4	Only adult heirs must pay the inheritance tax	
5	Taxes can't be raised without the barons' consent	
6	You couldn't be forced to build bridges	
7	Every man has the right to a fair trial	
8	The king can't force a widow to marry against her wish	

TASK 3

Watch and listen to identify emotions.

1. What feeling do the rebels demonstrate at their first meeting? Second (with the Bishop of Canterbury)?
2. Who do you think was the leader of the rebels? Can you identify him by his manner of speaking?
3. What emotions did King John feel when he first heard of the rebels approaching London? When he was signing the Charter?

DEVELOPING LOGICAL THINKING SKILLS

Logical thinking (LT) is an intellectual skill which is equally vital for both a speaker and a writer who aim to present a convincing case for their opinion. Flaws in LT can seriously weaken one's position in a debate or in a piece of writing, so it's time to have a closer look at what they are and how to avoid them.

TASK 1

Read the extract from the book 'Plato and a Platypus Walk into a Bar. Understanding philosophy through jokes' by Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klein (chapter "Logic"). What are the main tools of logical thinking according to the authors?

Inductive logic reasons from particular instances to general theories. [...] If you observe enough apples falling from trees, you will conclude that apples always fall down, instead of up or sideways. You might then form a more general hypothesis that includes other falling bodies, like pears. This is the progress of science.

In the annals of literature, no character is as renowned for his powers of "deduction" as the intrepid Sherlock Holmes, but the way Holmes operates is not generally by using deductive logic at all. He really uses inductive logic. First, he carefully observes the situation, then he generalizes from his prior experience, using analogy and probability, as he does in the following story:

Holmes and Watson are on a camping trip in the middle of the night. Holmes wakes up and gives Dr. Watson a nudge.

"Watson," he says, "look up in the sky and tell me what you see."

"I see millions of stars, Holmes," says Watson.

"And what do you conclude from that, Watson?"

Watson thinks for a moment. “Well,” he says,
“Astronomically, it tells me that there are millions of galaxies and potentially billions of planets. Astrologically, I observe that Saturn is in Leo. Horologically, I deduce that the time is approximately a quarter past three. Meteorologically, I suspect that we will have a beautiful day tomorrow. Theologically, I see that God is all-powers, and we are small and insignificant. Uh, what does it tell you, Holmes?”
“Watson, you idiot! Someone has stolen out tent!”

We don't know exactly how Holmes arrived at his conclusion, but perhaps it was something like this:

1. I went to sleep in a tent, but now I can see the stars.
2. My intuitive working hypothesis, based on analogies to similar experiences I have had in the past, is that someone has stolen our tent.
3. In testing that hypothesis, let's rule out alternative hypotheses:
 - a. Perhaps the tent is still here, but someone is projecting a picture of stars on the roof of the tent. This is unlikely, based on my experience of human behavior and the equipment that experience tells me would have to be present in the tent obviously isn't.
 - b. Perhaps the tent blew away. This is unlikely, as my past experiences lead me to conclude that that amount of wind would have awakened me, though perhaps not Watson.
 - c. Etc., etc., etc.
4. No, I think my original hypothesis is probably correct. Someone has stolen our tent.

Induction. All these years we've been calling Holmes's skill by the wrong term.

Deductive logic reasons from the general to the particular. The bare-bones deductive argument is the syllogism “All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.” It is amazing how often people screw it up and argue something like, “All man are mortal; Socrates is mortal; therefore Socrates is a man,” which doesn't logically follow. This would be like saying, “All men are mortal; my kid's hamster is mortal; therefore, my kid's hamster is a man.”

There is nothing like an argument from analogy. [...] Some have argued that because the universe is like a clock, there must be a Clockmaker. [...] this is a slippery argument, because there is nothing that is really perfectly analogous to the universe as a whole, unless it is another universe, so we shouldn't try to pass off anything that is just a part of *this* universe. Why a clock anyhow? Why not say the universe is analogous to a kangaroo? After all, both are organically interconnected systems. But the kangaroo analogy would lead to a very different conclusion about the origin of the universe: namely, that it was born of another universe after that universe had sex with a third universe. A fundamental problem with arguments from analogy is the assumption that, because some aspects of A are similar to B, other aspects of A are similar to B. It isn't necessarily so.

Another problem with arguments from analogy is that you get totally different analogies from different points of view.

Three engineering students are discussing what sort of God must have designed the human body. The first says, “God must be a mechanical engineer. Look at all the joints.”

The second says, "I think God must be an electrical engineer. The nervous system has thousands of electrical connections."

The third says, "Actually, God is a civil engineer. Who else would run a toxic waste pipeline through a recreational area?"

TASK 2

Read another extract from this book; focus on logical fallacies.

The "Post Ergo Propter Hoc" Fallacy

/"After this, therefore because of this"/

The phrase describes the error of assuming that because one thing *follows* another, that thing *was caused* by the other. For obvious reasons, this false logic is popular in sociopolitical discourse, such as "Most people hooked on heroin started with marijuana." True, but even more started with milk. Post hoc makes life more entertaining in some cultures: "the sun rises when the rooster crows, so the rooster's crowing makes the sun rise." Thanks, rooster! Or take our colleague:

Every morning she steps out onto her front stoop and exclaims, "Let this house be safe from tigers!" then she goes inside.

Finally we said to her, "What's that all about? There isn't a tiger within a thousand miles from here."

And she said, "You see? It works!"

In general we are deceived by this fallacy because we fail to see there's another cause at work.

Circular Argument

Circular argument is an argument in which the evidence for a proposition contains the proposition itself. []

It was autumn, and the Indians on the reservation asked their new chief if it was going to be a cold winter. Raised in the ways of the modern world, the chief had never been taught the old secrets and had no way of knowing whether the winter would be cold or mild. To be on the safe side, he advised the tribe to collect wood and be prepared for a cold winter. A few days later, as a practical afterthought, he called the national Weather Service and asked whether they were forecasting a cold winter. The meteorologist replied that, indeed, he thought the winter would be quite cold. The chief advised the tribe to stock even more wood.

A couple of weeks later the chief checked in again with the Weather Service. "Does it still look like a cold winter?" asked the chief.

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“It sure does,” replied the meteorologist. “It looks like a very cold winter.” The chief advised the tribe to gather every scrap of wood they could find.

A couple of weeks later, the chief called the Weather Service again and asked how the winter was looking at that point. The meteorologists said, “We’re now forecasting that it will be one of the coldest winters on record!”

“Really!” said the chief. “How can you be so sure?”

The meteorologist replied, “The Indians are collecting wood like crazy!”

The chief’s evidence for the need to stock more wood turns out to be that he was stocking more wood. Fortunately, he was using a circular saw.

Argument from Respect for Authority Fallacy

The argument from respect for authority is one of our boss’s favorite arguments. Citing authority to support your argument is no logical fallacy in and of itself; expert opinion is legitimate evidence alongside other evidence. What **is** fallacy is using respect for authority as the sole confirmation of your position, despite convincing evidence to the contrary.

Ted meets his friend Al and exclaims, “Al! I heard you died!”

“Hardly,” says Al, laughing, “As you can see I am very much alive.”

“Impossible,” says Ted. “The man who told me is much more reliable than you.”

What is always at play with arguments from authority is whom one accepts as a legitimate authority.

A man walks into a pet shop and asks to see the parrots.

The shop owner shows him the two beautiful ones out on the floor. “This one is \$5,000 and the other is \$10,000,” he says.

“Wow!” says the man. “What does the \$5,000 one do?”

“This parrot can sing every aria Mozart wrote,” says the store owner.

“And the other?”

... “He sings entire Wagner’s Ring cycle. There is another one out back for \$30,000.”

“Holy moley! What does he do?”

“Nothing that I’ve heard. But the other two call him ‘Maestro’”

*/from Plato and a Platypus² Walk into a Bar. Understanding philosophy through jokes’
by Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klein. Penguin Books. London. 2008/*

¹ Expression of surprise

² утконос

TASK 3

Make a list of logical tools to be applied and of logical fallacies to be avoided.

Logical tools (1)	Logical fallacies (2)

TASK 4

Read the sentences below and check them against the list above. Point out logical tools and logical fallacies.

1. Monarchy is the best form of government for Great Britain because Great Britain has always been a monarchy.
2. Monarchy is one of the oldest forms of government, which has become obsolete in most European countries. However, the British monarchy has survived and continually kept its position. Hence, the British monarchy has a greater capacity for adjustment.
3. Obama is a good communicator because he speaks effectively.
4. All empires eventually collapsed. The USA is an empire; therefore, it is certain to collapse, too.
5. In 2008 America elected their first non-white president. Given that black Americans were granted the right to vote before American women did, it appears natural to expect Hilary Clinton to win the next elections.
6. I can't call abstract painting art. Small wonder Nikita Khrushchev said it was sheer daubery.
7. The Bank of Russia let the ruble's exchange rate float freely and oil prices went down.
8. If drug trafficking were not illegal, then it would not be prohibited by the law.
9. When President Obama finally got his healthcare bill approved by Congress, the latter became predominately Republican.
10. Viability of a form of government depends on its capacity for change. If a government is capable of adapting to change it can outlive other forms. Monarchy is one of the oldest forms of government. The British monarchy has survived due to its adjustability to change. Therefore, the British monarchy is a viable form of government.
11. Fiscal austerity initiated by the Government in 2010 has produced recovery of the British economy.
12. If you ask your children what personal computer they're using, chances are they'll say an Apple II, which is a sound reason to think it is the leading computer in education.
13. It (Québec's referendum in 1995) is like parents getting a divorce, and maybe the parent you don't like getting custody.
14. According to leading experts, the stalemate can last indefinitely.
15. According to former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger Russian President Vladimir Putin should not be viewed as a new Hitler; every senior Russian that he ever met, including dissidents like Solzhenitsyn and Brodsky, looked at Ukraine as part of the Russian heritage.

There are more fallacies to learn about in Unit 2

WRITING AN ESSAY

Useful tips on how to write an effective essay are given in the Manual.

This unit offers practice in writing logical arguments in support of one's thesis statement.

TASK 1

Topic: The future of the British Monarchy

Thesis statement: Great Britain is most likely to retain the monarchy.

To develop the statement logically and convincingly, answer the question:

Why will the British keep the monarchy?

Look through the list of reasons below and choose those you think are most sound and powerful. Share your ideas with your partner.

1. Britain has been a monarchy for centuries, only for a short while becoming a republic under Cromwell.
2. The British zealously preserve their traditions, be it Christmas pudding or afternoon tea. Having a monarch at the head of the state is one of them.
3. Monarchy gives a sense of continuity and security in the ever changing world.
4. The British monarch has a purely decorative function and thus does not contradict the democratic principles of government in Great Britain.
5. The British monarch is impartial, does not support any political party, hence, can give advice to whoever is head of the state at the moment.
6. Britain without a monarch will lose most of its attractiveness for tourists who bring millions to the country's budget.
7. The British monarch works endlessly as an ambassador and representative of the country.
8. The Crown consolidates the nation and strengthens the unity of the UK.

You are welcome to add more to this list!

TASK 2

Develop the reasons you've chosen into 'full bodied' arguments.

To make sure the reasons you have chosen can be developed into solid arguments answer the questions:

1. Is the age of either a form of governance or of a leader a sure sign of efficiency and effectiveness?
2. In what way does following traditions protect a country (in this case Great Britain) from calamities? ¹ ?
3. How well do democratic principles coexist with monarchy? Does this combination work out for Great Britain?
4. Does the British monarch contribute to world peace and unity of nations (at least members of the former empire)?

¹ беды

5. Why should monarchy make a country (in this case Great Britain) more attractive to tourists?
6. Is the British monarch perceived by the Britons as 'the father/mother of the whole nation'?
7. Do the British respect the monarch as a symbol or as a particular individual on the throne at a particular moment in the country's history?
8. In what way can the British monarch 'shelter' the people from disturbing changes within the kingdom or the world at large?
9. Can you think of good analogies to prove that the British monarchy does have a future?
10. What facts and statistics can you provide to prove the reasons are valid? (e.g. find out how much the monarch costs the nation and how much she/he brings to the treasury).

TASK 3

Write down three solid arguments that you managed to develop with logical and factual support.

TASK 4

Write an essay on the topic 'The future of the British Monarchy'. Consult the Manual ('Writing an essay' section).

UNIT II

**US:
FROM DEMOCRACY
TO EMPIRE?**

THE ROAD MAP FOR UNIT II

INTEGRATING CORE SKILLS

PROJECT WORK

Compiling the Reader (for details see p. p. 79–80)

Stage 1



Finding articles on the issues raised in Unit 2 to be included in the Reader

Stage 2



Writing an abstract of the article chosen to present for peer reviewing

Stage 3



*Writing a review of an article for the class to choose
the best three for inclusion in the Reader*

SPEAKING

DEBATE: TRADING PLACES

Holding a debate on a politically relevant topic (for details see p. 78)

TERM PRESENTATION

*Making a power point presentation based on one's analysis
of an issue relevant to the topic "US: From Democracy to Empire?"
(for details see p. 70)*

LEAD-IN

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. Can you explain the difference between the notions “formal empire” (the Roman model) and “informal empire” (the Athens model)? Which of them is appropriate for the modern world?
2. Is the United States, in your view, an empire? Give your reasoning.

Read the text and find the author’s arguments in support of the idea that the US is an empire. Do you find the arguments convincing?

HEIR TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE

(Based on Conclusion Chapter from *Empire. How Britain Made the Modern World* by Niall Ferguson. Penguin books LTD, London, 2004)

What **lessons** can the United States today draw from the British experience of empire? The obvious one is that **the most successful economy in the world** — as Britain was for the most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries — can do a very great deal to **impose its preferred values on less technologically advanced societies**. It is nothing short of astonishing that Great Britain was able to govern so much of the world without running up an especially large defence bill. To be precise, Britain’s defence expenditure averaged little more than three per cent of net national product between 1870 and 1913, and it was lower for the rest of the nineteenth century. This was money well spent. In theory **open international markets would have been preferable to imperialism**; but in **practice global free trade** was not and is not naturally occurring. The British Empire **enforced** it.

By comparison, the United States today is vastly wealthier relative to the rest of the world than Britain ever was. In 1913 Britain’s share of the world output was eight per cent; the equivalent figure for the US in 1998 was 22 per cent. Nor should anyone pretend, at least in fiscal terms, that the cost of expanding the American Empire, even if it were to mean a great many small wars like the one in Afghanistan, would be prohibitive. [...] Even after big cuts in military expenditure, the **United States is still the world’s only superpower**, with an **unrivalled financial and military-technological capability**. Its defence budget is fourteen times that of China and twenty-two times that of Russia. Britain never enjoyed such a lead over her imperial rivals.

The hypothesis, in other words, is a step in the direction of **political globalization**, with the United States **shifting from informal to formal empire** much as late Victorian Britain once did. That is certainly what we should expect if history does repeat itself. [...] The British Empire began as a network of **coastal bases and informal spheres of influence**, much like the post-1945 American ‘empire’. But real and perceived threats to their commercial interests constantly tempted the British to progress from **informal to formal imperialism**. That was how so much of the atlas came to be coloured imperial red.

No one could deny the **extent of the American informal empire** — the empire of multinational corporations, of Hollywood movies and even of TV evangelists. Is this so very different from the early British Empire of monopoly trading companies and missionaries? Nor is it any coincidence that a map showing the principal US military bases around the world looks remarkably like a map of Royal Navy coaling stations¹ a hundred years ago. Even **recent American foreign policy recalls**

¹ **Coaling stations** (fuelling stations) are repositories of fuel (coal & later oil) that have been located to service commercial and naval vessels.

■ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

the gunboat diplomacy¹ of the British Empire in its Victorian heyday², when a little trouble on the periphery could be dealt with by a short sharp “surgical strike”. The only difference is that today’s gunboats fly.

Yet in three respects the process of “Anglobalization” is fundamentally different today. On close inspection, American strengths may not be the strengths of a natural imperial hegemon. For one thing, the British imperial power relied on the massive export of capital and people. But since 1972 the American industry has been a net importer of capital (five per cent of gross domestic product in 2002) and it remains the favoured destination of immigrants from around the world, not a producer of would-be colonial emigrants. Britain in its heyday was able to draw on a culture of unabashed imperialism which dates back to the Elizabethan period, whereas the US — born not in a war against slavery [...], but in a war against the British Empire — will always be a reluctant ruler of other people. Since Woodrow Wilson’s intervention to restore the elected government in Mexico in 1913, the American approach has been to fire some shells, march in, hold elections and then get the hell out — until the next crisis. Haiti is one recent example, Kosovo another. Afghanistan may yet prove to be the next, or perhaps Iraq.

[...] The Empire that rules the world today is both more and less than its British begetter (прародитель). It has a much bigger economy, many more people, a much larger arsenal. But it is an empire that lacks the drive to export its capital, its people and its culture to those backward regions which need them most urgently and which, if they are neglected, will breed the greatest threats to its security. It is an empire, in short, that dare not speak its name. It is an empire in denial.

The American Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously said that Britain had lost an empire but failed to find a role. Perhaps the reality is that the Americans have taken our (British) old role without yet facing the fact that an empire comes with it. The technology of overseas rule may have changed — the Dreadnoughts may have given way to F-158. But like it or not, empire is as much a reality today as it was throughout the three hundred years when Britain ruled, and made the modern world.

LISTENING 1

What are American Values?

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9pkYyzkJhM>

VOCABULARY

1. **To pull oneself up by one’s bootstraps** — to improve your position and get out of a difficult situation by your own efforts, without help from other people
2. **To hold sway** (literary) — to rule or influence people
3. **To weight** — to change something slightly so that you give more importance to particular ideas or people

¹ **Gunboat diplomacy** — diplomacy conducted by threats of military intervention, especially by a major power against a militarily weak state (дипломатия канонерок)

² **Heyday** — the period of greatest popularity, success, or power; prime.

PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS

1. Do you think Americans have their own unique values different from any other nation? If so, what are they?
2. If your answer to the first question is positive, how can you explain the fact that American values differ from those of other democratic countries?

VIEWING

Watch the video and answer the following questions:

1. What universal values do the students mention when asked about the values of the American society?
2. Which of the values they name are unique to the United States?
3. There was a note of criticism in one of the comments. What exactly did the student say?
4. One of the students names a value and comments on its downside. What is the value and what is its negative side?
5. Is there a negative side to any of the other values cited by the students?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTION

How do you think the values mentioned in the video affect the American society?

READING 1

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. How do you understand the term the “American dream”?
2. What basic values underpin the American dream?
3. Is there a downside to these values?

Scan the text to find out whether your opinion coincides with that of the author.

THE VICES OF OUR VIRTUES

*The American Creed¹ is what makes us great as a nation —
and also what fosters some big problems*

By Robert J. Samuelson

March 11, 1996 — *Newsweek*

<http://www.newsweek.com/vices-our-virtues-175908>

I am proud to be an American; most of us are. Our patriotism is fierce, if often quiet. A recent Gallup poll asked respondents in 16 countries whether they would like to live elsewhere. Americans finished almost last. Only about 11 percent of us would move. By contrast, 38 percent of Britons, 30 percent of Germans, 20 percent of Japanese and 19 percent of Canadians would. Why, then, are

¹ Creed — a summary of articles of religious beliefs, any system of beliefs or principles.

we so mad at our leaders and society? One neglected answer is this: America's glories and evils are tightly fused together.

The things that we **venerate** about America — its respect for the individual, its opportunity, its economic vitality, its passion for progress — also **breed** conditions that we despise: crime, family breakdown, inequality, cynicism, vulgarity and stress, to name a few. Naturally optimistic, Americans reject any connection between our virtues and vices. We refuse to see, as sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset argues in an important new book, that “seemingly contradictory aspects of . . . society are intimately related.”¹

But they are, and in an election year, the relationship is highly **relevant**. Only by **grasping** it can we keep our perspective on the campaign's inevitable excesses. Already, we are **deluged** with **anguished** analyses of our faults and vast schemes for self-improvement. Both exaggerate our problems and our capacity to cure them; some national conditions aren't easily changed.

The American Creed — our **distinct** set of values — **blends** freedom, individualism and egalitarianism. This mix has fired economic advance. Why do we lead the world in computers? The answer is mostly culture. We love to create, experiment and **tinker**. We are the land of Apple Computer and Netscape. Every year, more than 600,000 new businesses incorporate. We have the largest global pool of **venture** capital. But the same emphasis on individual striving, success and liberty can also **inhibit** social control and loosen people's sense of communal obligation.

Crime becomes just another path to “making it.” Divorce rises if marriage seems to **imperil** self-fulfillment. Because we worship individual effort, we are more tolerant of failure and inequality than other nations. In 1987, a poll asked whether “government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.” Only 21 percent of Americans agreed — about a third of the number of Germans (56 percent) or Britons (61 percent). Naturally, our welfare state palls² next to theirs. Nor should we be surprised that:

Among advanced societies, we are the richest — and the most unequal. In 1995, Americans' incomes averaged roughly 20 to 30 percent above those of Europe and Japan. But the richest 90th **percentile**³ of Americans have incomes nearly six times higher than the poor at the 10th percentile. In Germany, the same ratio is 3 to 1; in Canada and Italy, it's about 4 to 1.

We have the most successful democracy — and among the lowest voter turnouts. In the Gallup poll, more Americans (64 percent) were satisfied with democracy than people anywhere else. Canadians (62 percent) were closest; Britons (40 percent) and Japanese (35 percent) were well behind. Yet, in nonpresidential elections, less than half of eligible Americans vote.

Although decidedly moralistic, we have one of the world's most violent societies. In 1990, the American murder rate was more than twice as high as Germany's and nine times higher than Japan's.

Contradictions abound. “Concern for the legal rights of accused persons and civil liberties in general is tied to opposition to gun control and difficulty in applying crime-control measures,” writes Lipset. Naturally, Americans are among the world's most gun-owning peoples. In 1993, 29 percent of U.S. households had handguns, compared with 5 percent of Canadian and 2 percent of Australian.

To some extent, the proof that our virtues and vices are connected comes from abroad, where the advance of American values has created a natural experiment in social change. The loosening

¹ “American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword”, 1997

² To pall — to become less appealing or interesting

³ Percentile — a) in statistics any of 99 points at which a range of data is divided to make 100 groups of equal size; b) any of these groups.

of tight social controls in Russia, China and South Africa has led to more freedom — and crime. In Europe and Japan, prosperity and the celebration of individuality have coincided with more divorce and crime. Between 1970 and 1991, divorce rates rose 40 percent in Germany and 50 percent in Japan (though both remain well below U.S. levels).

The American Creed was already well established by the 1830s, when Alexis de Tocqueville first described it. Even in Colonial times, America was less **rigid** socially than Europe. Land was a great **leveler**. In America, most farmers owned it; in England, 60 percent of the population didn't. Still, Colonial America **brimmed** with hereditary privileges and **arbitrary** power. In a 1992 book, historian Gordon S. Wood of Brown University argued that the decisive break occurred during the Revolution itself, which created a social and intellectual upheaval.

Loyalists **decamped** to Canada, which (like Europe) remained a more **deferential**, communal and paternalistic¹ society. But in America, the legitimacy of unchangeable social **distinctions** collapsed. Jefferson said that men would advance based on "virtue and talent," and not on birth. The Revolution "made the interests and prosperity of ordinary people — their **pursuit** of happiness — the goal of society and government," wrote Wood.

The resulting mind-set often means disappointment and division. All authority is suspect, because it elevates some over others and **triggers** an **inbred** distrust of "aristocracy" — now "elites" or **callous** CEOs. Popular culture is democratic and, therefore, sometimes shallow and offensive. Talk radio and trash TV are only new expressions of old impulses. Progress is never sufficient, because happiness — though constantly **pursued** — can never be guaranteed. Politicians fall short of the ideals that we (and they) set: one reason why we attack them even while admiring our system.

The election will expose these contradictions but not dispose of them. It's great to be an American, but we are burdened as well as blessed by our beliefs. That defines the American Drama.

Notes

1. **Gallup poll** — assessment of public opinion by questioning a representative sample of people, esp. in order to forecast voting at an election. Gallup polls are named after the American statistician, George Horace Gallup, who invented them.
2. **Individualism** — is closely allied to ideas of freedom. It encompasses a number of goals which individuals may wish to attain including maximizing personal opportunities, realizing one's potential, the fulfillment of aspirations, enjoyment of wealth, property and privacy as well as the security which results from a well-ordered and peaceful society, **egalitarianism** — political theory that all members of society have equal rights and should have equal treatment.
3. **Welfare state** — a term used to describe a national system when all citizens are required to contribute through taxation or other contributions to the provision of social services such as health, education, financial benefits, pensions, etc. These services are available to all according to need on a free or subsidised basis.
4. **Alexis de Tocqueville** (1805–1859 — French democratic theorist, author of *De La Democratie en Amerique* (Democracy in America) and *De L'Ancien Regime*, which set out nineteenth century liberal ideas. Tocqueville used the term "democracy" meaning a society where there

¹ Paternalism — a policy or practice of treating or governing people in a fatherly manner, especially by providing for their needs without giving them rights or responsibilities

■ Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

is social equality and an absence of class hierarchy and privilege. Over a century later, in the 1960s, Tocqueville's ideas on democracy were echoed in the sociological studies of American political scientists.

5. **Colonial times.** In 1765 British America was comprised of thirteen colonies which came under the jurisdiction of Parliament in London, and whose people were subjects of the King (George III at that time). Each of the colonies had its own political institutions, but these were relatively powerless, with no legislative and few executive powers.
6. **Jefferson, Thomas** (1743–1826) — US politician and 3rd President. A delegate to the Second Continental Congress (1775), he drafted the Declaration of Independence. Jefferson was Governor of Virginia (1779–1781), Minister to France (1785) and Secretary of State (1790). He served as Vice-President under John Adams (1797–1801) and as President (1801–1809).
7. **The pursuit of happiness** — a quote from the American Declaration of Independence. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness" (American Declaration of Independence).

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. *Comment on the notions expressed by Robert J. Samuelson.*

1. The things that Americans venerate about America breed conditions that they despise.
2. The American Creed (the Americans' distinct set of values) has fired economic advance.
3. The emphasis on individual striving, success and liberty can inhibit social control and loosen people's sense of communal obligation.
4. Because Americans worship individual effort, they are more tolerant of failure and inequality than other nations.
5. To some extent, the proof that American virtues and vices are connected comes from abroad.
6. Even in Colonial times, America was less rigid socially than Europe. Land was a great leveler.
7. Colonial America brimmed with hereditary privileges and arbitrary power.
8. But in America, the legitimacy of unchangeable social distinction collapsed. Jefferson said that men would advance based on "virtue and talent" and not on birth.
9. The Revolution "made the interests and prosperity of ordinary people — their pursuit of happiness — the goal of society and government."
10. Progress is never sufficient, because happiness — though constantly pursued — can never be guaranteed.
11. Popular culture is democratic and, therefore, sometimes shallow and offensive.

B. *Answer the questions on the text.*

1. How does American patriotism compare with that of Europeans?
2. What is it about the American society that makes its citizens so proud of their country?
3. What features of their society do Americans despise?
4. Why, according to the author, is it important that Americans should see the connection between the two?

5. What achievements of the American society can be attributed to their national values?
6. What are the negative effects of individualism and striving for success on the American society?
7. What social changes in the countries that have recently acquired political freedom prove, in the author's opinion, his assumption?
8. In what historical conditions was the American national mindset shaped?
9. How can Americans' distrust of authorities be accounted for?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Seymour Martin Lipset argues that "seemingly contradictory aspects of ... society are intimately related."

List all the contradictions mentioned in the article. Comment on the relationship.

Do you find the author's assumption that individual freedom breeds social problems plausible?

FOLLOW-UP

In a three-minute statement compare the American basic values with those

- a) of the country you study
- b) of Russia
- c) of your native country



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 1

Ex. 1. a) find words in the text to match the definitions below; reproduce the context they are used in;

b) give their synonyms;

c) suggest their Russian equivalents;

d) use the words in sentences of your own.

1. to help the growth or development of something
2. to respect deeply, regard as sacred
3. to produce or lead to (something) over a period of time
4. appropriate to the current time, period, or circumstances; of contemporary interest
5. to comprehend fully
6. to overwhelm with a large number or amount
7. to exist together as a combination
8. to attempt to repair or improve something in a casual or desultory way
9. an undertaking involving chance, risk, or danger
10. to prevent or slow down the activity or occurrence of (something)
11. to put (something or someone) in a dangerous situation

■ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

12. something that tends to reduce or eliminate differences among individuals
13. depending on individual discretion (as of a judge) and not fixed by law; not restrained or limited in the exercise of power
14. showing that you respect someone and want to treat them politely
15. the process of trying to achieve something

Ex. 2. Continue the strings of collocations, translate them. Make up a sentence with one collocation from each list.

1. **to foster** development, _____, _____, _____.
2. **to breed** contempt, _____, _____, _____.
3. **arbitrary** arrest, _____, _____, _____.
4. business, _____, _____, _____ **venture.**
5. **to inhibit** development, _____, _____, _____.
6. **deferential** society, _____, _____, _____.

Ex. 3. Fill in the gaps with the words from Ex. 1 and Ex. 2.

1. Railway Minister is unlikely _____ with basic passenger fares but may announce some new trains and measures to improve services.
2. Sri Lankan officials claim that the UN investigation threatens to _____ the development of the island.
3. The Great Depression was a great _____ that reduced (social) differences in the face of common want.
4. According to the author, democracy is not likely to come about unless leadership becomes _____ to democratisation and governance reform.
5. _____ decision-making by the powers that be is common in academia.
6. The ethnic, religious, and political diversity of the region has historically _____ conflict.
7. The purpose of the visit is _____ economic relations between the two countries, especially in the field of agriculture.
8. Mary Wollstonecraft's work in _____ of equality for women led to her being dubbed the founder of the British Women's Rights Movement.
9. In fact, China was once at the centre of a regional security system, and other states had to conduct their relations with Beijing in a _____ manner.
10. While Britain has been forced to worship at the altar of equality and _____ the values and beliefs of minorities, no-one noticed that the place was falling apart.
11. It was difficult _____ the idea that a handful of revolutionaries had managed to seize the entire Egyptian army.
12. Students who search for broad terms on the Internet can be _____ by useless or offensive information.
13. Government income redistribution thus not only lowers working individuals' incomes but also _____ *economic growth*.
14. The essential problem is that the EU was founded as a political venture but quickly grew into a (promising) economic _____.
15. And George Bush has relentlessly promoted a cultural view of the world that _____ religiosity, patriotism, and uncritical obedience to government.

READING 2**PRE-READING QUESTIONS**

1. What is social mobility? What do you think the term “intergenerational vertical social mobility” implies?
2. To your knowledge, what countries have the highest social mobility?
3. What is the connection between social mobility and the American dream?
4. How do you think the US ranks in terms of social mobility?

Skim the text to find out whether you guessed correctly.

THE END OF THE AMERICAN DREAM

By Niall Ferguson / June 26, 2013 — *Newsweek* (abridged)

<http://www.newsweek.com/2013/06/26/niall-ferguson-end-american-dream-237614.html>

“The United States is where great things are possible.” Those are the words of Elon Musk, whose astonishing career illustrates that the American dream can still come true.

Musk was born in South Africa but emigrated to the United States via Canada in the 1990s. After completing degrees in economics and physics at the University of Pennsylvania, he moved to Silicon Valley, intent on addressing three of the most “important problems that would most affect the future of humanity”: the Internet, clean energy, and space. Having founded PayPal, Tesla Motors, and SpaceX, he has pulled off an astonishing triple. At the age of 42, he is worth an estimated \$2.4 billion. Way to go!

But for every Musk, how many talented young people are out there who never get those crucial lucky breaks? Everyone knows that the United States has become more unequal in recent decades. Indeed, the last presidential election campaign was dominated by what turned out to be an unequal contest between “the 1 percent” and the “47 percent” whose votes Mitt Romney notoriously wrote off.

But the real problem may be more insidious¹ than the figures about income and wealth distribution imply. Even more disturbing is the growing evidence that social mobility is also declining in America.

The distinction is an important one. For many years, surveys have revealed a fundamental difference between Americans and Europeans. Americans have a much higher toleration for inequality. But that toleration is implicitly conditional on there being more social mobility in the United States than in Europe.

But what if that tradeoff no longer exists? What if the United States now offers the worst of both worlds: high inequality with low social mobility? And what if this is one of the hidden structural obstacles to economic recovery? Indeed, what if current monetary policy is making the problem of social immobility even worse?

This ought to be **grist for the mill**² for American conservatives. But Republicans have **flunked** the challenge. By failing to distinguish between inequality and mobility, they have allowed

¹ **insidious** — proceeding in a gradual, subtle way, but with very harmful effects

² **grist to/for the mill** — anything that can be turned to profit or advantage

Democrats, in effect, to equate the two, leaving the GOP looking like the party of the 1 percent — hardly an election-winning strategy.

To their cost, American conservatives have forgotten Winston Churchill's famous distinction between left and right — that the left favors the line, the right the ladder. Democrats do indeed support policies that encourage voters to **line up for entitlements** — policies that often have the unintended consequence of trapping recipients in dependency on the state. Republicans need to start reminding people that conservatism is about more than just cutting benefits. It's supposed to be about getting people to climb the ladder of opportunity.

Inequality and social immobility are, of course, related. But they're not the same, as liberals often claim.

Let's start with inequality. It's now well known that in the mid-2000s the share of income going to the top 1 percent of the population returned to where it was in the days of F. Scott Fitzgerald's *Great Gatsby*. The average income of the 1 percent was roughly 30 times higher than the average income of everyone else. The financial crisis reduced the gap, but only slightly — and temporarily. [...] The top 1 percent owns around 35 percent of the total net worth of the United States — and 42 percent of the financial wealth.

The American Dream has become a nightmare of social **stasis**¹. According to research by Pew, just under 60 percent of Americans raised in the top fifth of incomes end up staying in the top two fifths; a fractionally higher proportion of those born in the bottom fifth — 60.4 percent — end up staying in the bottom two fifths.

This is the America so vividly described by Charles Murray in his bestselling book *Coming Apart*. At one end of the social scale, living in places with names like "Belmont," is Murray's "cognitive elite" of around 1.5 million people. They and their children dominate admissions to the country's top colleges. They marry one another and cluster together in fewer than a thousand.

At the other end, there are places like "Fishtown," where nobody has more than a high school diploma; a rising share of children live with a single parent, often a young and poorly educated "never-married mother." Not only has illegitimacy risen in such towns, so has the share of men unable to work because of illness or disability or who are unemployed or who work fewer than 40 hours a week. Crime is **rampant**; so is the rate of **incarceration**². In other words, problems that used to be disproportionately associated with African-American communities are now **endemic** in the trailer parks and subprime³ slums inhabited by poor whites. You get born there, you stay there — unless you get sent to jail.

What has gone wrong? American liberals argue that widening inequality inevitably causes falling social mobility. [...] But to European eyes, this is also a familiar story of poverty traps created by well-intentioned welfare programs. A single mom with two young kids is better off doing a part-time job for just \$29,000 — on top of which she receives \$28,327 in various benefits — than if she accepts a job that pays \$69,000, on which she would pay \$11,955 in taxes. Another good example is the growth in the number of Americans claiming Social Security disability benefits. Back in the mid-1980s, little more than 1.5 percent of the population received such benefits; today it's nearly 3.5 percent. [...]

¹ **stasis** — a state or condition in which things do not change, move, or progress

² **incarceration** — the state of being confined in prison; imprisonment

³ **subprime** — denoting or relating to credit or loan arrangements for borrowers with a poor credit history

The other main reason for declining social mobility [is] the disastrous failure of American high schools in the places like Murray's imaginary Fishtown.

Despite a **tripling** of per-pupil expenditure in real terms, American secondary education is failing. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, three quarters of U.S. citizens between the ages of 17 and 24 are not qualified to join the military because they are physically unfit, have criminal records, or have inadequate levels of education. [...]

In international comparison, the United States is now somewhere in the middle of the league table for mathematical aptitude at age 15. [...] The proportion of 15-year-olds who are functionally illiterate is 10.3 percent in Canada. In the U.S. it is 17.6 percent. And students from the highest social-class groups are twice more likely to go to college than those from the lowest classes.

In a disturbing critique of Ivy League admissions policies, the editor of *The American Conservative*, Ron **Unz**, recently pointed out a number of puzzling **anomalies**. For example, since the mid-1990s Asians have consistently accounted for around 16 percent of Harvard enrollments. At Columbia, according to Unz, the Asian share has actually fallen from 23 percent in 1993 to below 16 percent in 2011. Yet, according to the U.S. census, the number of Asians aged between 18 and 21 has more than doubled in that period. Moreover, Asians now account for 28 percent of National Merit Scholarship semifinalists and 39 percent of students at CalTech, where admissions are based purely on academic merit.

As a professor at Harvard, I am **disquieted** by such tendencies. Unlike Elon Musk, I did not come to the United States intent on making a fortune. Wealth was not my American dream. But I did come here because I believed in American meritocracy, and I was pretty sure that I would be teaching fewer **beneficiaries** of inherited privilege than I had encountered at Oxford.

Now I am not so sure.

Notes

1. In mid-September 2012, during the presidential election campaign, a video surfaced of **Mitt Romney**, the Republican presidential candidate, speaking before a group of supporters in which he stated that 47 percent of the nation pays no income tax, are dependent on the federal government, see themselves as victims, and will support President Obama unconditionally. Romney went on to say: "And so my job is not to worry about those people. I'll never convince them that they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives." After facing criticism about the tone and accuracy of these comments, he at first characterized them as "inelegantly stated", then a couple of weeks later commented: "I said something that's just completely wrong." Exit polls published following the election showed that voters never saw Romney as someone who cared about people like them.
2. **Francis Scott Key Fitzgerald** (September 24, 1896 — December 21, 1940) was an American author of novels and short stories, whose works are the paradigmatic writings of the Jazz Age. He is widely regarded as one of the greatest American writers of the 20th century. Fitzgerald is considered a member of the "Lost Generation" of the 1920s.
3. **The Great Gatsby** is a 1925 novel written by American author F. Scott Fitzgerald that follows a cast of characters living in the fictional town of West Egg on prosperous Long Island in the summer of 1922. The story primarily concerns the young and mysterious millionaire Jay Gatsby and his quixotic passion and obsession for the beautiful former debutante Daisy Buchanan. Considered to be Fitzgerald's magnum opus, *The Great Gatsby* explores themes of decadence, idealism, resistance to change, social upheaval, and excess, creating a portrait of the Jazz Age

or the Roaring Twenties that has been described as a cautionary tale regarding the American Dream.

4. **Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960–2010** is a 2012 book by political scientist and W.H. Brady Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Charles Murray. The book describes what the author sees as the economic **divideand** moral decline of white Americans that has occurred since 1960. The author focuses on white Americans in order to make it clear that the decline he describes was not being experienced solely by minorities, whom he brings into his argument in the last few chapters of the book.

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. *In pairs, discuss how you understand the phrases/clauses below. If still in doubt, discuss the phrases as a class.*

1. ... he has pulled off an astonishing triple.
2. At the age of 42, he is worth an estimated \$2.4 billion. Way to go!
3. ... an unequal contest between “the 1 percent” and the “47 percent” ...
4. But what if that tradeoff no longer exists?
5. This ought to be grist for the mill for American conservatives.
6. ... Republicans have flunked the challenge.
7. ... the left favors the line, the right the ladder.
8. The American Dream has become a nightmare of social stasis.
9. ... problems that used to be disproportionately associated with African-American communities are now endemic in the trailer parks and subprime slums inhabited by poor whites.
10. But to European eyes, this is also a familiar story of poverty traps created by well-intentioned welfare programs.

B. *Answer the questions on the text.*

1. What does Elon Musk’s story illustrate?
2. How is wealth distributed in the US?
3. Why are Americans more tolerant of inequality than Europeans?
4. Does inequality directly affect social mobility?
5. What, according to Niall Ferguson, is the difference between the “liberal” and the “conservative” approaches to tackling inequality?
6. How is the lack of social mobility in the American society nowadays illustrated in the book *Coming Apart* by Charles Murrey?
7. What, according to the article, are the major reasons for the declining social mobility in the US?
8. What do the data concerning Harvard enrollments indicate?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Why, in your view, is the article entitled *The End of the American Dream*?
2. Do you share Niall Ferguson’s opinion about poverty traps created by welfare programmes?
3. How does this tally (согласуется) with the fact that the countries with the highest social mobility are Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Canada, i.e. welfare states?
4. What do you think might be the outcomes of the US becoming a less meritocratic society?

FOLLOW-UP

Make a three-minute statement on

- problems in the US education system today
- modern American society
- social mobility in the country whose language you study



Use texts from the Reader, readings that you find yourself, and the video in Listening 2.

Compile a list of Topical Vocabulary necessary to speak on the issue (to be shared in class).



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 2

Ex. 4. a) find words in the text to match the definitions below; reproduce the context they are used in;

- give their synonyms and antonyms;
- suggest their Russian equivalents;
- use the words in sentences of your own.

- to succeed in achieving or winning something difficult
- to roughly calculate or judge the value, number, quantity, or extent of
- to dismiss someone or something as insignificant
- a difference or contrast between similar things or people
- in a way that is not directly expressed
- a thing that blocks one's way or prevents or hinders progress
- relating to money or currency
- a person or thing that receives or is awarded something
- flourishing or spreading unchecked (especially about something unwelcome)
- in a way that does not change or vary

Ex. 5. Continue the strings of collocations, translate them. Make up a sentence with one collocation from each list.

- pull off** a scheme, _____, _____, _____.
- to estimate** (the) cost, _____, _____, _____.
- rampant** inflation, _____, _____, _____.
- an **obstacle to** progress, _____, _____, _____.
- a **recipient of** (a/an) award, _____, _____, _____.
- a **monetary** system, _____, _____, _____.
- implicit** criticism, _____, _____, _____.
- a clear, _____, _____, _____ **distinction**.
- a **consistent** policy, _____, _____, _____.
- expressed, _____, _____, _____ **implicitly**.

■ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

Ex. 6. Fill in the gaps with the words from Ex. 4 and Ex. 5.

1. The vast scale of the global fishing fleet has always been an _____ to sustainable fisheries management.
2. Even though there is _____ unemployment in many parts of the world, there are still large numbers of jobs that are going unfilled because employers are having a hard time identifying people with the right set of skills.
3. The elder Republican Senator, who everyone in the political establishment thought was far too moderate to win the nomination, managed _____ the nomination.
4. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) conducts the country's _____ policy as an independent central bank.
5. _____ of welfare benefits and food stamps may now have to undergo a drug test to determine their eligibility due to a new bill signed this week.
6. Prejudice that is _____ still has the same harmful effect as prejudice which is consciously practiced to those who suffer because of it.
7. There is an obvious _____ between Hamas, the true war criminal, and the Palestinians who are suffering in Gaza.
8. You shouldn't _____ the US economy just yet because the resilient U.S. economy is fully capable of finding a path to full recovery and decent growth.
9. It is difficult _____ the carrying capacity of the planet, since this depends on the technologies available, our efficiency in the use of resources, and the acceptable standard of living.
10. The Vice-President of Vietnam emphasised Vietnam's _____ policy of joining other ASEAN members in boosting ASEAN-Russia ties in a comprehensive manner.

LISTENING 2

Is the American Dream real?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iYGc8-L_NmE



VOCABULARY

1. **To hitch one's wagon to a star** — try to succeed by forming a relationship with someone who is already successful
2. **Pretentious** — attempting to impress by affecting greater importance or merit than is actually possessed
3. **Metric** — a system or standard of measurement
4. **To allow for** — make provision or provide scope for

NOTES

1. **Craigslist** is the brainchild of Craig Newmark, and has become one of the most popular sites on the Internet. Started in San Francisco in 1995, it is perhaps the ultimate site for classified listings. It offers job advertisements, personal ads, ads for cars, pets, home supplies and a plethora of other choices.
2. **Andrew Carnegie** (November 25, 1835 — August 11, 1919) was a Scottish American industrialist who led the enormous expansion of the American steel industry in the late 19th century. He was also one of the highest profile philanthropists of his era and had given

away almost 90 percent — amounting to, in 1919, \$350 million (in 2014, \$4.76 billion) — of his fortune to charities and foundations by the time of his death. His 1889 article proclaiming «The Gospel of Wealth» called on the rich to use their wealth to improve society, and stimulated a wave of philanthropy. Carnegie was born in Dunfermline, Scotland, and emigrated to the United States with his very poor parents in 1848. Carnegie started as a telegrapher and by the 1860s had investments in railroads, railroad sleeping cars, bridges and oil derricks.

PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS

1. Why do you think the US is one of the most popular destination countries for immigrants?
2. Is the American dream still a reality?

VIEWING

Watch the video and answer the following questions:

1. What does the story of the East European immigrant illustrate?
2. What does becoming rich or poor in the US mostly depend on nowadays?
3. Why should social mobility and equality of opportunity be called the Danish dream in the 21st century, according to the video?
4. Do women in the US have the same economic opportunities as men?
5. In what sense does the American dream remain uniquely American?
6. What is the effect of redistributive tax policies on innovation?
7. Why, according to the video, the US might become increasingly less appealing to smart professional people?
8. Why is the systemic inequality of opportunity bad for all Americans?

Watch the video for specific information and fill in the gaps in the sentences that follow.

1. _____% of American men raised in the bottom 20% of incomes stay there, while in the UK that number is _____%, and in Denmark _____%.
2. In the United States, women make _____ cents for every dollar that men make in the workforce. In _____ the situation is even worse.
3. In _____ women make 83 cents for every dollar men make; in Sweden it is _____.
4. The most underrated country is _____, where women make _____ cents for every dollar that men make in the workforce.
5. A lot of innovative companies like _____, _____, and _____ started in the US.

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTION

Comment on the following quote, which describes the type of society that inevitably emerges from a meritocracy.

“It would be a society with extremely high and rising inequality yet little circulation of elites. A society in which the pillar institutions were populated by and presided over by group of hypereducated, ambitious overachievers who enjoyed tremendous monetary rewards as well as

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unparalleled political power and prestige and yet who managed to insulate themselves from sanction, competition, and accountability, a group of people who could more or less rest assured that now that they have achieved their status, now that they have scaled to the top of the pyramid, they, their peers, and their progeny¹ will stay there." (*Twilight of the Elites: America After Meritocracy* by Christopher Hayes.)

SPEAKING

TERM PRESENTATION

Each student is expected to make a 10-min power point presentation on one of topics studied this term (the UK, the USA, the EU).

If you decide to make one on the USA, choose a politically relevant topic and prepare a presentation. Guidelines are to be found in the Manual.

READING 3

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. Can you define the term exceptionalism? Does it necessarily imply superiority?
2. Is it typical of great nations to consider themselves exceptional? Can you give examples of what such nations pride themselves on or did so in the past?

Skim the introduction to the article to find out the author's views on the American uniqueness.

THE MYTH OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

*The idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous may be comforting to Americans.
Too bad it's not true.*

By Stephen M. Walt²

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptionalism

Over the last two centuries, prominent Americans have described the United States as an "empire of liberty", a "shining city on a hill", the "last best hope of Earth", the "leader of the free world, and the "indispensable nation". These enduring tropes explain why all presidential candidates feel compelled to offer ritualistic paeans³ to America's greatness and why President Barack Obama landed in hot water — most recently, from Mitt Romney — for saying that while he believed in "American exceptionalism", it was no different from "British exceptionalism", "Greek exceptionalism", or any other country's brand of patriotic chest-thumping.

Most statements of "American exceptionalism" presume that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. They also imply that the United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.

¹ Progeny — a descendant or the descendants of a person, offspring

² **Stephen Martin Walt** (born July 2, 1955) is an American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

³ Paean ['pi:ən] — a joyous song or hymn of praise, tribute, thanksgiving, or triumph

The only thing wrong with this self-congratulatory portrait of America's global role is that it is mostly a myth. Although the United States possesses certain unique qualities — from high level of religiosity to a political culture that privileges individual freedom — the conduct of US foreign policy has been determined primarily by its relative power and by **inherently** competitive nature of international politics. By focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways that they are a lot like everyone else.

This unchallenged faith in American exceptionalism makes it harder for Americans to understand why others are less enthusiastic about US dominance, often alarmed by US policies, and frequently irritated by what they see as US hypocrisy, whether the subject is possession of nuclear weapons, **conformity** with international law, or America's tendency to condemn the conduct of others while ignoring its own failings. Ironically, US foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.

What we need, in short, is a more realistic and critical assessment of America's true character and contributions. In that spirit, I offer here the Top 5 Myths about American Exceptionalism.

Myth 1

There Is Something Exceptional About American Exceptionalism

Whenever American Leaders refer to the "unique" responsibilities of the United States, they are saying that it is different from other powers and that these differences require them to take on special burdens.

Yet there is nothing unusual about such lofty declarations; indeed, those who make them are treading a well-worn path. Most great powers have considered themselves superior to their rivals and have believed that they were advancing some greater good when they imposed their preferences on others. The British thought they were bearing the "white man's burden", while French colonialists invoked *la mission civilisatrice* to justify their empire. Portugal, whose imperial activities were hardly distinguished, believed it was promoting a certain *missão civilizadora*. Even many officials of the former Soviet Union genuinely believed they were leading the world toward a socialist utopia despite the many cruelties that communist rule inflicted. Of course, the United States has by far the better claim to virtue than Stalin or his successors, but Obama was right to remind us that all countries prize their own particular qualities.

So when Americans proclaim they are exceptional and indispensable, they are simply the latest nation to sing a familiar old song. Among great powers, thinking you're special is the norm, not the exception.

Myth 2

The United States Behaves Better Than Other Nations Do

Declarations of American exceptionalism rest on the belief that the United States is a uniquely virtuous nation, one that loves peace, **nurtures** liberty, respects human rights, and **embraces** the rule of law. Americans like to think their country behaves much better than other states do, and certainly better than other great powers.

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If only it were true. The United States may not have been as brutal as the worst states in world history, but a dispassionate look at the historical record **belies** most claims about America's moral superiority.

For starters, the United States has been one of the most expansionist powers in modern history. It began as 13 small colonies clinging to the Eastern Seaboard, but eventually expanded across North America, seizing Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California from Mexico in 1846. Along the way, it eliminated most of the native population and **confined** the survivors to impoverished reservations. By the mid-19th century, it had pushed Britain out of the Pacific Northwest and consolidated its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.

The United States has fought numerous wars since then — starting several of them — and its wartime conduct has hardly been a model of restraint. [...] The United States dropped more than 6 million tons of bombs during the Indochina war, including tons of napalm and lethal defoliants like Agent Orange, and it is directly responsible for the deaths of many of the roughly 1 million civilians who died in that war.

[...] US drones and Special Forces are going after suspected terrorists in at least five countries at present and have killed an unknown number of innocent civilians in the process. Some of these actions may have been necessary to make Americans more prosperous and secure. But while Americans would undoubtedly regard such acts as indefensible if some foreign country were doing them to us, hardly any US politicians have questioned these policies. Instead, Americans still wonder, "Why do they hate us?"

The United States talks a good game on human rights and international law, but it has refused to sign most human rights treaties, is not a party to the International Criminal Court, and has been all too willing to cozy up to dictators — remember our friend Hosni Mubarak? — with **abysmal** human rights records. If that were not enough, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the George W. Bush administration's reliance on waterboarding¹, extraordinary rendition², and preventive detention should shake America's belief that it consistently acts in a morally superior fashion. Obama's decision to retain many of these policies suggests they are not temporary aberration.

The United States never conquered a vast overseas empire or caused millions to die through tyrannical blunders like China's Great Leap Forward or Stalin's forced collectivization. And given the vast power at its disposal for much of the past century, Washington certainly could have done much worse. But the record is clear: US leaders have done what they thought they had to do when confronted by external dangers, and they paid scant attention to moral principles along the way. The idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous may be comforting to Americans; too bad it's not true.

Myth 3

America's Success Is Due to Its Special Genius

The United States has enjoyed remarkable success, and Americans tend to portray their rise to world power as a direct result of the political foresight of the Founding Fathers, the virtues of the

¹ Waterboarding — an interrogation technique in which water is forced into a detainee's mouth and nose so as to induce the sensation of drowning

² Extraordinary rendition — (especially in the US) the practice of sending a foreign criminal or terrorist suspect covertly to be interrogated in a country with less rigorous regulations for the humane treatment of prisoners

US Constitution, the priority placed on individual liberty, and the creativity and hard work of the American people. In this narrative, the United States enjoys an exceptional global position today because it is, well, *exceptional*.

There is more than a grain of truth to this version of American history. It's not an accident that immigrants came to America in droves in search of economic opportunity, and the "melting pot" myth facilitated the assimilation of each wave of new Americans. America's scientific and technological achievements are fully deserving of praise and owe something to the openness and vitality of the American political order.

But America's past success is due as much to good luck as to any uniquely American virtues. The new nation was lucky that the continent was lavishly **endowed** with natural resources and traversed by navigable rivers. It was lucky to have been founded far from the other great powers and even luckier that the native population was less advanced and highly **susceptible** to European diseases. Americans were fortunate that the European great powers were at war for much of the republic's early history, which greatly facilitated its expansion across the continent, and its global primacy was ensured after the other great powers fought two devastating world wars. This account of America's rise does not deny that the United States did many things right, but it also acknowledges that America's present position owes as much to good fortune as to any special genius or "manifest destiny".

Myth 4

The United States Is Responsible for Most of the Good in the World

Americans are fond of giving themselves credit for positive international developments. President Bill Clinton believed the United States was "indispensable to the forging of stable political relations," and the late Harvard University political scientist Samuel P. Huntington thought US primacy was central "to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world." [...] Given all the high-fives American leaders have given themselves, it is hardly surprising that most Americans see their country as an overwhelmingly positive force in world affairs.

Once again, there is something to this line of argument, just not enough to make it entirely accurate. The United States has made undeniable contributions to peace and stability in the world over the past century, including the Marshall Plan, the creation and management of the Bretton Woods system, its rhetorical support for the core principles of democracy and human rights, and its mostly stabilizing military presence in Europe and the Far East. But the belief that all good things flow from Washington's wisdom overstates the US contribution by a wide margin.

For starters, though Americans watching *Saving Private Ryan* or *Patton* may conclude that the United States played the central role in vanquishing Nazi Germany, most of the fighting was in Eastern Europe and the main burden of defeating Hitler's war machine was borne by the Soviet Union. Similarly, though the Marshall Plan and NATO played important roles in Europe's post-World War II success, Europeans deserve at least as much credit for rebuilding their economies, constructing a novel economic and political union, and moving beyond four centuries of sometimes bitter rivalry. [...] Moreover, [...] the spread of liberal ideals is a global phenomenon with roots in the Enlightenment, and European Philosophers and political leaders did much to advance the democratic ideal. Similarly, the abolition of slavery and the long effort to improve the status of women owe more to Britain and other democracies than to the United States, where progress in both areas trailed many other countries. [...]

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Finally, any honest accounting of the past half-century must acknowledge the downside of American primacy. The United States has been the major producer of greenhouse gases for most of the last hundred years and thus a principal cause of the **adverse** changes that are altering the global environment. The United States stood on the wrong side of the long struggle against apartheid in South Africa and backed plenty of unsavory dictatorships — including Saddam Hussein's — when short-term strategic interests dictated. [...]

Bottom line: Americans take too much credit for global progress and accept too little blame for areas where US policy has in fact been counterproductive. Americans are blind to their weak spots, and in ways that have real-world consequences. [...]

Myth 5

God Is on Our Side

A crucial component of American exceptionalism is the belief that the United States has a divinely ordained mission to lead the rest of the world. Ronald Reagan told audiences that there was "some divine plan" that placed America here [...]. The same idea was expressed, albeit less nobly, in Otto von Bismarck's alleged quip that "God has a special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States."

Confidence is a valuable **commodity** for any country. But when a nation starts to think it enjoys the mandate of heaven and becomes convinced that it cannot fail or be led astray by scoundrels or incompetents, then reality is likely to deliver a swift rebuke. [...]

Despite America's many successes, the country is hardly immune from setbacks, follies, and bone-headed blunders. If you have doubts about that, just reflect on how a decade of ill-advised tax cuts, two costly and unsuccessful wars, and a financial **melt-down** driven mostly by greed and corruption have managed to **squander** the privileged position the United States enjoyed at the end of the 20th century. Instead of assuming that God is on *their* side, perhaps Americans should heed Abraham Lincoln's admonition that our greatest concern should be "whether *we* are on God's side." [...]

America has its own special qualities, as all countries do, but it is still a state embedded in a competitive global system. It is far stronger and richer than most, and its geographical position is remarkably favourable. These advantages give the United States a wider range of choice in its conduct of foreign affairs, but they don't ensure that its choices will be good ones. Far from being a unique state whose behavior is radically different from that of other great powers, the United States has behaved like all the rest, pursuing its own self-interest first and foremost, seeking to improve its relative position over time, and devoting relatively little blood or treasure to purely idealistic pursuits. Yet, just like past great powers, it has convinced itself that it is different, and better, than everyone else.

International politics is a contact sport, and even powerful states must compromise their political principles for the sake of security and prosperity. Nationalism is also a powerful force, and it inevitably highlights the country's virtues and sugarcoats its less savoury aspects. But if Americans want to be truly exceptional, they might start by viewing the whole idea of "American exceptionalism" with a more skeptical eye.

Notes

1. The **Empire of Liberty** is a theme developed first by Thomas Jefferson to identify America's world responsibility to spread freedom across the globe. Jefferson saw America's mission in

terms of setting an example, expansion into the west, and by intervention abroad. Major exponents of the theme have been Abraham Lincoln (in the Gettysburg Address), Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush.

2. **A City upon a Hill** is a phrase from the parable of Salt and Light in Jesus's Sermon on the Mount. In Matthew 5:14, he tells his listeners, "You are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hidden." In the twentieth century, the image was used a number of times in American politics. On 9 January 1961, President-Elect John F. Kennedy returned the phrase to prominence during an address delivered to the General Court of Massachusetts:

"...I have been guided by the standard John Winthrop set before his shipmates on the flagship Arabella three hundred and thirty-one years ago, as they, too, faced the task of building a new government on a perilous frontier. «We must always consider», he said, «that we shall be as a city upon a hill — the eyes of all people are upon us». Today the eyes of all people are truly upon us — and our governments, in every branch, at every level, national, state and local, must be as a city upon a hill — constructed and inhabited by men aware of their great trust and their great responsibilities."

President Ronald Reagan used the image as well, in his 1984 acceptance of the Republican Party nomination and in his January 11, 1989, farewell speech to the nation:

«I've spoken of the shining city all my political life.... And how stands the city on this winter night? ... After 200 years, two centuries, she still stands strong and true to the granite ridge, and her glow has held no matter what storm. And she's still a beacon, still a magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness, toward home.»

3. The **Bretton Woods system** of monetary management established the rules for commercial and financial relations among the world's major industrial states in the mid-20th century. The Bretton Woods system was the first example of a fully negotiated monetary order intended to govern monetary relations among independent nation-states.

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. In pairs, discuss how you understand the phrases/clauses below. If still in doubt, discuss them as a class.

1. ...President Obama landed in hot water ...
2. ...patriotic chest-thumping
3. ... those who make them are treading a well-worn path.
4. ... they are simply the latest nation to sing a familiar old song.
5. The United States talks a good game on human rights and international law ...
6. The US ... has been all too willing to cozy up to dictators ...
7. Given all the high-fives American leaders have given themselves ...
8. ...where progress in both areas trailed many other countries.
9. ... the United States has a divinely ordained mission to lead the rest of the world.
10. But when a nation starts to think it enjoys the mandate of heaven..., then reality is likely to deliver a swift rebuke.
11. International politics is a contact sport ...
12. Nationalism ... inevitably ... sugarcoats its (the country's) less savory aspects.

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B. Answer the questions on the text.

1. What American politicians and on what occasions referred to their country as the “last best hope of Earth”, the “leader of the free world”, and the “indispensable nation”? What do these phrases imply? (Do at-home research to find answers to these questions.)
2. What is the effect of the distorted self-perception on the US foreign policy?
3. Is the idea of exceptionalism unique to the United States?
4. What arguments does the article provide to prove that the US does not behave better than other nations in terms of maintaining peace, promoting international law, and protecting human rights?
5. What do Americans usually attribute the success of their nation to? What in reality makes the US a powerful nation, according to the article?
6. Do you agree that American past success is to a great extent due to good luck?
7. How does the author prove that the actual contribution of the US to world stability and global progress has been relatively modest?
8. How does the article dispel the myth of the divine origin of American exceptionalism?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Do you share the author’s viewpoint on American exceptionalism or do you think Americans rightly consider themselves exceptional? Explain your position.
2. Does the US, in your opinion, cope with the self-assumed role of global policeman?
3. Is there a good side to the US taking on responsibility for global issues?

FOLLOW-UP

Make a three-minute statement on

- a) the US role in the world
- b) the US foreign policy
- c) the current US — Russian relations



Use texts from the Reader, readings that you find yourself, and the video in Listening 3.

Compile a list of Topical Vocabulary necessary to speak on the issue (to be shared in class).



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 3

Ex. 7. a) find words in the text to match the definitions below; reproduce the context they are used in;

b) give their synonyms;

c) suggest their Russian equivalents;

d) use the words in sentences of your own.

1. so important or useful that it is impossible to manage without it
2. existing in someone or something as a permanent and inseparable element, quality, or attribute

3. correspondence in form, nature, or character
4. to help a plan, idea, feeling, etc to develop
5. to take up the cause, ideology, practice, method, of someone and use it as one's own
6. to show to be false
7. to shut or keep in; prevent from leaving a place because of imprisonment, illness, discipline, etc.
8. extremely or hopelessly bad or severe
9. provided or supplied or equipped with (especially as by inheritance or nature)
10. accessible, liable, or subject to some influence, agency, etc.
11. contrary to someone's interests or welfare
12. something of use, advantage, or value
13. the process or state of irreversible breakdown or decline
14. to spend wastefully or extravagantly

Ex. 8. Continue the strings of collocations, translate them. Make up a sentence with one collocation from each list.

1. **to embrace** the rule of law, _____, _____, _____.
2. valuable, _____, _____, _____ **commodity**.
3. **to nurture** liberty, _____, _____, _____.
4. **abysmal** record, _____, _____, _____.
5. highly, _____, _____, _____ **susceptible**.
6. **adverse** change, _____, _____, _____.
7. **inherent** ability, _____, _____, _____.
8. **to squander** a position, _____, _____, _____.

Ex. 9. Fill in the gaps with the words from Ex. 7 and Ex. 8 or their derivatives.

1. The head of the Teachers Federation says a full-scale strike scheduled for Tuesday is imminent because the government _____ an opportunity to negotiate a contract on the weekend.
2. It is very difficult to govern a country in the aftermath of a revolution and political talent is a scarce _____.
3. As they age, baby boomers will be increasingly _____ to ailments and conditions such as heart attack, stroke, and diabetes.
4. In spite of his _____ record, Reagan is considered one of the nation's most popular presidents, which goes to show how powerful a toothpaste smile can be!
5. Teaching human rights means both conveying ideas and information concerning human rights and _____ the values and attitudes that lead to the support of those rights.
6. Egalitarianism, which is destructive of moral freedom, is _____ to political freedom.
7. The policies promoted by the outgoing Commission had an _____ impact on the working classes and grass roots sections of society.
8. It is difficult to make sense of this information due to the _____ bias in design, small sample sizes and outcomes of questionable relevance.
9. Unable to return to their pre-war lives, many Albanians _____ the Revolution as an opportunity to create a new life.

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10. Nepal, the recently declared Republic in the Himalayas, is a small country generously _____ with natural beauty and ethnic and cultural variety.
11. Facts _____ the statement issued by the United Nations that this year's flood is the worst in the living memory.
12. Every day, in jails and prisons across the United States, young people under the age of 18 are held in solitary _____.
13. If a state accepts a treaty but does not adapt its national law in order to _____ to the treaty or does not create a national law explicitly incorporating the treaty, then it violates international law.
14. The underlying causes of the _____ are multiple, and include an assorted domino effect that, when the last domino fell, took down financial giants and destroyed the working lives of many.

SPEAKING

DEBATE: TRADING PLACES

Debate 1

Prepare and hold a debate on the chosen topic.

Team work

Decide on the topic (see Appendix), on the roles (the judge, the "for team", "the opposing team", the leader of each team). For guidelines see the Manual. Decide what research you will have to do to win the debate.

Individual work

*Do the research you've been assigned.
Revise the debate format (see the Manual).*

Team work

Final preparation: share the information you've gathered and the statements you've prepared for the debate.

Class work

Debate the issue in class.

Debate 2

Prepare and hold a debate on another topic. Change the roles (the judge, the "for team", "the opposing team", the leader of each team). Follow the same guidelines.

LISTENING 3

American 'Exceptionalism' an Outdated Concept

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZ4vtkeO-sc>



VOCABULARY

1. **Psyche** /'saɪki/ — the human soul, mind, or spirit
2. **Belligerent** — inclined or eager to fight; hostile or aggressive
3. **Righteous** /'raɪtʃəs/ — morally good, virtuous
4. **To assert** — cause others to recognize (one's authority or a right) by confident and forceful behaviour

PRE-VIEWING QUESTION

How is American exceptionalism manifested in international relations?

VIEWING

Watch the video and answer the following questions:

1. In what context did President Obama mention American exceptionalism in his speech at the UN General Assembly?
2. What meaning does the political analyst see behind the idea of American exceptionalism?
3. To what end did Obama, in the analyst's opinion, use the rhetoric?
4. Are 'national pride' and 'exceptionalism' similar notions?
5. How do ordinary Americans feel about their country's foreign policy?
6. What does the idea of collective global leadership embrace?
7. Does the analyst find it realistic?
8. In what way do modern wars differ from conventional wars, in the analyst's opinion?
9. What approach, in his view, can ensure a lasting peace in various regions of the world and globally?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Which of the views expressed by the political analyst do you share? On what points do you disagree?
2. Do you think his appearance on the *Russia Today* channel broadcast allowed him to stay even-handed?

INTEGRATING CORE SKILLS

PROJECT WORK

COMPILING THE READER

Individual work 1

STAGE 1

Find an article on one of the issues raised in Unit 2 to be added to the Reader. Start with looking through the Reader to decide what issue you should focus on.

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STAGE 2

*Write an abstract of the article (~100–120 words) for peer reviewing.
See the Manual for guidelines.*



STAGE 3

Team work

Form teams of two-three reviewers. Assign two (three) articles to each team. Make sure reviewers do not get the articles they have submitted! Each team is responsible for reading the abstracts of the articles and writing reviews of each article chosen.

Individual work 2

Read and analyse the article assigned to you. Write a short review based on the following criteria:

The article (or a text out of a book, etc.) should

- 1. be relevant to the topic;*
- 2. contain information of a more enduring nature rather than “a one-day sensation”;*
- 3. be appropriate in terms of the language (level of difficulty and useful vocabulary).*

STAGE 4

Individual work 3

Peer reviewing

Read the abstracts and the reviews; make your suggestions on the inclusion.



Class work

As a class compare your suggestions and come up with the final list.

VOCABULARY AND GRAMMAR REVISION

Ex. 10. Fill in the gaps with prepositions if necessary.

1. The constitutions of most of our States assert that all power is inherent ____ the people; that ... it is their right and duty to be at all times armed. (Thomas Jefferson)
2. We have always been deferential ____ the trial court as the fact finder, as the determiner of the credibility of witnesses, and as the sole and final authority in all areas of life.
3. Many persons may reach adult age without having built protective immunity and are thus susceptible ____ malaria.
4. About 100 U.S. soldiers have been confined ____ their barracks at Joint Base Lewis-McChord near Tacoma, Washington.
5. Developing countries that are well endowed ____ natural resources should use the revenues to increase wages and employment, boost private and public sector.
6. Jefferson observed that a well-informed public is indispensable ____ democracy's success.
7. On Monday the court observed that the action taken by the then government was not ____ conformity ____ the law.

8. Enlightened monarchs embraced ____ the principles of the Enlightenment, especially its emphasis upon rationality, and applied them to their territories.
9. Management monitoring of employee network usage is something that does not easily conform ____ European ideas of data privacy.
10. The scientific community has too long invested time and attention in lamenting that policy is not relevant ____ science.
11. The factors that have inhibited ____ the promotion of women and minority faculty members in the past will presumably continue to operate.
12. Norwalk city officials continue to tinker ____ legislation involving minimum water and sewer usage rates.

Ex. 11. Fill in the gaps with suitable words.

Privacy is also important to Americans. The notion of (1)_____ privacy may make it difficult to make friends. Because Americans (2) _____ one's privacy, they may not go much beyond a friendly "hello." Ironically, it is usually the foreigner who must be more assertive if a friendship is to develop.

The rugged individualism valued by most Americans (3)_____ from our frontier heritage. For much of our country's (4)_____, there was a frontier. That experience greatly (5)_____ American attitudes. Early (6)_____ had to be self-sufficient which forced them to be inventive. Their success gave them an *optimism* about the future, a (7)_____ that problems could be solved. This positive spirit (8)_____ Americans to take risks in areas where others might only dream, resulting in tremendous (9)_____ in technology, health and science.

The American frontier also created our (10)_____: the self-reliant, strong-willed, confident individual who preferred action to words and always tried to treat others (11)_____. Many of these characteristics are represented by the myth of the American cowboy, and the more modern versions personified in movies by John Wayne, Clint Eastwood, and Sylvester Stallone.

In addition to such basic American values as individual freedom, self-reliance, equality of (12)_____, hard work, (13)_____ wealth, and competition, we see a trend toward conservation with an emphasis on recycling and preserving the environment. Also there is a greater sensitivity to cooperation on a more global (14)_____.

No matter what changes the next century brings or whether you agree with American values, the opportunity to visit the United States and to (15)_____ Americans first-hand is an experience well worth the effort.

Ex. 12. Translate into English using Active Vocabulary.

1. Специалисты предупреждали, что признание независимости края Косово вполне может **вызвать** эффект домино.
2. Закон о неправительственных организациях (The Non-Governmental Organisations Act) **угрожает** свободе ассоциаций в Замбии, создавая ограничительный регулятивный режим для неправительственных организаций, и наверняка окажет **неблагоприятное** влияние на развитие гражданского общества.
3. Кажется, люди не всегда **улавливают разницу** между «хорошо образованными» и «умными» людьми.
4. Как может страна, щедро **наделенная** природными ресурсами и человеческим капиталом, **растранжировать** свое богатство?



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5. Томас Джефферсон однажды заметил, что хорошо информированная общественность является **необходимым условием** успешной демократии.
6. Книга Уоррена Дина (Warren Dean) «Первая Волна» **опровергает** миф о мирных индейцах, живших в гармонии с природой до появления португальцев.
7. Безусловно, эта программа **способствует** обучению студентов, **помогая** их социальному и эмоциональному развитию.
8. Семья последнего императора России **почитается** Русской Православной Церковью как великомученики.
9. Некоторые европейцы считают, что россиянам **присуще** чувство патриотизма, при этом они **подвержены** влиянию имперской пропаганды.
10. Существует ряд факторов, которые **препятствуют** экономическому росту в Европе.
11. Многие американцы **являются сторонниками** (*t.e. принимают эту идею*) международного сотрудничества в космосе, особенно в области пилотируемых полетов (*manned missions*).
12. Подросток был **заключен** в тюрьму для малолетних преступников **с ужасными условиями содержания** (1 word).

Ex. 13. Complete the second sentence so that it has a similar meaning to the first sentence, using the word(s) given. Do not change the word(s) given.

1. By the end of January, the soldiers' supplies had come to an end. (**RUN**)
By the end of January, the soldiers _____ supplies.
2. I'm sure he put his life at risk to save them. (**HAVE**)
He _____ at risk to save them.
3. I didn't mean to alarm you unnecessarily. (**INTENTION**)
I _____ you unnecessarily.
4. I have a feeling that I should stop exercising so much. (**DOWN**)
I have a feeling that I should _____ exercising.
5. As far as I know the company is still run by the man who founded it. (**KNOWLEDGE**)
To _____, the company is still run by the man who founded it.
6. Mrs Larson is responsible for the complaints department. (**CHARGE**)
Mrs Larson _____ the complaints department.
7. It is reported that at least 12 people were injured in the accident. (**REPORTED**)
At least 12 people _____ in the accident.
8. Why don't you buy a second-hand car if you can't afford a brand new one? (**WERE**)
If _____ buy a second-hand car.
9. It would be better if you left your passport at reception. (**RATHER**)
We _____ your passport at reception.
10. Sally was on the point of leaving the office when her boss asked her to type up a report. (**ABOUT**)
Sally _____ the office when her boss asked her to type up a report.

EAP CORNER

BRUSHING UP READING SKILLS

TASK 1

Read the text and divide it into logical parts matching the subtitles below. The first is done for you.

Pair work

Compare your choice with that of your partner. Discuss what prompted your decision.

AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY

There is one more element of the American dynamic that we must cover: the grand strategy that drives American foreign policy.

A country's grand strategy is so deeply embedded in that nation's DNA, and appears so natural and obvious, that politicians and generals are not always aware of it. Their logic is so constrained by it that it is an almost unconscious reality. But from a geopolitical perspective, both the grand strategy of a country and the logic driving a country's leaders become obvious.

Grand strategy is not always about war. It is about all of the processes that constitute national power. But in the case of the United States, perhaps more than for other countries, grand strategy is about war, and the interaction between war and economic life. The United States is, historically, a warlike country.

The United States has been at war for about 10 percent of its existence. This statistic includes only major wars — the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, Vietnam. It does not include minor conflicts like the Spanish-American War or Desert Storm. During the twentieth century, the United States was at war 15 percent of the time. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was at war 22 percent of the time. And since the beginning of the twenty-first century, in 2001, the United States has been constantly at war. War is central to the American experience, and its frequency is constantly increasing. It is built into American culture and deeply rooted in American geopolitics. Its purpose must be clearly understood.

America was born out of war and has continued to fight to this day at an ever increasing pace. Norway's grand strategy might be more about economics than warfare, but U.S. strategic goals, and U.S. grand strategy, originate in fear. The same is true of many nations. Rome did not set out to conquer the world. It set out to defend itself, and in the course of that effort it became an empire. The United States would have been quite content at first not to have been attacked and defeated by the British, as it was in the War of 1812. Each fear, however, once alleviated, creates new vulnerabilities and new fears. Nations are driven by fear of losing what they have. Consider the following in terms of this fear.

The United States has five geopolitical goals that drive its grand strategy. Note that these goals increase in magnitude, ambition, and difficulty as you go down the list

C. THE COMPLETE DOMINATION OF NORTH AMERICA BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY
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Had the United States remained a nation of discrete states existing between the Atlantic coast and the Allegheny Mountains, it is extremely unlikely that it would have survived. It not only had to unite but had to spread into the vast territory between the Alleghenies and the Rocky

Mountains. This gave the United States not only strategic depth but also some of the richest agricultural land in the world. Even more important, it was land with a superb system of navigable rivers that allowed the country's agricultural surplus to be shipped to world markets, creating a class of businessmen-farmers that is unique in history.

The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 gave the United States title to this land. But it was the Battle of New Orleans in 1814, in which Andrew Jackson defeated the British, that gave the nation real control of the region, since New Orleans was the single choke point of the entire river system. If Yorktown founded the nation, the Battle of New Orleans founded its economy. And what secured this in turn was the Battle of San Jacinto, a few hundred miles west of New Orleans, where the Mexican army was defeated by Texans and thus could never pose a threat to the Mississippi River basin again. The defeat of the Mexican army was not inevitable. Mexico was in many ways a more developed and powerful country than the United States. Its defeat made the U.S. Army the dominant power in North America and secured the continent for the United States — a vast and rich country that no one could challenge.

With North America secured, the only other immediate threat came from Latin America. In reality, North and South America are islands, not really connected: Panama and Central America are impassable by large armies. South America's unification into a single entity is remote. When you look at a map of South America, leaving out impassable terrain, you see that there can be no transcontinental power: the continent is sliced in two (see map, page 43). So there is no chance of a native threat to the United States emerging from South America.

The major threats in the hemisphere came from European powers with naval bases in South and Central America and the Caribbean, as well as land forces in Mexico. That is what the Monroe Doctrine was about — long before the United States had the ability to stop the Europeans from having bases there, it made blocking the Europeans a strategic imperative. The only time the United States really worries about Latin America is when a foreign power has bases there.

In 1812, the British navy sailed up the Chesapeake and burned Washington. Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States was terrified that the British, using their overwhelming control of the North Atlantic, would shut off its access to the ocean, strangling the United States. It was not always a paranoid fear: the British did consider this on more than one occasion. This general problem was, in other contexts, the origin of the American obsession with Cuba, from the Spanish-American War through the Cold War.

Having secured the hemisphere in the late nineteenth century, the United States has an interest in keeping the sea lanes approaching its borders free of foreign naval power. The United States secured its Pacific approaches first. During the Civil War it acquired Alaska. In 1898 it annexed Hawaii. Those two actions taken together closed off the threat of any enemy fleet being able to approach the continent from the west, by eliminating any anchorage for supplying a fleet. The United States secured the Atlantic by using World War II to take advantage of British weakness, driving it from near the U.S. coast, and by the end of World War II had created a fleet of such enormous power that the British were unable to operate in the Atlantic without U.S. approval. This made the United States effectively invulnerable to invasion.

The fact that the United States emerged from World War II not only with the world's largest navy but also with naval bases scattered around the world changed the way the world worked. As I mentioned previously, any seagoing vessel — commercial or military, from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea to the Caribbean — could be monitored by the United States Navy, who could choose to watch it, stop it, or sink it. From the end of World War II onward, the combined weight of all of the world's existing fleets was insignificant compared to American naval power.

This highlights the single most important geopolitical fact in the world: the United States controls all of the oceans. No other power in history has been able to do this. And that control is not only the foundation of America's security but also the foundation of its ability to shape the international system. No one goes anywhere on the seas if the United States doesn't approve. At the end of the day, maintaining its control of the world's oceans is the single most important goal for the United States geopolitically.

Having achieved the unprecedented feat of dominating all of the world's oceans, the United States obviously wanted to continue to hold them. The simplest way to do this was to prevent other nations from building navies, and this could be done by making certain that no one was motivated to build navies — or had the resources to do so. One strategy, "the carrot," is to make sure that everyone has access to the sea without needing to build a navy. The other strategy, "the stick," is to tie down potential enemies in land-based confrontations so that they are forced to exhaust their military dollars on troops and tanks, with little left over for navies.

The United States emerged from the Cold War with both an ongoing interest and a fixed strategy. The ongoing interest was preventing any Eurasian power from becoming sufficiently secure to divert resources to navy building. Since there was no longer a single threat of Eurasian hegemony, the United States focused on the emergence of secondary, regional hegemons who might develop enough regional security to allow them to begin probing out to sea. The United States therefore worked to create a continually shifting series of alliances designed to tie down any potential regional hegemon.

The United States had to be prepared for regular and unpredictable interventions throughout the Eurasian landmass. After the fall of the Soviet Union, it did engage in a series of operations designed to maintain the regional balance and block the emergence of a regional power. The first major intervention was in Kuwait, where the United States blocked Iraqi ambitions after the Soviets were dead but not yet buried. The next was in Yugoslavia, with the goal of blocking the emergence of Serbian hegemony over the Balkans. The third series of interventions was in the Islamic world, designed to block al Qaeda's (or anyone else's) desire to create a secure Islamic empire. The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were both a part of this effort.

For all the noise and fuss, these were minor affairs. In Iraq, the largest operation, the United States has used fewer than 200,000 troops and suffered fewer than 5,000 killed. This is about 6 to 8 percent of the casualties suffered in Vietnam, and about 1 percent of the casualties in World War II. For a country of over a quarter billion people, an occupation force of this size is trivial. The tendency of the United States to overdramatize minor interventions derives from its relative immaturity as a nation. [...]

Subtitles to choose from:

- A. THE PREVENTION OF ANY OTHER NATION FROM CHALLENGING U.S. GLOBAL NAVAL POWER.
- B. COMPLETE DOMINATION OF THE WORLD'S OCEANS TO FURTHER SECURE U.S. PHYSICAL SAFETY AND GUARANTEE CONTROL OVER THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM
- C. THE COMPLETE DOMINATION OF NORTH AMERICA BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY
- D. THE ELIMINATION OF ANY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES BY ANY POWER IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
- E. COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE MARITIME APPROACHES TO THE UNITED STATES BY THE NAVY IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE ANY POSSIBILITY OF INVASION

TASK 2

Make a list of key words and compare it with that of your partner.



TASK 3

Read the extract below and say which part of the text it belongs to.



All nations have grand strategies, though this does not mean all nations can achieve their strategic goals. Lithuania's goal is to be free of foreign occupation. But its economy, demography, and geography make it unlikely that Lithuania will ever achieve its goal more than occasionally and temporarily. The United States, unlike most other countries in the world, has achieved most of its strategic goals, which I will outline in a moment. Its economy and society are both geared toward this effort.

DEVELOPING LISTENING SKILLS

Listening for specific information and identifying emotions

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wmlb2Jb-KC8>

TASK 1

Watch the video 'Logical fallacies part II', listen to the dialogue between the professor and the student. How can you describe their relationship and their emotional state? How many fallacies does the professor identify in his student's arguments?

TASK 2

Listen again and write down the names of the fallacies mentioned by the professor to match their descriptions. Those which are new to you are given below.

Red herring, appeal to pity, bandwagon, ad hominem

Fallacy	Description
	The speaker takes the sequence of events for cause and effect relationship
	Instead of criticising the opponent's ideas, the speaker attacks his/her character
	To prove that the argument is solid the speaker states that this idea is supported/shared by the majority
	The speaker presents an argument irrelevant to the issue aimed at diverting the opponent's attention
	The speaker assumes that A is like B in all respects, which is not true
	The speaker makes a claim aimed to create pity to win support for his/her idea

Which of these are you unlikely to come across in a debate or essay?

DEVELOPING LOGICAL THINKING SKILLS

TASK 1

Find logical fallacies in the sentences below. Remember those that were discussed in Unit 1.

List of logical fallacies from unit 1:

post hoc, circular argument, false analogy, false authority.

1. John McCain lacks a basic understanding of the current economic system. John McCain is not sure about the number of houses he owns.
2. "James Joyce is a prolific and talented writer. He is also demanding, capricious and harassing." (from a literary review).
3. Increasingly, people are coming to believe that this country is heading for disaster.
4. The Republicans pass a new tax reform law that benefits wealthy Americans. Shortly thereafter the economy takes a nose dive. The Democrats claim that the tax reform caused the economic slide.
5. There has been no vision or inspirational leadership emerging from the First person of the province, communities are losing hope, and all the Premier does is wear a better outfit every day, and shining like a lamp pole.
6. We have worked hard to help eliminate criminal activity. What we need is economic growth that can only come from the hands of leadership.
7. The project may have certain flaws but, unless it is approved, thousands of children will find themselves deprived of free lunch.
8. Ukrainian experts claim that the plane was shot down by pro-Russian separatists.
9. 'This bill (on banning a pesticide) reminds me of legislation that ought to be introduced to outlaw automobiles on the grounds that cars kill people,' said Tom Delay, Texas State Representative.
10. The tax reform is vital for our economy. After all, our economy depends on changes in taxation.

TASK 2

Read the text below, which is a speech at an imaginary local council meeting.



Point out logical fallacies. Which do you think are used intentionally and what for?

Without a doubt the 'New Initiative' is a laudable project, which may contribute to improving our city's environment. It is no secret that pollution today is well below European standards and has increased dramatically after the new mayor took office. What worries me, though, in this project is the scale of involving our children in this endeavour. The very idea of having children work after classes when they are overwhelmed with studying for this new state exam is a serious put-off. The exam that our Ministry of Education has patterned on British education goes against our traditions and may adversely affect students' academic achievements. Really, sending children to collect litter or plant trees reminds me of soldiers being sent to pick up crops or help build their commander's country house. Most parents think that robbing their children of what little free time they have is totally unacceptable. Just the other day, a doctor spoke about it on the radio and insisted that our children's health is seriously damaged by lack of sleep due to extracurricular

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activities. Going to school is a full-time job. After all, children spend a lot of time at school. I am coming to the end. The 'New Initiative' is an attempt to involve our children in community life; but this interest in children does puzzle me, coming from a person who declared bluntly that having children would ruin her career. Thank you!

TASK 3

Read the description of the project and the opponent's speech again. Suggest a better way to present a case against the project.



The New Initiative has two aims: 1) involve children in their teens in community life and 2) teach them to be environmentally friendly. Keeping one's school, street, town tidy is part of it. Another important aspect of the project is introducing ecoliteracy course at school, in doing which students learn both the ways of sustainable living and work out practical projects of their own to ensure learning by doing.

MASTERING LISTENING SKILLS

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ca_kl948JUA (14:56)



PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS:

1. Can you sum up the central idea of Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights?
2. Before you watch the video 'Magna Carta, English Bill of Rights, and American Government. From England with Love', can you make a guess as to whether the lecturer is going to be positive or negative about the English influence on American Government.

TASK 1

Watch the video for the main idea of this lecture. Answer the questions:

1. What principle of American government was laid by Magna Carter?
2. What ideas of English Government took root in the American colonies in the 18th century?

TASK 2

Watch the video again and listen for specific information. Write down the names of people or places associated with the ideas and institutions given in the right column of the table.

While listening, decide if the lecturer's tone is respectful or critical.

Names	Ideas
	Constitutional monarchy
	Absolutism
	Papism
	Parliamentary supremacy
	Natural rights

Names	Ideas
	Consent of the governed
	Salutary Neglect
	Town meetings

WRITING A SURVEY REPORT

Useful tips on how to write a good survey report are given in the Manual.

This unit offers practice in writing the three main parts of a survey report: Introduction, Main Body and Conclusion.

Let's start with looking at the core: Main Body.

TASK 1

Study the table of data, which contains answers to the question of a survey¹:

Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia?

Think of the best way to analyse and present the data in a survey report. Share your opinion with your partner.

Country	Approve (%)	Disapprove (%)	DK/refused (%)	Total (%)
United States	52	41	7	100
France	27	72	1	100
Germany	30	67	3	100
Greece	8	89	3	100
Italy	18	74	8	100
Poland	32	54	14	100
Spain	12	86	2	100
United Kingdom	33	59	8	100
Russia	7	78	15	100
Ukraine	11	66	23	100
Turkey	7	83	10	100
Egypt	4	87	9	100

¹ Only the 2014 data is included

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Country	Approve (%)	Disapprove (%)	DK/refused (%)	Total (%)
Jordan	5	90	5	100
Lebanon	23	71	6	100
Palestine ter.	7	84	9	100
Tunisia	17	77	6	100
Israel	65	27	8	100
Bangladesh	22	70	8	100
China	35	52	13	100
India	28	36	36	100
Indonesia	10	74	16	100
Japan	12	82	6	100
Malaysia	6	80	14	100
Pakistan	3	66	31	100
Philippines	24	67	9	100
South Korea	23	75	2	100
Thailand	12	79	9	100
Vietnam	12	78	10	100
Argentina	5	87	8	100
Brazil	7	87	6	100
Chile	15	68	17	100
Colombia	9	86	5	100
El Salvador	11	73	16	100
Mexico	14	80	6	100
Nicaragua	9	88	3	100
Peru	10	80	10	100

TASK 2

Analyse the two extracts from students' survey reports based on these data. Check the statements in the reports against the data. Are the generalizations well grounded?

Text 1

From the table of data the most significant items are as follows. The only country (except the USA where 52% of respondents support the American policy) in which a majority of respondents (65%) approve of US drone strikes is Israel. The same situation can be found in France, where 27% of French stand for the US strikes against the above mentioned countries. It has been found that a large percentage of US allies and partners from Jordan (90%), Greece (89%), Nicaragua (88%), Egypt (87%), Spain (86%) etc. totally disapprove of the use of drones. Despite the fact that the strikes are aimed at Pakistani extremists that imperil their country, a significant number of Pakistani citizens (30%) refused to answer the question, while only 66% express disapproval.

Text 2

The results of the survey show that in most of the 44 countries (with Israel and the USA itself being the few exceptions) people oppose missile strikes from drones conducted by the USA. In countries such as Argentina, Japan, Russia, Greece, Spain, Mexico and Nicaragua more than two-thirds of the respondents said they disapprove of these attacks. Besides, an overwhelming majority of the respondents from the Islamic states (90% in Jordan, 87% in Egypt and 84% in Palestinian Administered Territories) are also opponents of the practice of using drones to conduct strikes.

Unsurprisingly, the interviewees from the closest allies of the USA tend to justify this method of combating terrorism — in Israel about 65 per cent of the respondents back it. In Great Britain, Poland and Germany those who approve of the USA conducting missile strikes account for 32–33 per cent of all the respondents. Their number is also large in China (35%) and India (28%).

TASK 3

Write your own version of the main body based on the data analysis.

TASK 4

Read the two conclusions and say whether they give a good sum-up of the main findings presented in the main body. Choose the one that you find the more effective and improve it. Remember to use cautious language.

Text 1

To conclude, frequent deaths of innocent people as a result of missile strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia breed resentment of the citizens of many countries regardless of their attitude to the USA in general. Islamic states are the most critical as they perceive such methods inhibiting extremism as an aggression against Islam. Except for the closest allies of the USA, only China and India seem to be more or less justifying the strikes; it is possible to speculate

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that as these countries view Islamic extremism and terrorism as one of the greatest threats to international peace and security they consider such 'strict measures' to be indispensable.

Text 2

According to the findings, it is evident that an overwhelming majority of people in different countries across the globe appear to disapprove of the US drone strikes against extremists. Even in the USA the population is divided over the issue; the biggest support, understandably, comes from Israel. Not surprisingly, the strongest opposition is found in the Middle East, though little support is also characteristic of many Latin American countries, Greece and Spain, which are not directly involved in this fight against terrorists. On the whole it is clear the USA doesn't enjoy universal support on that issue.

TASK 5

Check the introduction below against the tips in the Manual. Decide what is lacking or needs correcting in terms of content or language. Write your own version.

A survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research International from March 17 to June 5, 2014 among 48,643 people from 44 countries. The survey has been conducted by the means of telephone and face-to-face interviews of people older than 18. The participants are asked whether they approve or disapprove of the USA conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft to fight terrorists. The figures are divided into sections which show answers received in different groups of countries: the first group represents the USA and European countries, the second deals with the countries of the Middle East, the third and the fourth are dedicated to Asian and Latin and Central American countries, respectively.

UNIT III

EU AT THE CROSSROADS

THE ROAD MAP FOR UNIT III

SPEAKING

VERBAL JOUST

*Holding a one-to-one debate on a politically relevant topic
(for details see p. 116)*

TERM PRESENTATION

*Making a power point presentation based on one's analysis
of an issue relevant to the topic "EU: At the Crossroads"
(for details see p. 109)*

INTEGRATING CORE SKILLS

PROJECT WORK

Compiling a Video Library (for details see p. 117)

Stage 1

*Finding a video clip on the topic "EU: From Coal and Steel to a Bigger Deal".
Preparing a short statement on its merits*

Stage 2



*Writing Vocabulary notes and Listening/Viewing and Comprehension tasks
to make the item ready for use in class*

Stage 3



Peer viewing and reviewing

LEAD-IN

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. Do you see Europe as one entity? Is the European Union, in your opinion, **synonymous** with Europe?
2. Which part of Europe plays a leading role in the international arena?
3. Do you think that politically Russia is part of Europe?

Skim the text to find out what picture of Europe the author presents in this extract from his book.

TEXT A

EUROPE: THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

Europe is still in the process of reorganizing itself after the loss of its empire and two devastating world wars, and it remains to be seen whether that reorganization will be peaceful. Europe is not going to regain its empire, but the complacent certainty that **intra-European** wars have ended needs to be examined. Central to this is the question of whether Europe is a spent volcano or whether it is merely **dormant**¹. The European Union has a total GDP of over \$14 trillion, a trillion more than the United States. It is possible that a region of such wealth — and of such diversity in wealth — will remain immune from conflict, but it is not guaranteed.

It is unreasonable to talk of Europe as if it were one entity. It is not, in spite of the existence of the European Union. Europe consists of a series of sovereign and **contentious**² nation-states. There is a general entity called Europe, but it is more reasonable to think of four Europes (we exclude Russia and the nations of the former Soviet Union from this list — although geographically European, these have a very different dynamic from that of Europe):

- Atlantic Europe: the nations that front the Atlantic Ocean and North Sea directly and that were the major imperial powers during the past five hundred years.
- Central Europe: essentially Germany and Italy, which did not come into existence until the late nineteenth century as modern nation-states. It was their assertion of national interest that led to the two world wars of the twentieth century.
- Eastern Europe: the nations running from the Baltic to the Black Sea that were occupied by Soviet troops in World War II and developed their recent national identities from this experience.
- There is, of course, a fourth less significant Europe, the Scandinavian countries.

In the first half of the twentieth century, Atlantic Europe was the imperial heart of the world. Central Europeans were later comers and challengers. Eastern Europeans were the victims. Torn apart by two world wars, Europe faced a fundamental question: What was the status of Germany in the European system? The Germans, frozen out of the imperial system created by Atlantic Europe, sought to overturn that system and assert their dominance. The conclusion of World War II found Germany shattered, divided and occupied, controlled by Soviets in the east, and England, France, and the United States in the west.

During the 1950s, when NATO was created, the European Economic Community was also **conceived**. The European Union, which emerged from it, is a schizophrenic entity. Its primary purpose

¹ Dormant — not doing anything at this time : not active but able to become active

² Contentious — exhibiting a tendency to quarrels and disputes

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is the creation of an integrated European economy, while leaving sovereignty in the hands of individual nations. Simultaneously, it is seen as the preface to a federation of European countries, in which a central European government, with a parliament and professional civil service, would govern a federal Europe where national sovereignty was limited to local matters, and defense and foreign policy rested with the whole.

Europe has not achieved this goal. It has created a free-trade zone and a European currency, which some members of the free-trade zone use and others do not. It has failed to create a political constitution, however, leaving individual nations sovereign — and therefore never has produced a united defense or foreign policy. Defense policy, to the extent it is coordinated, is in the hands of NATO, and not all members of NATO are members of the EU (notably the United States). With the collapse of the Soviet empire, individual countries in Eastern Europe were admitted to the EU and NATO.

In short, post-Cold War Europe is in **benign¹ chaos**. It is impossible to **unravel** the extraordinarily complex and ambiguous institutional relationships that have been created. Given the history of Europe, such confusion would normally lead to war. But Europe, excepting the former Yugoslavia, has no energy for war, no appetite for instability, and certainly no desire for conflict. Europe's psychological transformation has been extraordinary. Where, prior to 1945, slaughter and warfare had been regular pastimes for centuries, after 1945 even the conceptual chaos of European institutions could not generate conflict beyond rhetoric.

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Do you find the author's classification of European countries logical and reasonable? What are the criteria of this classification?
2. Do you share his view of Europe as a 'schizophrenic entity'?
3. What does the statement "post-Cold War Europe is in benign chaos" imply? Do you agree with this opinion?

TEXT B

Read Text B for detail and say if George Friedman has a compelling case for his view of Europe.

EUROPE: THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

Underneath the surface of the EU, the old European nationalisms continue to assert themselves, albeit **sluggishly²**. This can be seen in economic negotiations within the EU. The French, for example, assert the right to protect their farmers from excessive competition, or the right not to honor treaties controlling their deficits. Therefore, in a geopolitical context, Europe has not become a unified transnational entity.

For these reasons, talking of Europe as if it were a single entity like the United States, or China, is **illusory**. It is a collection of nation-states, still **shell-shocked** by World War II, the Cold War, and the loss of empire. These nation-states are highly insular³ and determine their geopolitical actions

¹ Benign — not causing harm or damage

² Sluggish — economically inactive, slow

³ Insular — separated from other people or cultures

according to their individual interests. Primary interactions are not between Europe and the rest of the world, but among European nations. In this sense, Europe behaves far more like Latin America than like a great power. In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina spend a great deal of time thinking about each other, knowing that their effect on the globe is limited.

Russia is the immediate strategic threat to Europe. Russia is interested not in conquering Europe, but in reasserting its control over the former Soviet Union. From the Russian point of view, this is both a reasonable attempt to establish some minimal sphere of influence and essentially a defensive measure. However, it is a defensive measure that will immediately affect the three Baltic states, which are now integrated into European institutions.

Obviously the Eastern Europeans want to prevent a Russian resurgence. The real question is what the rest of Europe might do — and especially, what Germany might do. The Germans are now in a comfortable position with a buffer between them and the Russians, free to focus on their internal economic and social problems. In addition, the heritage of World War II weighs heavily on the Germans. They will not want to act alone, but as part of a unified Europe.

Germany's position is unpredictable. It is a nation that has learned, given its geopolitical position, that it is enormously dangerous to assert its national interest. In 1914 and 1939, Germany attempted to act decisively in response to geopolitical threats, and each time its efforts ended catastrophically. The German analysis is that engaging in politico-military maneuvers outside of a broad coalition exposes Germany to tremendous danger. Atlantic Europe sees Germany as a buffer against Russia and will see any threat in the Baltics as being irrelevant to their interests. Therefore, they will not join the coalition Germany needs to face the Russians. So the most likely outcome will be German inaction, limited American involvement, and a gradual return of Russian power into the borderland between Europe and Russia.

But there is another scenario. In this scenario Germany will recognize the imminent danger to Poland in Russian domination of the Baltics. Seeing Poland as a necessary part of German national security, it will thus exercise a forward policy, designed to protect Poland by protecting the Baltics. Germany will move to dominate the Baltic basin. Since the Russians will not simply abandon the field, the Germans will find themselves in an extended confrontation with the Russians, competing for influence in Poland and in the Carpathian region.

Germany will find itself, of necessity, both split off from its aggressive past and from the rest of Europe. While the rest of Europe will try to avoid involvement, the Germans will be engaged in traditional power politics. As they do that, their effective as well as potential power will soar and their psychology will shift. Suddenly, a united Germany will be asserting itself again. What starts defensively will evolve in unexpected ways.

This is not the most likely scenario. However, the situation might galvanize Germany back into its traditional role of looking at Russia as a major threat, and looking at Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe as a part of its sphere of influence and as protection against the Russians. This depends partly on how aggressively the Russians move, how tenaciously the Balts resist, how much risk the Poles are willing to take, and how distant the United States intends to be. Finally, it depends on internal German politics.

Internally, Europe is inert, still in shock over its losses. But external forces such as Islamic immigration or Russian attempts to rebuild its empire could bring the old fault line back to life in various ways.

(from *The Next 100 Years*
by George Friedman Anchor Books: New York, 2010)

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What do you think of G. Friedman's view of Russia's role in the past and future history of Europe?
2. Do you agree with G. Friedman's analysis of Russia's and Germany's intertwined destinies?
3. Which of the scenarios for the future of Europe do you find the more feasible? Can you suggest one of your own?

LISTENING 1

A Brief History of the European Union

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XgnXwrsMBUs>

PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS

1. Do you know when the idea of a European Community first appeared?
2. What organisations were the predecessors of the European Union?
3. How many members are there currently in the EU? What countries have acceded to the EU since 2004?

VIEWING

a) While watching the video jot down the words/phrases you may need to speak about the history of the EU (to be compared and shared after viewing).

b) After watching the video answer the following questions:

1. What made European countries strive for a union after World War II?
2. What were the successive stages of the EU formation? What was the aim of each?
3. Why were citizens of some European countries, including Britain, unhappy about being within the EEC/EU?
4. What do you learn from the video about the history of the UK-EU relations?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What is the procedure of joining the EU nowadays?
2. Do you think any countries are likely to apply for membership in the EU in the near future?
3. What problems has the EU enlargement brought about?

READING 1

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. Are the EU member states developing at the same speed? How many of them are members of the euro-zone?
2. What do you think the notion of a "multi-speed"/"two-speed Europe" implies? Is it a reality or a concept?

3. Should the more developed countries sign a legally binding agreement giving them power to make decisions independently from the other EU members, what would be the consequences for the Union?

Look through the article to find out what the positive and negative outcomes of a formal implementation of the 'two-speed Europe' model might be.

THE DANGER OF A TWO-SPEED EUROPE

http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR43_REINVENTION_OF_EUROPE_ESSAY_AW1.pdf

By Mark Leonard¹

Joshka Fischer, a long-time champion of the idea of two-speed Europe, predicts that the EU will divide into a **vanguard** (the euro group) and a rearguard (the rest of the 27 EU members): "This formalised division will fundamentally change the EU's internal architecture," he wrote in July. "Under the umbrella of the enlarged EU, the old dividing lines between a German/French-led European Economic Community and a British/Scandinavian-led European Free Trade Association re-emerge." What Fischer **envisages** is some kind of legally binding intergovernmental agreement signed by members of the Eurozone outside the scope of the EU treaties (along the same lines as the Schengen arrangement on border-free travel).

An intergovernmental agreement of this kind would allow member states to avoid the pain of ratification in the 27 member states and prevent the 17 from being blackmailed by the renegotiation demands of British Eurosceptics. Even some Eurozone countries such as Slovakia and Finland could be excluded if their parliaments refused to ratify the agreement. However, the paradox of this idea of a "euro-core" is that it could be a kind of federalism without the federalists: it could exclude EU institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Moreover, many of the most pro-European member states — including Poland (which currently holds the presidency), Latvia and Lithuania — would also be left in the slow lane of European integration.

Angela Merkel has said that the fragmentation of the euro would lead to the end of the EU. But, as Wolfgang Münchau has argued, saving the euro could also lead to the destruction of the EU. This danger is in part an institutional question: the inner core that is emerging is breaking some of the elements of the consensus that has allowed the EU to function in recent years. It has sidelined the European Commission, empowered and co-opted the European Council by appointing Jean-Claude Juncker as chair of the group, and has acted through a Franco-German core that does not fully reflect the interests of small member states or the deficit countries.

At the same time, the danger of a **two-speed** Europe is a policy question. It is inevitable that the "euro-core" will increasingly speak **with one voice** within the EU as well as outside it. For example, in negotiations on the single market in financial services it is quite likely that the "euro-core" would agree a single position and only then negotiate with the 10 states outside the Eurozone. If an inner core of European states moves forward, the excluded states will be very nervous about ensuring that control of key policy areas such as the single market, common trade policy and the common budget remain with the 27 rather than being decided by the "euro-core".

¹ **Mark Leonard** (born 1974) is a British political scientist, and writer. He founded the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in October 2007, for which he serves as executive director.

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There are also big questions about the effects of a two-speed Europe on the other two big integration projects: the common judicial space and common foreign policy. For example, it will be hard for the EU to rise to its potential on the world stage if geopolitically powerful countries such as Britain and Poland are excluded from the core. The implications for justice and legal affairs could be equally profound. Some of the Schengen countries could be excluded from the “euro-core”, but it is possible that countries that have entered a fiscal union with each other might want to unite their migration policies. As David Miliband has argued, a two-speed Europe would be unbalanced on economic issues such as free trade and the single market and foreign-policy issues such as Russia.

This could in turn create a danger of the fragmentation of the EU into informal or even formal alliances and the emergence of geo-economic power struggles within it. There has already been some co-ordination between the Polish presidency, Denmark, Sweden and the UK. Some have suggested that the non-Eurozone states should formally organise themselves into a “Non-Euro Group” (NEG) that would elect its own chair and hold its own summits in order to protect itself from discrimination (in particular, by ensuring that future Council and Commission presidents can still come from non-euro countries). However, unless the Eurozone behaves in an aggressive way, it is unlikely that this group — which includes some states such as Poland that want one day to join the euro, others such as Denmark that haven’t yet decided, and others such as the UK that are unlikely to join for the foreseeable future — will cohere into a coalition with shared interests. As well as a lack of cohesion among the “euro-outs”, there is also a lack of cohesion within the Eurozone: one Eurozone minister recently said in private that “the countries we want in the Eurozone like Sweden and the UK are not there and the ones we do not want are.”

In order to avoid the break-up of the EU, attention should be devoted to the relations between the 17 and the 10, as well as to the governance of the Eurozone. It will be important to devise membership criteria that are open so that other countries can join at any time if and when they are willing and able (many Eastern Europeans are keen to make sure they are able to join when they meet the convergence criteria). It will also be important to leave a gateway open for the absorption of the core into the larger union at a later stage. The best outcome would be to develop the two-speed Europe within the existing treaties under the provisions for “enhanced cooperation”¹. This would make it possible for non-euro countries to stay in the room when discussions take place and to prevent the “euro-core” formally discussing without them issues that fall within the scope of the existing treaties. This would also keep alive the prospect of a messy Europe of variable geometry rather than a two-speed Europe of first- and second-class states.

Above all, European leaders will need to agree an explicit new deal between surplus and deficit countries and between northern and southern, eastern and western member states. As well as reconciling the Eurozone with the non-Eurozone countries, this deal will need to strike a balance between austerity and budget transfers, liberalisation and social protection, and ways of transferring money from the rest of the world to the eastern and southern neighbourhoods. Such a deal will require many national leaders to recognise that it is in their own national interests to reach consensus about how the Eurozone and the EU should work in the future. They

¹ In the European Union (EU), **enhanced cooperation** is a procedure where a minimum of nine EU member states are allowed to establish advanced integration or cooperation in an area within EU structures but without the other members being involved. As of February 2013 this procedure is being used in the fields of divorce law and patents, and is approved for the field of a financial transaction tax.

must agree on a vision that is perceived as fair by all member states rather than seeming to penalise any of them.

A break with the one-speed model could create opportunities as well as threats. For example, enlargement has ground to a halt within the current EU. But in a messier multi-speed Europe, there may be new ways to integrate Turkey or Ukraine (although Turkey will not be keen on second-class membership unless it includes visa-free travel). Yet whichever of the institutional options Europe's leaders choose, they are unlikely to close the gap between Europe and its citizens — in fact, they may exacerbate it — unless they also change the content and form of European integration.

/from the essay *Four Scenarios for the Reinvention of Europe*,
European Council of Foreign Relations, November 2011/

Notes:

1. **Joseph Martin “Joschka” Fischer** (born April 12, 1948) is a German politician of the Alliance '90/The Greens. He served as Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor of Germany in the cabinet of Gerhard Schröder from 1998 to 2005. Fischer has been a leading figure in the West German Greens since the 1970s, and according to opinion polls, he was the most popular politician in Germany for most of the government's duration. Following the September 2005 election, in which the Schröder government was defeated, he left office on November 22, 2005. In September 2010 he supported the creation of the Spinelli Group, a europarlamentarian initiative founded with a view to reinvigorate the strive for the federalisation of the European Union.
2. **Angela Dorothea Merkel** (born 17 July, 1954) is a German politician and a former research scientist, who has been the Chancellor of Germany since 2005 and the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) since 2000. She is the first woman to hold either office the first German Chancellor to be born after World War II, and the first post-reunification Chancellor to be raised in the former East Germany (though she was actually born in the former West Germany).
Angela Merkel has been described as the *de facto* leader of the European Union, and was ranked as the world's second most powerful person by *Forbes* magazine in 2013, the highest ranking ever achieved by a woman, and is now ranked fifth. On 26 March 2014, she became the longest-serving incumbent head of government in the European Union. On 28 May 2014, she was named the most powerful woman in the world, also by *Forbes*
3. **Wolfgang Münchau** (born 1961) is considered one of the world's foremost experts on the eurozone. He writes the European economic column of the *Financial Times*. His latest book, *The Meltdown Years: The Unfolding of the Global Economic Crisis*, won the prestigious GetAbstract business book award in its original German-language version, *Vorbeben*. He is the recipient of the 2012 SABEW award for best international columnist.
4. **Jean-Claude Juncker** (born 9 December 1954) is the 12th and current President of the European Commission, the executive branch of the European Union (EU). A Luxembourgish politician, Juncker was Prime Minister of his native country from 1995 to 2013, as well as Minister for Finances from 1989 to 2009. He was the longest-serving head any national government in the EU, and one of the longest-serving democratically elected leaders in the world, by the time he left office, his tenure encompassing the height of the European financial and sovereign debt crisis. From 2005 to 2013 Juncker served as the first permanent President of the Eurogroup.
5. **David Wright Miliband** (born 15 July 1965) is a former British Labour Party politician who was the Member of Parliament (MP) for South Shields from 2001 to 2013, and was the Secretary

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of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 2007 to 2010. He and his brother, the current Leader of the Labour Party Ed Miliband, were the first siblings to sit in the Cabinet simultaneously since Edward, Lord Stanley, and Oliver Stanley in 1938.

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. *Explain the following notions. Suggest the Russian equivalents for the phrases.*

1. a two-speed Europe
2. a legally binding intergovernmental agreement
3. the inner core/the "euro-core"
4. surplus and deficit countries
5. to sideline the European Commission
6. to speak with one voice
7. the common trade policy / budget / foreign policy / judicial space
8. fragmentation of the EU into formal and informal alliances
9. a coalition with shared interests
10. the break-up of the EU
11. to meet the membership / convergence criteria
12. under the provisions for
13. fall within the scope of the existing treaties
14. a ... Europe of variable geometry
15. to strike a balance between austerity and budget transfers, liberalisation and social protection

B. *Answer the questions on the text.*

1. What lies behind the concept of a two-speed Europe?
2. What does the paradox of the idea of a "euro-core" consist in?
3. Why does the concept of a two-speed Europe pose a danger to the EU both institutionally and politically?
4. What might be the effect of an agreement between the "core" countries on the common judicial space, common foreign policy, and economic issues?
5. How feasible is the danger of the EU fragmentation into a number of alliances?
6. What measures should be taken to prevent the break-up of the European Union?
7. What kind of new agreement is necessary between the surplus and the deficit countries?
8. What might be a positive implication of a two-speed Europe?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. From what you read, do you think the implementation of a two-speed Europe model would imperil or benefit the EU?
2. What do you make of the one positive implication of a 'messier' Europe mentioned in the text?

FOLLOW-UP

A. *Make a three-minute statement on*

- a) the current political and/or economic situation in the EU



- b) the relations between the “euro-core” and the other members of the EU
- c) the prospects of further EU enlargement

Use texts from the Reader or readings that you find yourself.

B. Compile a list of Topical Vocabulary necessary to speak on the issue (to be shared in class).



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 1

Ex. 1. Find words/phrases in Comprehension Assignments (A) to match the following definitions. Use the words in sentences of your own; make sure they relate to the topic of discussion.

1. the amount of money that a country or company has left after it has paid for all the things it needs
2. to remove from the centre of activity or attention; place in a less influential position
3. difficult economic conditions created by government measures to reduce public expenditure
4. a condition or requirement in a legal document
5. to choose a moderate course or compromise
6. a coming together of two or more distinct entities or phenomena
7. (of an agreement or promise) involving an obligation that cannot be broken
8. to belong to the area of effectiveness, operation
9. to express the same opinion
10. disintegration, collapse, or breakdown
11. (of an economic system) allowing one sector to grow at a faster rate than another
12. rules for exports and imports, export credit insurance, and the administration of anti-dumping and countervailing duties¹ shared by a number of countries

Ex. 2. Fill in the gaps with the words/phrases from Comprehension (A) and Ex. 1.

1. _____ of the Maastricht Treaty and the European stability and growth pact, 27 EU countries, including Britain, are expected to conform to limits on borrowing.
2. A treaty is a _____ between two or more sovereign states.
3. Africa will _____ at the upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development.
4. US-Britain while launching their murderous attack on Iraq totally _____ the Security Council and the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who pulled out his observers from Iraq.
5. “We are building alliances with _____,” said civil rights leader Jesse Jackson who convened a strategy session in Chicago last week.
6. For each state to adopt the new currency on 1 January 2002, they had to meet the _____ set out by the Maastricht Treaty.
7. The external borrowing needs of a country depend in part on the size of the balance of payments on current accounts and whether it is in _____ or _____.

¹ Countervailing duty — компенсационная пошлина

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8. How is Taiwan going to _____ between liberalisation and protection for its people and markets?
9. All the variants of the worst scenario involve some combination of the collapse of Iraqi institution and the _____ of the country into sections that, at least in the south and west, are ungoverned or without clear authorities.
10. Euro proponents seem to fear that the _____ of the eurozone is some kind of Armageddon.
11. The prohibition on providing technical and financial assistance related to military activities _____ of the Treaty.
12. Newcomers outside the euro zone, like Hungary or Latvia, have had to endure horrible _____ programmes in the last two years under IMF supervision, while countries inside the euro zone are to be spared IMF programmes.
13. Nicolas Sarkozy made no secret of wanting to increase the power of the heads of state and government from the 16 euro zone countries, turning them into an _____ Europe (that just so happens to look rather like Europe before the big bang enlargement).
14. The concept of a _____ Europe is a controversial and highly sensitive subject.
15. One of the most ambitious proposals that could be found in the drafts for the future of the EU and the euro zone in particular was the creation of a _____, called in the draft documents a 'fiscal capacity' for absorbing shocks.

READING 2

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. Do you think the concept of a common European identity is a myth or reality?
2. What processes are, in your view, fostering / hindering the formation of a common identity?

Skim the article to find out if the author has similar views on the issue.

TOO EARLY TO SAY HOMO EUROPAEUS¹ IS DOOMED

<http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/too-early-to-say-homo-europaeus-is-doomed/>

By John Wyles²

25.01.2012

Europeans may not view Europe as a homeland, but the notion of a common identity emerging should not yet be dismissed.

For at least 40 years, journalists, politicians and political and social scientists have been scouring Europe for a new species of animal. It would be recognisable by eyes that are focused on matters higher than the parochial³ interests of the nation state, and a preference for entering its habitat through the door marked 'Europe'. Closely related species tend to choose the entrance

¹ /ew.ro:'paj.us/

² John Wyles is Senior Adviser to EPC (European Policy Centre) on EU politics and institutions, Chair of the EU Politics and Governance Forum

³ Parochial — having a limited or narrow outlook or scope

symbolised by their native territory, but the concept of a European door spoke to an ideal, an inclusive identity and shared loyalties.

This animal had no clear profile and its DNA had scarcely formed during the early post-war years when the idea of integration began to enthuse the political classes in the western part of the European mainland. But it was an islander, Winston Churchill, who in 1948 offered a first definition of what it would feel like to belong to this new breed.

“We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think of being a European as of belonging to their native land, and ... wherever they go in this wide domain ... will truly feel, ‘Here I am at home.’”

For more than 60 years, this aspiration has shaped hopes and expectations of the benefits of European integration. The legacy of Churchillian thinking, the desire to make people feel at home in Europe, is evident in the widespread search for a formula that would make a reality of a European demos. The goal is to forge a stronger European identity through heightened political participation and institutional accountability.

Many have shared Churchill’s vision and closely examined polling evidence and political behaviour for signs of its emergence. It was assumed that he offered a legitimate benchmark against which to judge the impact, or lack of it, of European integration on the citizens of Europe’s nation states. When this assumption seemed to be feeble, especially with the growth of nationalist populism in many member states, the conclusion was drawn that Europe was failing to capture the loyalty and trust of its citizens. Its legitimacy is now held to be in peril. The inability of people to identify with the Union and its institutions is underscored and depicted as a major political adjunct to the economic crises currently afflicting Europe.

Gareth Harding, a former European Voice journalist, evangelises¹ this view in an article for the latest issue of *Foreign Policy*. His charge sheet itemises four important failures of European integration: regional and national differences have not dissolved; Europeans are divided on everything from the role of the state to the obligation to pay taxes; there is no real consensus on what are European values; and the nation state remains the primary focus of loyalty and identity.

Is a sense of European identity really absent beyond the 10% who regularly claim to feel its weight rather than their national origins? Could it be that Harding and many others are looking for a political mirage and, therefore, highlighting misleading evidence? What should we make of Eurobarometer polls consistently reporting that freedom to travel, study and work is the attribute most strongly and positively associated with EU membership? This may not imply a widespread sense of a common homeland, but it does suggest that many people identify with the European space enough as to feel at ease about moving around in it.

This comfort zone provides some insulation against the unwelcome realisation that the Union has lost reputation and prestige at home and abroad through its handling of the eurozone debt crisis. It should surprise no one that there has been a loss of trust and confidence in EU leadership and institutions when ‘Europeans’ as diverse as George Osborne, the UK finance minister, and Mario Monti, a former European commissioner and now Italy’s prime minister, complain about the quality of crisis management.

Resistance and protest against austerity and structural reforms in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain is entirely predictable. Much less predictable is the headway that at least three of these governments are making in winning popular acceptance of draconian measures vital not only

¹ To evangelise — to be very enthusiastic about something and tell people how good it is

for national economic survival, but also for sustaining the European project. The eurozone crisis and the affliction and infliction of fiscal austerity across many of the 27 may be creating a pan-European identity out of shared negative experience.

Millions of Europeans cannot avoid the continent-wide truth that 'we are all in the same boat'. Political arguments in most member countries are burning around similar priorities and values: for cutting public spending, for reforming welfare systems and alleviating and reducing unemployment. At the European level, the differences that Harding and others highlight are not proving any kind of obstacle to collective action to steer national economic and fiscal policies.

We are in a transformative moment, poised between integration and disintegration. Popular acquiescence to a forced march towards fiscal union is by no means consolidated, nor is the political route clearly marked. However, it would not be foolish optimism to see a common identity emerging from eventual acceptance of stronger, shared obligations to sustain the common welfare. But first, the EU needs to deliver.

Notes:

1. **George Gideon Oliver Osborne** (born 23 May 1971) is a British Conservative Party politician who has been the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Second Lord of the Treasury since 2010 and the Member of Parliament for Tatton since 2001. A pragmatic Eurosceptic.
2. **Mario Monti** (born 19 March 1943) is an Italian economist who served as the Prime Minister of Italy from 2011 to 2013, leading a government of technocrats in the wake of the Italian debt crisis.

Monti served as a European Commissioner from 1995 to 2004, with responsibility for the Internal Market, Services, Customs and Taxation from 1995 to 1999 and for Competition from 1999 to 2004. Monti has also been Rector and President of Bocconi University in Milan for many years. On 12 November 2011, in the midst of the European sovereign debt crisis, Monti was invited by President Giorgio Napolitano to form a new technocratic government following the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi. Monti was sworn in as Prime Minister on 16 November 2011, just a week after having been appointed a Senator for Life by President Napolitano, and initially became Minister of Economy and Finances as well, giving that portfolio up the following July. From 16 May 2013 to 17 October 2013 Monti was the President of Civic Choice, a centrist political party.

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. Explain and/or comment on the following clauses/sentences.

1. It (the new species of animal) would be recognisable by eyes that are focused on matters higher than the parochial interests of the nation state.
2. Closely related species tend to choose the entrance symbolised by their native territory ...
3. This animal had no clear profile and its DNA had scarcely formed during the early post-war years ...
4. Could it be that Harding and many others are looking for a political mirage and, therefore, highlighting misleading evidence?
5. ... the infliction of fiscal austerity across many of the 27 may be creating a pan-European identity out of shared negative experience.
6. Millions of Europeans cannot avoid the continent-wide truth that 'we are all in the same boat'.
7. But first, the EU needs to deliver.

B. Answer the questions on the text.

1. Why do you think the author uses an extended metaphor in which he compares a “new” European to a new species of animal?
2. What does the idea of a European identity imply?
3. What arguments are usually used to support the opinion that European integration has failed?
4. What facts prove that many people embrace the idea of a common Europe?
5. What has led to the growing distrust of the EU and its institutions?
6. In what way has the euro zone crisis brought the European nations together?
7. What makes the author optimistic about the prospects of forging a common European identity?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Do you share the author’s optimism?
2. Do you think a common identity can be based on shared economic obligations?
3. What shapes a national identity?

FOLLOW-UP

A. Make a three-minute statement on

- a) the future of European integration
- b) the rise of populist nationalism in Europe
- c) the feasibility of forging a common European identity



Use the texts from the Reader and online resources.

B. Compile a list of Topical Vocabulary necessary for the discussion of the issues (to be shared in class).



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 2

Ex. 3. a) find words in the text to match the definitions below; reproduce the context they are used in;

b) give their derivatives or words they are formed from;

c) suggest their Russian equivalents;

d) use the words in sentences of your own.

1. not excluding any section of society or any party involved in something
2. a standard or point of reference against which things may be compared
3. failing to convince or impress
4. a thing added to something else as a supplementary rather than an essential part
5. (of a problem or illness) cause pain or trouble to; affect adversely
6. a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something
7. the state of being protected from unpleasant influences or experiences
8. the act of imposing something unpleasant on smb

9. to make (suffering, deficiency, or a problem) less severe
10. to guide the movement or course of
11. to be or cause to be balanced or suspended (figurative)
12. the reluctant acceptance of something without protest

Ex.4. Continue the strings of collocations. Make up a sentence with one collocation from each list.

1. **inclusive** society, _____, _____, _____.
2. **to inflict** pain, _____, _____, _____.
3. **feeble** assumption, _____, _____, _____.
4. **to alleviate** suffering, _____, _____, _____.
5. **to be afflicted with** an epidemic, _____, _____, _____.
6. **to steer** economy, _____, _____, _____.
7. **an attribute of** democracy, _____, _____, _____.
8. **an adjunct to** freedom, _____, _____, _____.

Ex. 5. Fill in the gaps with the words from Ex. 3 and Ex. 4.

1. This assessment of the candidates makes the assumption that Governor Romney will hold to his own policy positions, a _____ assumption given Romney has been known to publicly alter his positions in periods of time occasionally under twenty-four hours.
2. A leading Australian scientist, recognised internationally for his work in wetlands, says better management of the world's wetlands will help _____ the effects of climate change.
3. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the city (Independence MO.) served as a political _____ to nearby Kansas City and produced the future President Harry S. Truman.
4. George Osborne said encouraging investment and exports was a _____ against which the government should be judged.
5. The Pakistani politician said that the present government has neither vision nor capacity and future planning _____ the country out of the prevailing crisis.
6. The economic crisis which has _____ the EU has required some major policy innovations, and EU institutions now have a much greater say over national economic policies — particularly for states in the euro area.
7. An _____ culture involves a full and successful integration of diverse people into a workplace or industry.
8. Strength is an asset and, true, it is an _____ against unscrupulous aggression, but it also becomes self-destructive if it grows excessively strong and is crushed under its own momentum.
9. Lord Byron created *Manfred* when Europe was _____ between the night of the Napoleonic wars and the dawn of the Age of Revolution — a time that bred charismatic national heroes.
10. Freedom is an _____ of democracy, but not undisciplined — an irresponsible freedom by participation of the people directly or indirectly in the making of the laws by which they are governed.
11. This reported behaviour of refusing most requests is at odds with previous observational research in the US that showed _____ to be the more typical.
12. What is impermissible is for the state to hand over the _____ of sanctions to private individuals who _____ the sanctions on its behalf.

SPEAKING

TERM PRESENTATION

Each student is expected to make a 10-min power point presentation on one of topics studied this term (the UK, the USA, the EU).

If you decide to make one on the EU, choose a politically relevant topic and prepare a presentation. Guidelines are to be found in the Manual.

LISTENING 2

Rise of Euroscepticism; an assertion of identity — Nigel Farage

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVorAQUtHHY>



Notes:

1. **Nigel Paul Farage** (/ˈfæɹɑːʒ/; born 3 April 1964) is a British politician and leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) since 2010, a position he also held from September 2006 to November 2009. Since 1999 he has been a Member of the European Parliament for South East England. Farage has been noted for his passionate and sometimes controversial speeches in the European Parliament and has strongly criticised the euro, the European single currency.
2. **José Manuel Durão Barroso** (born 23 March 1956) is a Portuguese politician who was the 11th President of the European Commission, serving from 2004 to 2014. He served as Prime Minister of Portugal from 6 April 2002 to 17 July 2004.
3. **Charles de Gaulle**, in full **Charles André Joseph Marie de Gaulle** (born November 22, 1890, Lille, France — died November 9, 1970, Colombey-les-deux-Églises), French soldier, writer, statesman, and architect of France's Fifth Republic.
4. **Patrie** (French) — homeland

PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS

1. See the note on Nigel Farrage. What is the position of his party on European integration?
2. What are the arguments of Eurosceptics against a closer political integration?

VIEWING

a) While watching the video make notes of the rhetorical techniques used by Nigel Farrage. Comment on his manner of speaking.

b) After watching the video choose the correct answer in the sentences that follow.

1. Nowadays Eurosceptics in the European Parliament are considered to be
 - a. mentally ill
 - b. idiots
 - c. populists
2. 2005 was the pivotal moment in the history of the EU because
 - a. the French voted against the European Constitution
 - b. the Dutch supported the European Constitution
 - c. the European Constitution was ratified

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3. According to Nigel Farage, the real European debate is about
 - a. a common economic policy
 - b. national identity
 - c. the flag and anthem of the European Union
4. Farage denies that the Eurosceptic position is
 - a. right-wing
 - b. sensible
 - c. nationalist
5. Eurosceptics speak out against
 - a. economic cooperation
 - b. immigration
 - c. political union

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Why don't Eurosceptics embrace the idea of a political union?
2. Why do you think nationalist populism is gaining ground in the EU member states?

READING 3

PRE-READING QUESTIONS

1. How long has the UK been in the EU?
2. Why isn't the UK a member of the Eurozone?
3. Why do you think David Cameron had to pledge to hold a referendum on Britain's EU membership if he remains Prime Minister after 2015?

Scan the article to find out what role French President de Gaulle played in Britain joining the European Economic Community.

IS BRITAIN MORE EUROPEAN THAN IT THINKS?

<http://www.historytoday.com/james-ellison/britain-more-european-it-thinks>

By James Ellison¹ | Published in *History Today* Volume: 62 Issue: 2 2012

Britain's recent disputes with the European Union are part of a long historical narrative, argues James Ellison — but it is not the whole story.

There is the old joke about British reports of 'Fog in the Channel — Continent cut off.' The 'fog' is now thicker and perhaps even more hazardous than it was. David Cameron's veto² last December during the Eurozone crisis gave it an unhelpful and familiar 'Britain versus the EU' dimension as Europe faced its darkest economic moment since the Great Depression. While Angela Merkel and

¹ James Ellison is Reader in International History at Queen Mary, University of London and author of *The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge 1963–68* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

² In December 2011, David Cameron refused to sign a tax and budget pact to tackle the Eurozone debt crisis claiming he had to protect key British interests, including its financial markets.

Nicolas Sarkozy tried to pump blood into the collapsing veins of the euro, Cameron's demands for City of London safeguards appeared self-centred and anti-*communautaire*.

The French hit back. Sarkozy told *Le Monde*: 'There are clearly now two Europes.' No code there: there is the EU and there is Britain. Merkel was more emollient¹, telling the Bundestag that it is 'beyond doubt that Britain will remain an important partner in the EU'. As long as the euro survives this crisis will be put down to experience, like others in the EU's past. What Cameron asked for was neither unreasonable nor unexpected to those in the know, it was just that he asked for it undiplomatically and at the last moment. The real fallout from these events is that they reaffirm a damaging and distorted history of Britain and Europe. But there is another story to tell.

Let us first reprise² the tired narrative of Britain and Europe. Of the contenders for the title 'Father of Europe', a short French economist, planner and statesman, Jean Monnet (1888–1979), stands tall. He laid the foundation stone of the EU after the Second World War and wanted the British in from the beginning. Alongside Charles de Gaulle, Monnet travelled to London amid the drama of June 1940. He took with him a proposal for 'indissoluble union' between Britain and France, but the plan fell with Petain's submission to the Nazis. Preventing future Nazis was in part the stimulus for Monnet to write the Schuman Plan of 1950. Named after Robert Schuman, then the French foreign minister, it called for a coal and steel union in Western Europe to neutralise historical enmities. Monnet ensured that the British received an invitation to join, but they demurred. One of Monnet's compatriots recalled the British saying: 'You in Europe have been defeated; you have been occupied; that is not our situation.'

When the six Schuman Plan countries — Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands — built on their success with the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, Britain's position looked like hubris³. The British dismissed the Six's chances leading up to 1957. Rab Butler, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, even described their plans as 'archaeological excavations'. Yet in 1961, eating partly digestible humble pie, Harold Macmillan's government decided that Britain had no alternative but to seek membership. The economic imperative was strong — Britain needed a new sense of purpose and economic growth — but so too was an age-old British strategy: no one nation could be allowed to dominate the Continent. Macmillan warned privately of the danger that, through the EEC, the Germans would revive their power: 'It is really giving them on a plate what we fought two world wars to prevent.'

Yet it was not a German who dominated Europe as Britain tried to get into the EEC, but a Frenchman. General de Gaulle blocked two British applications to join the Community. In saying 'non' to the first in January 1963 he stated that Britain was 'insular' and 'maritime' and set apart by 'habits and traditions'. He maintained his position throughout the 1960s. Indeed one reason that Britain could enter the EEC on January 1st, 1973 was that de Gaulle had left office in 1969. At last Britain was European, or so it was hoped by Edward Heath's government. Horizons of economic revival and political rebirth stretched out, but sadly not for Heath, who was a casualty of Britain's mid-1970s malaise. Part of the country's identity crisis at that time came from Harold Wilson's decision to put EEC membership to the public in a historic referendum 18 months after entry; the overwhelming 'yes' vote of June 6th, 1975, however, did not end the debate.

¹ Emollient — attempting to avoid confrontation or anger; calming or conciliatory

² To reprise — to repeat the principal points or stages of

³ Hubris — excessive pride or self-confidence

■ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

This story of British ambivalence towards Europe is well-entrenched in the national mind and also those of EU member states; hence the vituperative¹ tone of recent criticisms of Britain. Like British leaders before him, Cameron has been accused of asking for something, while offering nothing in return. As a former Belgian MP said: 'You're either at the table or you're on the menu.'

The British have always wanted to be at the table. It has just taken a while to get there and they have not found the seat that comfortable. In 1897 Prime Minister Lord Salisbury believed that the 'Federation of Europe is the only hope we have' to avert European war. That has not changed. Indeed, it is why the first post-1945 Labour government pursued Anglo-European unity, before the Cold War prioritised Anglo-American co-operation. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Britain's European policy, though short on supranationality — the leitmotif of the Six — was purposeful. After entry, Britain worked as a member state to further the EC and rigorously applied European legislation. To this day Britain functions as a nation whose greatest interests are European. Trade figures, financial ties, international politics and, to an extent, law all point that way. So does the fact that so many Brits holiday in Europe. Yet the country is not at peace with this reality.

Monnet once gave an explanation for Britain's predicament. 'I never understood why the British did not join,' he said. 'I came to the conclusion that it must have been because it was the price of victory — the illusion that you could maintain what you had, without change.' The Second World War also cut a much deeper cultural scar on the nation. In 1949, when British diplomats debated a future in Europe, one Labour minister was unequivocal: 'Anti-European feeling is a commonplace of British thought. Everyone has relatives in the US and Canada. Most have no one in Europe except the dead of two wars.' Sixty years later that sentiment may no longer be entirely correct, but it remains powerful and may have been revalidated by failed diplomacy. Unless we understand why imagery from the Second World War has been used in Britain over Cameron's veto — the PM showed 'bulldog spirit' — and why this latest spat² between Britain and Europe is more atypical than many think — the untold story is more about co-operation than conflict — the relationship between the British and their European partners will be imprisoned in the past.

Notes:

1. The Franco-German Armistice of June 22, 1940, divided France into two zones: one to be under German military occupation and one to be left to the French in full sovereignty, at least nominally. The unoccupied zone comprised the southeastern two-fifths of the country, from the Swiss frontier near Geneva to a point 12 miles (19 km) east of Tours and thence southwest to the Spanish frontier, 30 miles (48 km) from the Bay of Biscay.
2. **Philippe Pétain**, in full Henri-Philippe Benoni Omer Joseph Pétain (born April 24, 1856, Cauchy-à-la-Tour, France — died July 23, 1951, Île d'Yeu), French general who was a national hero for his victory at the Battle of Verdun in World War I but was discredited as chief of state of the French government at Vichy in World War II. He died under sentence in a prison fortress.
3. The **Schuman Declaration** of 9 May 1950 was a governmental proposal by then-French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman to create a new form of organisation of states in Europe called a *supranational community*. Following the experiences of two world wars, France concluded that certain values such as justice could not be defined by the State apparatus alone. It involved far more than a technical Community to place the coal and steel industries of France,

¹ Vituperative — full of angry and cruel criticism

² Spat — a brief quarrel

West Germany and other countries under a common High Authority. It led to the re-organization of post- World War western Europe by treaty. The proposal led first to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It was also the forerunner of several other European Communities and also what is now the European Union (EU). The event is commemorated annually as Europe Day and Schuman himself is considered one of the Founding fathers of the European Union.

4. **Richard Austen Butler, Baron Butler of Saffron Walden**, (9 December 1902 — 8 March 1982), generally known as **R. A. Butler** and familiarly known as **Rab**, was a British Conservative politician. Butler was one of only two British politicians (the other being John Simon, 1st Viscount Simon) to have served in three of the four Great Offices of State (Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary) but never to have been the Prime Minister, for which he was twice passed over.
5. **Maurice Harold Macmillan, 1st Earl of Stockton**, OM, PC, FRS^[2] (10 February 1894 — 29 December 1986) was a British Conservative politician and statesman who served as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 10 January 1957 to 18 October 1963. Macmillan worked with states outside the European Economic Community (EEC) to form the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which from 3 May 1960 established a free-trade area. Macmillan also saw the value of rapprochement with the EEC, to which his government sought belated entry, but Britain's application was vetoed by French president Charles de Gaulle on 29 January 1963. De Gaulle was always strongly opposed to British entry for many reasons. He sensed the British were inevitably closely linked to the Americans. He saw the EEC as a continental arrangement primarily between France and Germany, and if Britain joined France's role would diminish.
6. **Sir Edward Richard George Heath**, (9 July 1916 — 17 July 2005) was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from June 1970 to February 1974 and Leader of the Conservative Party from 1965 to 1975. Heath became Prime Minister after winning the 1970 election. In 1971, Heath oversaw the decimalisation of British coinage and in 1972, he implemented major reform to the UK's system of local government; these included a reduction in the number of local authorities across Britain as well as the creation of a number of new metropolitan counties. Possibly most significantly, Heath took the UK into the European Economic Community in 1973. Heath's Premiership also oversaw the height of The Troubles in Northern Ireland, with the suspension of the Stormont Parliament and the imposition of direct British rule. Unofficial talks with IRA delegates were unsuccessful, as was the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, which caused the Ulster Unionist Party to withdraw from the Conservative whip.
7. **James Harold Wilson, Baron Wilson of Rievaulx**, (11 March 1916 — 24 May 1995) was a British Labour Party politician who served as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1976. He won four general elections, and is the most recent British Prime Minister to have served non-consecutive terms.

COMPREHENSION ASSIGNMENTS

A. *In pairs, discuss how you understand the phrases/clauses below. If still in doubt, discuss them as a class.*

1. There is the old joke about British reports of 'Fog in the Channel — Continent cut off'.
2. ... Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy tried to pump blood into the collapsing veins of the euro ...

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3. ... eating partly digestible humble pie ...
4. ... he stated that Britain was 'insular' and 'maritime'...
5. 'You're either at the table or you're on the menu.'
6. The British have always wanted to be at the table.
7. Britain's European policy, though short on supranationality ... was purposeful.
8. ... the PM showed 'bulldog spirit' ...

B. Answer the questions on the text.

1. How old is the idea of a united Europe?
2. When and by whom were the foundations of the EU laid?
3. Why was the UK unwilling to join the Coal and Steel Union established after World War II?
4. What were the economic and political reasons behind Britain's subsequent decision to seek EEC membership?
5. Why did it take Britain about twenty years to become a member of the EEC?
6. Has Britain been an enthusiastic member of the European Community/the EU ever since?
7. What can British ambivalence towards Europe be attributed to?
8. What were the reactions of the European leaders to David Cameron's veto of a new EU treaty? Why do you think they differed?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION

1. Does the article prove that Britain is a nation whose interests lie inside the EU?
2. Do you know anything about the current state of things?

FOLLOW-UP

A. Make a three-minute statement on

- a) the reasons for Euroscepticism in the UK
- b) the implications of a possible British exit from the EU for the UK / the EU
- c) the feasibility of a disintegration of the European Union



Use the texts from the Reader and online resources.

B. Compile a list of Topical Vocabulary necessary for the discussion of the issues (to be shared in class).



VOCABULARY PRACTICE 3

Ex. 6. a) find words in the text to match the definitions below; reproduce the context they are used in;

b) give their synonyms;

c) suggest their Russian equivalents;

d) use the words in sentences of your own.

1. a measure taken to protect someone or something or to prevent something undesirable
2. the adverse results of a situation or action

3. a person who tries to win something in a contest; especially a person who has a good chance of winning
4. to politely refuse to accept a request or suggestion
5. a general feeling of discomfort, illness, or unease whose exact cause is difficult to identify
6. the state of having mixed feelings or contradictory ideas about something or someone
7. (of an attitude, habit, or belief) firmly established and difficult or unlikely to change
8. extremely thoroughly and carefully
9. a difficult, unpleasant, or embarrassing situation
10. general feeling or opinion

Ex. 7. Continue the strings of collocation. Make up a sentence with one collocation from each list.

1. **a safeguard against** tyranny, _____, _____, _____.
2. **ambivalence towards** reform, _____, _____, _____.
3. **ambivalent** position, _____, _____, _____.
4. **rigorous** planning, _____, _____, _____.
5. to find oneself in, _____, _____, _____ **a predicament.**
6. nationalist, _____, _____, _____ **sentiment(s).**
7. **entrenched in** a society, _____, _____, _____.
8. **contender for** supremacy, _____, _____, _____.

Ex. 8. Fill in the gaps with the words from Ex. 6 and Ex. 7.

1. Does Britain's attitude to the Eurovision song contest reflect its _____ towards the European Union?
2. During the Civil War, the city of St. Louis found itself in the _____ of being loyal to the Union in a state that was predominately dedicated to the Confederate cause.
3. The economic _____ is felt in a loss of competitiveness and in the faltering of prominent economic institutions like IBM.
4. The importance of the seaside holiday and the belief in the wholesomeness of outdoor life is _____ in the national psyche.
5. In Korea as well, anti-American _____ has been on the rise, albeit in a different form than that of the extremist Islamic circles of the Middle East.
6. Russia is currently a big gas supplier to Europe, but this position has been threatened by the _____ from the Ukraine crisis.
7. China is a potential _____ for the global leadership in the 21st century.
8. The Arak reactor is another serious problem with the proposed agreement with Iran and was one reason France _____, leading the last round of talks to end without an agreement.
9. Faced with growing popular opposition to the EU, the EU summit was supposed to convey the message that the EU is a _____ against the relapse of the continent into barbarism and war.
10. Sporadic attempts at reform were _____ suppressed in the cities, and government became more and more petrified into aristocracy.

SPEAKING

VERBAL JOUST

Hold a one-to-one debate on a politically relevant topic.

LISTENING 3

John Ashton¹ on European identity

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tub9t0gzQ0k>



VOCABULARY

1. **Ad Interim** — temporary
2. **To Pontificate** — to speak or express your opinion about something in a way that shows that you think you are always right
3. **To Overrun** — to swarm or spread over rapidly
4. **To Beset** — (esp. of dangers, temptations, or difficulties) to trouble or harass constantly
5. **To Conceive (of)** — to have an idea (of); imagine; think

PRE-VIEWING QUESTIONS

1. What does the so-called 'insular thinking' of the British consist in?
2. What are the arguments of the proponents of Britain's exit from the EU?

VIEWING

Watch the video and answer the questions that follow.

1. Does John Ashton perceive himself as British or English?
2. What do you think John Aston means when he speaks about the British lacking self-confidence in the European dimension?
3. How does the identity crisis Britain is experiencing affect its relations with Europe?
4. In what way does Scotland set an example to England?
5. What are, in John Ashton's opinion, the implications of Britain's leaving the EU?

Speak Up

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Do you think the British are likely to ever assume a European identity?
2. Do you agree with John Ashton's assertion that should Britain leave the EU it wouldn't be the end of the story?

¹ 1. One of the world's top climate diplomats, **John Ashton** is now an independent commentator and adviser on the politics of climate change. From 2006–12 he served as Special Representative for Climate Change to three successive UK Foreign Secretaries, spanning the current Coalition and the previous Labour Government. He is a co-founder and, from 2004–6, was the first Chief Executive of E3G. From 1978–2002, after a brief period as a research astronomer, he was a career diplomat, with a particular focus on China. He is a visiting professor at the London University School of Oriental and African Studies, and a Distinguished Policy Fellow at the Grantham Institute for Climate Change at Imperial College.

2. *E3G* (Third Generation Environmentalism) is an independent organisation acting to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development.

INTEGRATING CORE SKILLS

PROJECT WORK

*Compiling a Video Library on the topic "EU: From Coal and Steel to a Bigger Deal".
Writing a short statement on its merits.*

Each team is to ultimately submit one video clip with tasks and vocabulary notes.
(~2 weeks to do it)

Team work (1)

Form a team of 2–3 students, choose the leader. Discuss with the rest of your group which particular topic you are going to focus on.

Do your part of the search: find a video clip, get ready to present it to the rest of your team

Prepare a short (written) statement as to why it deserves to be included.

Team work (2)

Compare the results of your team search and decide which clip is worth including. Decide on the type of Listening tasks and Vocabulary notes to make the item ready for use in class.

Individual work (2)

Write the tasks and vocabulary notes assigned to you. Send them over to the other team members.



Individual work (3)

Peer reviewing of the uploaded clips with the tasks and notes (At least two reviewers per item). Give each item a grade (5–2).



VOCABULARY AND GRAMMAR REVISION

Ex. 9. Fill in the gaps with prepositions if necessary.

1. E-learning is broadly inclusive ____ all forms of educational technology in learning and teaching and is broadly synonymous ____ multimedia learning.
2. Bibliotherapy is an adjunct ____ psychological treatment that incorporates appropriate books or other written materials, usually intended to be read outside of psychotherapy sessions.
3. Do we have to contend ____ all this criticism?
4. Clearly government should not have the right to inflict sanctions ____ specific individuals whenever officials feel this would be a good idea.
5. But this type of corruption is pervasive and deeply entrenched ____ the culture of many nations.
6. Nationalist and communist political groups in the Arab countries are no different: their ambivalence ____ the gender question has been matched only ____ their political calculations.

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7. The West African nation of Liberia is currently afflicted ____ an epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD), along ____ the neighbouring countries of Guinea and Sierra Leone.
8. It was partly to alleviate ____ the consequences of these rivalries in Indonesia that Maeda's office had been set up.
9. Your right to think what you wish is an attribute ____ freedom of speech.
10. During this election, I felt that our nation was poised ____ the chance to grow up a little and the chance to prolong its adolescence a little longer.
11. The leading contender ____ the post is the ambitious governor of Virginia, Jack Hathaway (William Petersen), a loyal Democrat and a noted patriot.
12. A European System of Central Banks and a European Central Bank were set up ____ the provisions of the Treaty ____ addition ____ the existing financial institutions.
13. The Court is ____ present required to ascertain whether the particular action of the United States was of the kind which really fell ____ the scope of the Treaty.
14. He notes that China and Africa have always spoken ____ one voice ____ common aims of development and economic progress.
15. The comparison is intended to be viewed as a benchmark ____ which efforts to improve air quality in London can be assessed.
16. Religious freedom is a safeguard ____ all forms of totalitarianism and contributes decisively to human fraternity.

Ex. 10. Fill in the gaps with suitable words.

"Unity in diversity": the reality of European social models

The EU's Member States have developed their _____ socioeconomic models, reflecting their history and their collective choices. _____ of these national models is underpinned by European characteristics:

- _____ elements such as public pensions, health and long-term care, social _____, labour market _____ and redistribution through tax policies;
- _____ values such as solidarity and cohesion, _____ opportunities and the fight _____ all forms of discrimination, health and safety in the workplace, universal _____ to education and healthcare, quality of life and quality in work, _____ development and the involvement of _____ society;
- role of the public sector in the organisation and financing of national systems, _____ more so than in America or Asia;
- a strong "European dimension" reinforcing national systems;
- a tradition of social dialogue and partnership _____ governments, industry and trade unions.

_____, besides these points which Member States have in _____, the Commission underlines the significance of disparities within the EU. For example, Lithuania, Latvia and Ireland spend 14 to 15% of GDP on social protection systems, _____ France and Sweden spend 30%. In addition, the level of public pensions may be twice _____ high in one country _____ in another, varying _____ between 31 and 37% of average earnings in Ireland, the UK and Belgium _____ over 70% in Austria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. It seems, _____, that no Member State has yet found all the answers, _____ the relative convergence in their approaches.

Ex. 11. Translate into English using Active Vocabulary.

1. Страны Латинской Америки до сих пор традиционно не **выступали с единых позиций** на международной арене, так как, несмотря на наличие **общих интересов**, они имеют существенные идеологические разногласия.
2. В большинстве стран существует **двойственное отношение** к иммигрантам: с одной стороны они своим трудом поддерживают благосостояние страны, с другой — в сознании многих **укрепились** подозрение и недоверие к «чужакам».
3. В Египте была принята государственная программа, направленная на **смягчение отрицательных** последствий **болезненного состояния экономики** для беднейших слоев населения.
4. Когда Великобританию пригласили вступить в ЕЭС, она **вежливо отказалась**. Позже президент Франции де Голль заблокировал вступление Великобритании в ЕЭС, обвинив ее в «**островном**» сознании.
5. Взаимодействие неправительственных организаций с властью является **отличительным признаком** и **мерилом** демократии, так как позволяет сделать политику более понятной для граждан.
6. Исследования показали, что политика **жесткой экономики**, **навязанная** Евросоюзом ряду европейских стран, не только не привела к восстановлению экономики, но и существенно ухудшила положение граждан.
7. Европа **находится в подвешенном состоянии** между двумя путями развития, один из которых может привести к **раздроблению** ЕС на **союзы «по интересам»**. Исход зависит от того, в каком направлении лидеры будут **вести** политику этой организации.



Ex. 12. Complete the second sentence so that it has a similar meaning to the first sentence, using the word(s) given. Do not change the word(s) given.

1. Joan's boss doesn't want her to wear jeans at work. **DISAPPROVES**
Joan's boss _____ jeans at work.
2. The committee decided to cancel the briefing **OFF**
The committee _____ the briefing.
3. Who is responsible for the rise of ISIS? **BLAME**
Who _____ the rise of ISIS?
4. The opposition leaders' request to hold a rally was not granted. **TURNED**
The opposition leaders' request to hold a rally _____.
5. "Get out of the house now!" he shouted at me. **DEMANDED**
He _____ out of the house immediately.
6. Jason started his PhD in order to become an academic. **AIM**
Jason started his PhD _____ an academic.
7. Unemployment hasn't been at such a high level at any time since the 1930s. **HAS**
Not since the 1930s _____ at such a high level.
8. The hotel staff put a lot of effort into trying to find a Scottish flag. **TROUBLE**
The hotel staff _____ to try and find a Scottish flag.
9. Everyone was wearing a suit apart from Steve. **WHO**
The only _____ was Steve.
10. Martha won't allow anybody to use bad language in her presence. **HAVE**
Martha won't _____ bad language in her presence.

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11. The Vikings won the battle, even though they had a far smaller force. **DESPITE**
The Vikings won the battle _____ a far smaller force.
12. You are always referring to yourself as a patriot. I want you to stop doing it. **WISH**
I _____ as a patriot.
13. Health Minister said today he didn't intend to resign. **INTENTION**
Health Minister said today he _____.
14. I'm certain he isn't responsible for the error; he looks too experienced. **CANNOT**
He _____ for the error; he looks too experienced.

EAP CORNER

BRUSHING UP READING SKILLS

TASK 1.

Skim the introduction to the article and find sentences which contain answers to the questions:

1. When and why did Great Britain find itself in the European Union?
2. Why does it appear to want out twenty years later?
3. What are Britain's options outside the EU?

Analysing and anticipating

Do you think the answers sum up the main idea of the introduction or of the whole article?

TASK 2.

Now look through the rest of the text ('Almost by accident') to find out more:

1. What can start the process of Great Britain leaving the EU?
2. How many different situations of its exit are analysed?
3. What is the position of the three British leading parties on the EU membership?
4. What makes the outcome of the referendum uncertain?

Analysing the strategy

Which of the words helped you to do it quickly and why?

Trigger, referendum, manifesto, scenario, pressure, Labour, trade unions, Tory, UKIP, poll, Eurosceptic, vote, unpredictable, single market

Did you find the answers at the beginning of the paragraphs? At the end? In the middle?

TASK 3.

Now skim the rest of the Article 'Making the Break' in the Reader and decide what message the author is trying to get across to his readers.

What do you anticipate?

1. Britain is far better off in the EU.
2. The 'marriage contract' between Britain and the EU needs reconsidering,
3. Britain's exit from the EU is fraught with serious consequences.



MAKING THE BREAK (1)

<http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21567914-how-britain-could-fall-out-european-union-and-what-it-would-mean-making-break>

How Britain could fall out of the European Union, and what it would mean

Dec 8th 2012 | From the print edition

BRITAIN has never been too keen on tying the knot with Europe. It sat aside in the 1950s as Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries forged a single market in coal and steel, which

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became a broader common market. It eventually joined, in 1973, largely because Europe seemed to be where the money was. Britons still think of their relationship with Europe as a transaction. But their feelings about the costs and benefits of membership have changed utterly.

Europe is no longer the thriving economic club that Britain joined 40 years ago. The euro-zone crisis has exposed the lack of dynamism in much of Europe (though Britain itself is hardly booming) and the British also feel sidelined, as countries that use the single currency are pulled more tightly together. Britons have come to associate the EU with the uncontrolled immigration of Poles and other east Europeans, seemingly to every village. Although many political leaders are determined to stop it happening, a British exit from Europe is coming to seem ever more possible.

If Britain falls out of the EU, it may find itself completely outside the single market. It might try to stay in the European Economic Area (EEA), a free-trade club that also includes Iceland and Norway. Or it could leave both the EU and the single market, but attempt to recreate a free-trade relationship through bilateral agreements. In this article we explain what each would mean for British business and the economy. But, first, how could an exit happen?

Almost by accident

The likeliest trigger is a referendum. David Cameron, Britain's prime minister, is under enormous pressure to call one from his own Conservative Party, which dominates Britain's coalition government. Last year 81 Tory MPs voted for a referendum on Britain's EU membership. "It's moved very fast," says John Redwood, a veteran critic of the EU. "People used to call me an extreme Eurosceptic. Now I'm a moderate."

Truly fervent Eurosceptics seek a referendum because they want to quit the EU. Other Tories want one to spike the guns¹ of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which campaigns for an exit. UKIP, a once-minor party that came second to Labour in two by-elections on November 29th, takes votes from all parties but most terrifies Conservative MPs. If the party does well in the next European Parliament elections, due in 2014, the pressure on Mr. Cameron will increase.

He is already bending. In September the prime minister hinted that Britons might have an opportunity to give "fresh consent" to their country's place in a looser union — a rather fuzzy suggestion that is unlikely to dampen calls for a starker question. Some Tory cabinet ministers now expect the party to include a promise of an "In-Out" referendum on Europe in its 2015 general-election manifesto.

That might persuade Labour to follow suit — which is the second referendum scenario. Although the party is broadly pro-European, some Labour strategists have been urging Ed Miliband, its leader, to promise a referendum all the same, chiefly to pile pressure on Mr. Cameron but also to stay on the right side of public opinion. "Whatever our position on Europe, we cannot be seen as the anti-referendum party," a senior Labour figure says.

The third scenario is already in play, thanks to the 2011 European Union Act. Passed by the coalition, this dictates that a referendum must be held on any new EU treaty that shifts power from Westminster to Brussels. The EU is acutely aware of this obstacle, so where treaty change is envisaged, it is trying to focus it as narrowly as possible on the euro zone, of which Britain is not a member. But the EU's creeping claim on its constituents' sovereign powers suggests that this "referendum lock" could be activated. The next treaty change, which could take place in 2015 or 2016, will be the moment for Mr. Cameron (if he is re-elected) to try to repatriate some powers from Brussels in the "new settle-

¹ Расстроить чьи-л. замыслы

ment” he seeks with Europe. If Britons voted to reject the revised treaty there would be redoubled pressure for a second referendum, on their membership of the European club.

There is a fourth scenario: simple diplomatic miscalculation. A year ago, at a summit where they agreed on a fiscal compact, almost all other EU leaders banded together to sidestep a British veto. If that were to happen again on an issue that Britons care more deeply about, Mr. Cameron may face irresistible pressure to call an early referendum.

The early signs are that Britons would opt to push off. YouGov’s latest poll on the issue suggests that 49% would vote to leave, whereas only 32% would choose to stay (the rest are unsure). One senior Tory, who wants Britain to stay in, says blankly that it would be impossible to win a referendum at the moment.

The leaders of all three main parties, backed by business and trade unions, could try to woo Britons to Europe. But they would have plenty of opposition, and not just from other MPs. When Britain last voted on Europe, in 1975, every national newspaper except the *Morning Star* campaigned for an “In” vote. That will not be repeated. Britain’s two biggest-selling dailies, the *Daily Mail* and the *Sun* — combined circulation, 4.5m — are deeply Eurosceptic.

What would make the vote unpredictable is that Britons cannot have what they really want. If offered a “detached relationship that is little more than a free-trade agreement”, according to the same YouGov poll, only 26% would still opt for the exit. The biggest group of respondents, 46%, would accept those looser terms. But continental leaders are unwilling to grant Britain full access to the single market without the costly bits. Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, says she dearly wants to keep Britain in the EU — but “as a good partner”. In the run-up to a promised referendum, Mr. Cameron could win only trifling concessions. That might convince some Britons that life outside the EU would be difficult; but it might equally inflame Eurosceptic opinion and make an “out” vote more likely.

/to be continued/

WRITING A SUMMARY

I. Paraphrasing: keeping the tone

**A Reminder: tone is the attitude the writer wants to convey,
the emotional colouring of his/her writing**

TASK 1.

Look through the text again and identify the tone of the article. Reread the underlined sentences. Which words, phrases, structures are particularly telling of the style?

TASK 2.

Analyse the phrases from the article and decide on the ways to paraphrase them (use synonyms or antonyms suitable to the author’s tone, change word class (verb to noun or noun to verb, etc), change sentence structure if necessary keeping the author’s tone.

1. Britain has never been too keen on tying the knot with Europe.
2. Britons still think of their relationship with Europe as a transaction.

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3. ...the British feel sidelined.
4. ...attempt to recreate a free-trade relationship through bilateral agreements.
5. ... persuade Labour to follow suit.
6. ...to pile pressure on Mr. Cameron but also to stay on the right side of public opinion.
7. The third scenario is already in play.
8. ...the EU's creeping claim on its constituents' sovereign powers suggests...
9. ... diplomatic miscalculation...
10. ...try to woo Britons to Europe.
11. ... agreed on a fiscal compact...
12. ...win only trifling concessions.

TASK 3

Write a summary (300–350 words) of the text 'Making the break (1)'. Focus on keeping the author's tone.

II. Cutting a Long Story Short

TASK 1

Read the text and divide it into logical parts. Decide which paragraphs are built around a similar main idea. Combine these paragraphs into one part (section). Write an outline.

Europe
<p>Until the fifteenth century, humans lived in isolated, <u>sequestered</u> worlds. The Chinese didn't know of the Aztecs, and the Mayas didn't know of the Zulus. The Europeans may have heard of the Japanese, but they didn't really know them — and they certainly didn't interact with them. The Tower of Babel had done more than make it impossible for people to speak to each other. It made civilizations <u>oblivious</u> to each other.</p> <p>Europeans living on the eastern <u>rim</u> of the Atlantic Ocean <u>shattered</u> the barriers between these sequestered regions and turned the world into a single <u>entity</u> in which all of the parts interacted with each other. What happened to Australian aborigines was intimately connected to the British relationship with Ireland and the need to find penal colonies for British prisoners overseas. What happened to Inca kings was tied to the relationship between Spain and Portugal. The imperialism of Atlantic Europe created a single world.</p> <p>Atlantic Europe <u>became the center of gravity</u> of the global system. What happened in Europe defined much of what happened elsewhere in the world. Other nations and regions did everything with one eye on Europe. From the sixteenth to the twentieth century hardly any part of the world escaped European influence and power. Everything, for good or evil, revolved around it. And the <u>pivot</u> of Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled that stretch of water controlled <u>the highway to the world</u>.</p>

Europe was neither the most civilized nor the most advanced region in the world. So what made it the center? Europe really was a technical and intellectual backwater in the fifteenth century as opposed to China or the Islamic world. Why these small, out-of-the-way countries? And why did they begin their domination then and not five hundred years before or five hundred years later?

European power was about two things: money and geography. Europe depended on imports from Asia, particularly India. Pepper, for example, was not simply a cooking spice but also a meat preservative; its importation was a critical part of the European economy. Asia was filled with luxury goods that Europe needed, and would pay for, and historically Asian imports would come overland along the famous Silk Road and other routes until reaching the Mediterranean. The rise of Turkey closed these routes and increased the cost of imports.

European traders were desperate to find a way around the Turks. Spaniards and Portuguese — the Iberians — chose the nonmilitary alternative: they sought another route to India. The Iberians knew of only one route to India that avoided Turkey, down the length of the African coast and up into the Indian Ocean. They theorized about another route, assuming that the world was round, a route that would take them to India by going west.

This was a unique moment. At other points in history Atlantic Europe would have only fallen even deeper into backwardness and poverty. But the economic pain was real and the Turks were very dangerous, so there was pressure to do something. It was also a crucial psychological moment. The Spaniards, having just expelled the Muslims from Spain, were at the height of their barbaric arrogance. Finally, the means for carrying out such exploration was at hand as well. Technology existed that, if properly used, might provide a solution to the Turkey problem.

The Iberians had a ship, the caravel, that could handle deep-sea voyages. They had an array of navigational devices, from the compass to the astrolabe. Finally they had guns, particularly cannons. All of these might have been borrowed from other cultures, but the Iberians integrated them into an effective economic and military system. They could now sail to distant places. When they arrived they were able to fight — and win. People who heard a cannon fire and saw a building explode tended to be more flexible in negotiations. When the Iberians reached their destinations, they could kick in the door and take over. Over the next several centuries, European ships, guns, and money dominated the world and created the first global system, the European Age.

Here is the irony: Europe dominated the world, but it failed to dominate itself. For five hundred years Europe tore itself apart in civil wars, and as a result there was never a European empire — there was instead a British empire, a Spanish empire, a French empire, a Portuguese empire, and so on. The European nations exhausted themselves in endless wars with each other while they invaded, subjugated, and eventually ruled much of the world.

There were many reasons for the inability of the Europeans to unite, but in the end it came down to a simple feature of geography: the English Channel. First the Spanish, then the French, and finally the Germans managed to dominate the European

	<p>continent, but none of them could cross the Channel. Because no one could defeat Britain, conqueror after conqueror failed to hold Europe as a whole. Periods of peace were simply temporary <u>truces</u>. Europe was exhausted by the advent of World War I, in which over ten million men died — a good part of a generation. The European economy was shattered, and European confidence broken. Europe <u>emerged</u> as a demographic, economic, and cultural <u>shadow of its former self</u>.</p> <p>(871 words)</p> <p>/ a section from chapter 1. <i>The Next 100 Years</i> by George Friedman.2009/</p>
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TASK 2

Paraphrase the parts/sentences you intend to include in your summary. Pay attention to the underlined words. Where several words (a phrase or separate words) in a sentence are underlined try to compress the sentence by using fewer words.

TASK 3

Write a summary of the text using your outline. First answer the question: 'Should the order in which the ideas are presented be preserved?'

Editing

Read your summary and answer the questions:

1. Have you accurately represented the author's ideas and key points (the author's emphasis)?
2. Have you given the author's name and the details of the publication¹ in the introduction?
3. Have you mentioned the author periodically?
4. Have you written it in your OWN words? If you quoted the author, use the quotation marks.
5. Have you included any minor details or your own ideas?
6. Is it the right length?

Peer reading

Read your partner's summary and check it against the questions above.



DEVELOPING LISTENING SKILLS

Listening for new information and taking notes

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXLTQi7vVsl> (

TASK 1.

Watch the video "The Fallacy Project: Examples of fallacies from advertising, politics, and popular culture". Identify the fallacies you did not come across in Units 1 and 2.

¹ Identify the title of the piece you are summarizing, the date of publication, the genre or type of piece (journal article, essay, economic report, etc.)

TASK 2.

Make a list of fallacies described in the video, and jot down the key words in their descriptions.

Pair work

Compare your list and the key words with those of your partner.

TASK 3.

Look up the definitions of the new additions on your “Logical Fallacies” list.

DEVELOPING LOGICAL THINKING SKILLS

Pair work

Make up a list of 12 most common logical fallacies (see Units 1&2 p. p. 45, 82) adding more from the video above.

TASK 1.

Match your list with examples below. The first is done for you.

	Logical fallacy	Example
1	straw man	Anyone who thinks that interest in books is waning hasn't paid much attention. I love the show <i>Face the Nation</i> and they recently had eight authors on!
2		The Dutch experience demonstrates that legalizing drugs is the best way to fight drug addiction. [no mention of the rise in crime rate and drug addiction in the Netherlands]
3		On 1 st January 2015 Lithuania joined the euro zone. In January 2015 the euro hit its lowest as compared to dollar.
4		The French President is not to be trusted given his record of cheating on his partners.
5		Legalising euthanasia will inevitably lead to non-voluntary euthanasia.
6		Political advertisements appeal to emotions not logic. Therefore, political advertising should be banned.
7		As empires grow older, fatigue, much like metal fatigue, spells their imminent failure.
8		My hairdresser, who also does the MP's hair, says the lady is incapable of dealing with any crisis.

	Logical fallacy	Example
9		The older members of the EU are bound to take on the financial burden of saving the euro as they are the core Europe.
10		Whenever I see a man in the rain without an umbrella, I assume he is Dutch.
11		Adopting a new law on tax evasion will not increase the state revenue. Sending more people to prison will violate human rights and will make this government even more liable to criticism.
12		Facebook is the best way to keep in touch. So many people are using it.

TASK 2.

Read the statements and say whether you find the author's logic convincing?



Can you spot any logical fallacies? Can you suggest ways to improve the statements?

1. We are taking children from their mothers too soon, which leads to increased crime rates. I went to the Department of Education and got a list of kindergartens and I went to the safety department and got the crime report. In general the towns with a kindergarten have 400 percent more crime than other towns in the same county. In every county the town and cities with kindergartens had more crime (New Hampshire Representative Bob Kingsbury).
2. On Monday an environmental group illegally blocked loggers and workers at the nuclear plant in Minnesota. Clearly, environmentalists are radicals who take the law into their own hands.
3. Al Gore should stop speaking on global warming. Every time he does the weather changes for the worse and the temperature falls by several degrees.
4. "It (Obama's) was the most anti-small business administration I've seen probably since Carter. Who would have guessed we'd look back at the Carter¹ years as the good old days?" said Romney (Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential elections)
5. One doesn't have to be an expert in economics to see that the country is heading for a new housing bubble. A good friend of mine, who is a real estate agent, says house prices are picking up.
6. Senator Clark: "Why are you not willing to support the antiabortion amendment? Don't you have any feelings at all for the unborn children whose lives are being indiscriminately blotted out?" Senator Rich: "I just don't understand why you people who get so worked up about lives being blotted out by abortion don't have the same feelings about the thousands of lives

¹ Carter's administration (1977–1981) is remembered for many failings (inflation, energy crisis, war in Afghanistan, and hostages in Iran)

that are blotted out every year by the indiscriminate use of handguns. Is not the issue of the sanctity of human life involved in both issues? Why have you not supported us in our efforts at gun-control legislation?"

7. Tensions within the EU like tension in a structure will inevitably lead to its destruction from within.
8. The USA should stop getting involved militarily in other countries. Once the government sends in a few troops, it will then send in thousands to die.
9. Richard Nixon was a family man, an experienced politician, and a world-known leader. He deserves a national monument.
10. William Bonnet, the leader of the antirap campaign claims that "nothing less is at stake than civilization" if rappers are not rendered silent. What makes Bennett qualified to lead a moralistic crusade on behalf of America's minority youth? The very person who urged that "illegitimate" babies be taken from their mothers and put in orphanages!

Do you think these fallacies were made intentionally? If so, to what end? What discourse are these typical of?



THE READER

NOTES ON A SERIES OF SCANDALS: IS BRITISH DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?

Many of us feel we are living through a period of profound crisis. But perhaps democracy is more secure than at any time since the 1970s.

<http://www.newstatesman.com/2014/02/notes-series-scandals>

By **David Runciman**

6 February, 2014

British democracy is going through its worst crisis of confidence in decades. The underlying cause is economic. The recovery since the crash of 2008 has been the slowest in modern times. For Labour, the fear is that the party will continue to carry the can for allowing the mess to happen in the first place; for the coalition partners, it is that they will get blamed for the woefully unequal and piecemeal recovery. In this climate of uncertainty and distress, fringe parties and maverick voices have a golden opportunity. It's not only Nigel Farage who ends up being taken seriously — even Russell Brand gets his moment in the political sun.

However, the primary symptoms of the malaise of British democracy are institutional. Over the past five years the standing of many of the central institutions of British public life has been undermined by scandal. The banks have forfeited public trust as a result of the corruption and incompetence that was exposed during and after the financial crisis. The reputation of parliament was gravely damaged by the expenses scandal that came to light in 2009 and has been rumbling on through the courts and the media ever since. The press saw what remained of its reputation for probity shredded by the phone-hacking scandal and subsequent Leveson inquiry.

The police have been heavily implicated in the worst examples of press behaviour. This is not only in relation to phone-hacking but dates back to the Hillsborough disaster nearly 25 years ago — in which the evidence of widespread misconduct by the South Yorkshire force drew a fulsome apology from the Prime Minister in 2012. Now the London Met is grappling with the fallout from "Plebgate", a saga that is all the more damaging for being so absurd (the saying "It's not the crime, it's the cover-up" was never more true than in this case). The BBC is still reeling from the scandal surrounding the activities of Jimmy Savile and the exposure of ludicrously generous pay-offs to executives caught up in it. This summer we discovered that the British secret services have been routinely eavesdropping on the everyday activities of ordinary British citizens, aiding and abetting the far more extensive surveillance operations being undertaken by the Americans.

The armed forces have emerged relatively unscathed from this period of purgatory for public institutions, although even they have been tarnished by revelations about past brutalities in Northern Ireland and Iraq. Perhaps it is only the monarchy whose reputation has risen in recent years, which says something about the state of British democracy. Elected politicians tiptoe around these scandals, looking for some way to ally themselves with public anger. At the same time, they are deeply wary of fuelling a backlash of disgust against the entire political establishment that would sweep them up as well.

What these institutional failings have in common is that they arose from a growing sense of impunity among small networks of elites. As British society has become more unequal it has created pockets of privilege whose inhabitants are tempted to think that the normal rules don't apply to them. In any democracy, people with power will abuse it. All public institutions follow the path

of least resistance over time. The usual democratic remedy is for other public institutions to rein them in: it is the job of the press and the police to keep an eye on the politicians, just as it is the job of the politicians to keep an eye on the press and police. In Britain, it looks like the opposite was happening. A managerial political class, with extensive links to other elites in the media and business, colluded in the sort of lax scrutiny that served their joint interests. Much of this behaviour coincided with a period of unparalleled political stability and economic prosperity: the long boom that lasted from the early 1990s until 2007. But when boom turned to bust, the cosy world of the elites became a joint liability.

The public's tolerance for managerial politics depends on the ability of the managers to keep delivering. Once that stops, they are exposed. You have to go back to the mid-1970s to find a comparable period of economic failure allied with institutional mistrust. Then, this toxic combination resulted in a similar anxiety among the political class about how they were going to find a way out. The Nixon shock of 1971 — which saw the unravelling of the Bretton Woods system of exchange controls — coupled with the oil shock of 1973 — which saw the price of crude oil quadruple in a matter of months following the Opec embargo — produced inflation, recession and rising unemployment across the western world. In Britain, industrial unrest broke first the will of the Heath government to resist inflationary pay rises and then its ability to sustain itself in office at all. The early 1970s brought an explosion of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, followed by a heavy-handed and brutal clampdown by the British army. By 1974 the violence had spread to the mainland. Parts of Britain appeared practically ungovernable. There were dark mutterings about the incapacity of the democratic British state to meet the challenges that it faced.

On 3 March 1974, the leading *New York Times* journalist James Reston published a widely syndicated column that he headlined "The crisis of democracy". His dateline was London. Reston had arrived to cover the outcome of the general election that had been called a month earlier in order to discover, as Prime Minister Edward Heath fatefully framed it, "who governs Britain". The inconclusive result — a hung parliament, with Heath failing to get the backing he had asked for but Labour also short of a majority — prompted Reston to despair of western democracy more generally.

Heath and his rival Harold Wilson were typical of an age of "political technicians" who had forfeited the confidence of their electorates by their inability to muster a grand vision of politics. In place of idealism, they offered piecemeal fixes. The problem, however, was that although they were just technicians, they were also deeply partisan. "Mr Heath and Mr Wilson stick with the paradox that the country is in grave danger, but not so grave as to require their combining to save it," Reston observed. "So they will muddle along separately, begging for votes from the minor parties . . ."

This, he felt, spelled disaster in the long run. "The political 'decline of the west,'" he concluded, "is no longer a subject for theoretical debate but an ominous reality . . ."

Many of these complaints are echoed today. Politics is petty and visionless. The deep causes of public disquiet are not being addressed, let alone remedied. The inconclusive muddle of British politics, exacerbated by a plague-on-all-your-houses result at the last general election in 2010, with perhaps worse to come next time, is happening against the backdrop of a global shift in power from west to east. The public has come to believe the politicians are in it only for themselves.

Yet it is important to recognise the many significant differences between the crisis of democracy of the 1970s and the crisis now. The first is that there existed a surprisingly widespread belief during the mid-1970s that, were the muddle to continue, it might need to be ended by force, with a military takeover. A coup was not outside the realms of political possibility (and we now know

that rogue forces within the secret services made cack-handed attempts to organise one, with either the Duke of Edinburgh or Lord Mountbatten as the preferred strongman to replace Wilson).

The particular focus of these fears was rising inflation. It was a common assumption at the time that no democracy could survive a sustained bout of inflation above 30 per cent — and in Britain the rate hit 25 per cent in 1975. It was commonplace to invoke the baleful example of Latin America, where the global economic crisis of the mid-1970s led to the collapse of a number of democratic regimes. The economist Milton Friedman suggested in 1974 that the failure to control inflation had been responsible both for Heath's replacement by Wilson in Britain and for Allende's replacement by Pinochet in Chile. It cost one man his job; the other his life. The barely veiled sense of threat was apparent.

Today the talk of democracy-destroying inflation has more or less disappeared. Yes, we face a mix of rising prices and stagnant or falling wages — the “cost-of-living crisis”, as the Labour Party likes to call it — that has some echoes of 1970s stagflation. But the scale is very different. Ours is a slow-burning, incremental squeeze on living standards, not the threat of an inflationary rip tide sweeping away savings and security. In large part because of the fears generated in the 1970s, we now have economic technicians in charge of an independent central bank whose job is to ensure that inflation remains more or less under control. Likewise, the idea that the current crisis might result in a military coup seems laughably remote. We worry — or at least some of us do — that the military-security complex is squeezing what is left of our privacy by spying on our communications. We don't, however, worry that the security services are secretly plotting to instal a member of the royal family as an unelected head of the government.

Connected to this is a more profound difference: in the 1970s there were in the air plenty of seemingly viable alternatives to western liberal democracy, and not just on the militarist right. On the left also the idea of revolutionary change was much more than simply a slogan: for its champions, it was a realistic possibility. The 1970s were a deeply ideological decade, during which alternatives to the prevailing democratic system were frequently aired and often taken seriously. Ours, by contrast, is a post-ideological age. When Russell Brand calls for the revolution he proclaims inevitable, it is not clear what kind of politics he has in mind. His only concrete notion is that greater political disengagement will precipitate the change. Political disengagement does not produce revolution. It just provides more space for the political technicians to operate.

Of course, there are still some viable alternatives to western liberal democracy. Chinese state capitalism is making headway in many parts of the world, including Africa. Democratic populism, of the kind practised by Hugo Chávez, has plenty of adherents in Latin America. But these alternatives are rarely, if ever, treated as even hypothetically viable futures for a country such as Britain. I chaired an event recently in Cambridge at which Seumas Milne of the *Guardian*, perhaps the most conventionally left-wing journalist currently writing for a mainstream publication (during the 1970s mainstream writers who shared Milne's views were legion), described the current failings of liberal democracy: botched wars, rapacious banks and energy companies, deep-seated inequality, under-resourced public services. His largely middle-class audience was with him every step of the way. But when someone asked what the alternative was, and he said we should run our economy more like the Chinese run theirs, there was an uncomfortable silence. Suddenly he was on his own. Discontented Britons who as a corollary embrace the idea of Chinese-style state capitalism are vanishingly rare.

Britain today is a very different country from what it was in the 1970s. It is more comfortable and much more tolerant of different personal lifestyles, even as it is less tolerant of extreme political

views. Above all, it is vastly more prosperous. It is true that the effects of the present economic crisis are far-reaching and serious: many people who considered themselves comfortably off have found that it is increasingly hard to sustain their standard of living. The squeeze on living costs is being felt by a large proportion of the population. At the same time, the disproportionate rewards being enjoyed by those at the very top are both more visible and more pronounced than ever. This is a much more unequal society than it was 40 years ago. Nonetheless, all this is happening from what is by any historic standards a very high base of material security (excepting the pockets of true deprivation that prosperous societies such as ours still allow to grow up in their midst).

There is extensive historical evidence that once they pass beyond a certain level of material prosperity democratic societies are very unlikely to experiment with alternative forms of government. The costs of the disruption are not worth any possible reward. The cut-off point is usually put at around \$7,000 per capita GDP. During the dark days of the 1970s, even as it contracted, the British economy remained well above that level — but not so far as to be out of sight (per capita GDP was roughly \$15,000 at the start of the 1970s). By 2008, per capita GDP in Britain was close to \$40,000 and although it has fallen since, it has not fallen far (and not below \$37,000). If we couldn't face the economic and social disruption of drastic political change in the 1970s, we are hardly likely to be keener on it now.

By contrast, there is almost no historical evidence to tell us what happens when an exceptionally prosperous democratic society like ours suffers from widespread institutional failure and enters a period of decline. The level of prosperity that Britain has achieved is far too recent a phenomenon for there to be useful historical examples to draw on. Perhaps the only real point of comparison is with contemporary Japan. Since the early 1990s the Japanese economy has largely stagnated and its political institutions have struggled to adjust to the challenges they have faced. Japan entered a period of crisis two decades ago in which it seemed to get permanently stuck.

At the start of the "lost decades" in Japan there were frequent warnings of impending disaster — could a democracy survive if it stopped delivering significant economic growth? It turns out that Japanese democracy could survive. Things in Japan never got so bad as to shake the system out of its torpor, but that means they also never got bad enough to bring the system to its knees. At no point has there been the prospect of a military coup. The political technicians simply muddled through as best they could, patching things together and hoping for better days. Over the past year there have been signs that better days are finally returning for the economy, although, as many Japanese are aware, they have been here before. One feature of drawn-out crises in which nothing gets sufficiently broken for anything to get finally fixed is that they are full of false dawns. In Britain we might right now be experiencing the first of many.

Britain is not Japan. British civil institutions are both more flexible and less socially cohesive than their Japanese equivalents. We are able to adapt to our failings more quickly — and we may need to, because we do not have the protection of extensive family and corporate support systems to paper over the cracks. But in one respect, Britain does resemble Japan. Japanese public life, though relatively rigid in institutional terms, has long been rife with scandal. It is the form in which political outrage gets expressed: business, media and political figures are all often brought down by the exposure of their personal failings. Similarly, one of the distinctive features of the present crisis of British democracy is the extent to which it has been dominated by scandal. It has been the exposure of individual misdeeds that has generated most of the outrage. Fred the Shred, Jimmy Savile, Rebekah Brooks, Sir Peter Viggers of duck-house infamy: these are the targets of public dismay and disgust. One reason why the present scandal over GCHQ surveillance is yet to

have a similar impact is that in the faceless world of high-level espionage it is by definition much harder to find an individual to blame. Even the phone-hacking scandal only really took off when the public was able to put a face to the injustice: Milly Dowler and her family.

Scandals are not the same as full-blown political crises, although it is often tempting to confuse the two. Crises can sometimes transform politics. Scandals rarely do. One reason why we often inflate the significance of democratic scandals is that all of them exist in the shadow of the greatest scandal of them all, which did result in a full-blown crisis and widespread political change. The Dreyfus affair, which split *fin de siècle* French society and reconfigured the power of the French state, is the scandal against which all others are measured. Every now and then the exposure of misdeeds in high places does indeed overturn the established order. But Dreyfus is the exception, not the rule. Most democratic scandals have very limited effects. They create a huge amount of fuss for a short period of time. Usually they offer moments of catharsis: a resignation, a trial, a conviction. What they do not produce is structural change.

Here a comparison with the 1970s is instructive. It was not an age of great political scandals in Britain, though we had our usual share of embarrassments and fall guys, from Lord Lambton to Jeremy Thorpe. The true sense of crisis that gripped the western democracies coincided with the most significant democratic scandal since Dreyfus: Watergate. The ripple effects from Watergate contributed to a growing feeling in the middle of the decade that western democracy was rudderless, its most important player turned in on itself in a never-ending bout of recrimination and political bloodletting. Europe's democratic politicians often complained during the 1970s about the excessive power of the United States. But they also complained when that power went missing. Recent criticisms of the US, fuelled by the hair-raising spectacle of a government shutdown taking the country to the brink of a catastrophic default, follow a similar pattern. We don't like American democracy to overshadow ours, but nor do we like it when America's politicians neglect the rest of the world to pursue their endless infighting. We don't want America's politicians telling us what to do, but nor do we want them turning their backs on us.

As it was unfolding, Watergate looked like it might be a watershed, and Nixon's resignation was widely regarded as the moment for American democracy to renew itself. Yet in retrospect its significance seems very different. Like most scandals, Watergate constituted a diversion rather than a decisive break with the past. American democracy absorbed the shock and moved on. The properly significant change occurred later in the decade, during the Carter administration, when a structural shift took place from the remnants of the New Deal economy to the finance capitalism that ultimately let rip in the Reagan years. At the end of the 1970s, Wall Street took over from main street as the dominant force in US political life, a position it has occupied ever since. Watergate provided some of the cover for this to happen. It generated first outrage and then a widespread feeling of disillusionment, once it became clear how little of substance had changed. Distraction followed by disillusionment are often the circumstances in which democratic politicians feel emboldened to try something new.

In 1975 another widely read publication appeared under the title *The Crisis of Democracy*. This was the report of the Trilateral Commission, which had been asked to look into the possibility that western democracy was at the end of the road. One of its co-authors, the American political scientist Samuel Huntington (later better known as the author of *The Clash of Civilisations*), shared the general feeling that western democracy was in deep trouble, weighed down by inflationary pressures, international discord and intellectual grandstanding. However, he pointed to a way out of the mess. It would not require the voters to ramp up their demands on the politicians: Huntington

thought that this was what had caused the trouble in the first place. Instead, rescue would come when the public became so tired of the disappointments of democratic politics that they more or less lost interest in it altogether. At that point, the politicians might finally have the room to attempt reform. Huntington's prognosis, cynical and disillusioned as it was, turned out to be prescient. What provides the space for change is not public anger; it is growing public indifference.

The current spate of British scandals looks different because there are so many of them: it is not just one institution but the whole edifice of public life that appears to be fraying. Scandal on this scale might provide the impetus for wholesale reform — yet I rather doubt it. More likely is that it multiplies the distraction. If anything, we are suffering from scandal overload: as each institutional exposure is followed by another, as yet more scapegoats are found and as politicians reposition themselves to withstand a fresh bout of public anger, it is harder than ever to find a focus for deep-rooted change.

Scandals in democracies allow the public to vent anger without undermining the basis of democracy — we fixate on the misdeeds of a few people at the top, which helps to preserve the underlying structures intact. This represents one of the basic differences between democracy and the alternatives. Under autocratic regimes, an outburst of public rage can be fatal because the system lacks the means to accommodate it. That is why autocrats are so scared of scandals (witness the efforts by the Chinese state to limit the effects of the Bo Xilai affair). The distraction of Watergate helped American democracy to survive the 1970s: it allowed citizens to let off steam without resulting in an implosion of the entire system of government. It was the regimes that couldn't accommodate popular anger, including the communist states of eastern Europe, that eventually fell apart.

A multiplication of scandals gives the appearance of the build-up of a huge head of steam for change. But in fact it means the steam gets let off in lots of different places at once, which makes it even harder to channel public anger in any one direction in particular. The response is far more likely to be fragmentary than coherent: endless firefighting rather than a concerted effort to build a better system of government. At the same time, we are still a long way from the state of public indifference that might give the politicians room to undertake bolder experiments. The risk is that a fragmentation of public attention coincides with a deepening sense of resentment at the ineffectual attempts by politicians to make a tangible difference. For now even the moments of catharsis are proving elusive.

The digital revolution exacerbates this risk. The multiplication of scandals is in part the result of the emergence of information that has long been suppressed. In the absence of secrets, public anger never completely goes away: there is always something new to rail against. Democracy in Britain is more secure than it was in the 1970s because of the absence of ideological alternatives and because of the material comfort in its foundations. But it faces a challenge that did not exist four decades ago. Constant scrutiny of a surfeit of information fragments more than just attention spans. At the end of the 1970s the two main parties together commanded the votes of over 80 per cent of voters on a turnout of over three-quarters of the electorate. Now Labour and the Tories share the support of barely two-thirds of those who vote on turnouts of less than two-thirds of the total electorate — and both figures are likely to keep falling.

The risk for British democracy is not of permanent crisis. It is of a permanent state of scandal obscuring the underlying crisis of elitist managerial politics and thereby making it harder to fix. It is increasingly difficult to envisage the circumstances in which politicians get the space to try something new.

The advantage of democratic systems of government is that they adjust when they have to, trying something new until they find something that sticks. They are broadly experimental and adaptable. British democracy is much more secure than it was in the 1970s, yet it is also much more fragmented. Together, these two factors leave its adaptability in question. With these factors in play, it may be that the crisis has to get a lot worse before the conditions arise in which significant change is possible. But the crisis is real and bad enough already, and wishing for worse in order to galvanise the prospects for institutional change is playing with fire. Although the leaders of both main political parties like to compare themselves with Margaret Thatcher in her role as steely-willed game-changer, no one wants to go back to the high-stakes politics of the 1970s. British democracy recovered from the travails of that decade. The present state of British democracy is a reflection of how far removed we are now from those looming fears of imminent collapse. This time the danger is different. We face the risk of getting stuck where we are.

David Runciman is a professor of politics and fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His latest book, "The Confidence Trap: a History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present", is published by Princeton University Press (£19.95)

This is an edited version of an essay that appears in the winter edition of the IPPR journal Juncture

COMPULSORY VOTING MAY REINFORCE THE RESENTMENT YOUNG PEOPLE FEEL TOWARD THE POLITICAL CLASS

By [Democratic Audit](#) 27/05/2014

*With young people much less likely to vote than older generations, it has been proposed the UK follow other countries such as Belgium and Australia by introducing compulsory voting, with IPPR suggesting only first-time voters should be forced to participate. **Matt Henn** and **Nick Foard** consider the merits of this proposal using data from a recent survey of voting intentions, concluding it would risk increasing the disconnect between young people and democracy.*

What might be done to re-connect today's youth generation to the formal political process and to convert their broad democratic outlooks into attendance at the ballot booth? Is compulsory voting the way forward? Recently, a report from Sarah Birch and IPPR has suggested that one way to arrest the decline in youth voter turnout is to introduce a system of compulsory voting for first-time voters. This suggestion is not as radical as it might at first seem. There are several established democracies that have compulsory voting laws, including Belgium, Australia, Greece, Luxembourg — and several more which have all had such systems for at least a period during the modern era (such as Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands).

There would certainly appear to be some major advantages should voting be made compulsory for first time voters. At present, there is a momentum developing in Britain for the idea of extending the vote to 16 and 17 year olds; the Labour party are considering making this part of their platform for office at the next general election, while these younger groups will be granted the right to vote at the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014. It is also argued that compelling these young people to vote will help towards eliminating the generational electoral divide. In doing so, it will force professional politicians, the political parties and future governments to treat

young people and their policy concerns more respectfully and on a par with those of their older contemporaries. Furthermore, evidence suggests that voting (and by implication, non-voting) is habit-forming (Franklin, 2004). Consequently, requiring young people to vote will help shape their commitment to voting in the future.

A major drawback of introducing such a compulsory voting scheme for young people is that it singles them out as 'different' from the rest of the adult population, helping to reinforce the stereotype of this current youth generation as apathetic and politically irresponsible. The implication being that it is the behaviour of young people that needs changing — rather than a reform of the political process and of democratic institutions to make the latter more accessible and meaningful for today's youth generation. Furthermore, critics might argue that compelling any young person to vote who has only limited interest in mainstream electoral politics or who feels no affinity with the parties on offer, has serious negative implications for the health of our democratic system; by forcing them to vote, they may develop an attitude of entrenched disdain for the parties, or indeed become particularly susceptible to parties with antidemocratic tendencies — especially those of the far-right. However, offering the option to vote for '*None of the above*' on the ballot paper may help militate against this latter point.

In our research study, we asked young people if the introduction of compulsory voting would make a difference to their turnout in future elections. Perhaps not surprisingly, the largest group (47 per cent) said it would, although a large minority (40 per cent) reported it would make no difference. Of particular note, Table 1 compares the views of those young people claiming to have voted at the 2010 General Election with those reporting that they had not. These 'Voters' and 'non-voters' were similar in stating that that they would be more likely to vote in the future if compulsory voting were introduced (46 per cent and 50 per cent respectively). However, 28 per cent of those who didn't vote in 2010 said that compulsory voting would make no difference — and that they would continue not to vote. Furthermore, and perhaps worryingly, twice as many previous non-voters (12 per cent) than voters (6 per cent) stated that they'd actually be *less* inclined to vote in the future should compulsory voting be introduced.

Table 1: Compulsory voting by voting behaviour at the 2010 General Election (%)

Would you be more likely or less likely to vote in the future if voting was compulsory?	Voted at the 2010 General Election	Did not vote at the 2010 General Election
More likely	46	50
Make no difference	44	28
Less likely	6	12
Don't know	4	10

Projecting forward, our results reveal important attitudinal differences between those already planning to vote at the next general election, and those intending to abstain. As Table 2 reveals, 58 per cent of those reporting that they were already very *unlikely* to vote felt that compulsory voting would make either no difference to this decision (38 per cent), or indeed make them even *less* likely to vote (20 per cent). From this we can infer that the introduction of compulsory voting would merely serve to reinforce existing feelings of resentment.

Table 2: Compulsory voting by likelihood to vote at the next General Election (%)

Would you be more likely or less likely to vote in the future if voting was compulsory?	All	Very likely to vote	Very unlikely to vote
More likely	47	50	32
Make no difference	39	42	38
Less likely	8	5	20
Don't know	6	2	10

Does compulsory voting represent a viable solution to the on-going disconnect between young people and the democratic process? It would seem that more young people would vote if such a system were introduced — not surprising if such a system were mandatory. However, whether or not this would mean that they would feel truly connected to the democratic process remains in question. Indeed, forcing young people to vote when they feel such a deep aversion to the political class may actually serve to reinforce a deepening resentment, rather than to engage them in a positive manner and bolster the democratic process.

WHY DOES THE UK LOVE THE MONARCHY?

Mark Easton, BBC News, UK

29 May 2012

<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18237280>

I have recently been accused on Twitter of being both a royalist “uber-Toady” and the author of “the most anti-monarchist report you could want to view”.

Both tweets related to the same item, a report for the BBC News at Ten that tried to answer a straightforward question: why does a country that has become so cynical about other institutions (Parliament, the City, the press, the police) remain so loyal to the monarchy?

Whatever republicans might wish, less than a fifth of the Queen’s subjects in the UK say they want to get rid of the Royal Family — a proportion that has barely changed across decades.

According to polling data from Ipsos Mori, support for a republic was 18% in 1969, 18% in 1993, 19% in 2002 and 18% last year. Three-quarters of the population want Britain to remain a monarchy — a finding that has been described by pollsters as “probably the most stable trend we have ever measured”.

Given the enormous social change there has been since the current Queen assumed the throne 60 years ago, it might seem surprising that a system of inherited privilege and power should have retained its popularity.

But reading some of the comments on Twitter, it seems that even to raise a quizzical eyebrow at the approval ratings of the Windsors is regarded by some monarchists as tantamount to treason.

Republicans, on the other hand, believe that to highlight the conspicuous lack of progress they have had in winning the nation to their cause is evidence of obsequious knee-bending.

I recently re-acquainted myself with the work of two seminal figures in the long-running debate between republican and monarchist thinkers in Britain — Thomas Paine and Walter Bagehot.

I was searching for an answer to the same question: “What is it about our country that we retain such affection for a system which appears at odds with the meritocratic principles of a modern liberal democracy?”

In January 1776, Paine’s pamphlet *Common Sense* began to be passed around among the population of the colonies of the New World, a manifesto for American independence and republicanism.

“There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of Monarchy,” Paine declared. “One of the strongest natural proofs of the folly of the hereditary right in kings, is, that nature disapproves it, otherwise she would not so frequently turn it into ridicule by giving mankind an ass for a lion.”

He contrasted the common sense of his pamphlet’s title with the absurdity and superstition that inspired the “prejudice of Englishmen” for monarchy, arising “as much or more from national pride than reason”.

To this day, British republicans refer to Paine’s *Common Sense* almost as the sacred text. But monarchists have their own sacred text, written almost exactly a century afterwards. Walter Bagehot’s *English Constitution* was a belated response to the revolutionary arguments of the New World republicans.

“We catch the Americans smiling at our Queen with her secret mystery,” he wrote, with a suggestion that Paine and his kind were prisoners of their own “literalness”. Bagehot didn’t try to justify monarchy as rational (indeed he accepted many of Paine’s criticisms), but his point was that an “old and complicated society” like England required more than mundane, dreary logic.

Walter Bagehot wrote about the “mystic reverence” essential to “true monarchy”

“The mystic reverence, the religious allegiance, which are essential to a true monarchy, are imaginative sentiments that no legislature can manufacture in any people,” he wrote. “You might as well adopt a father as make a monarchy.”

Bagehot had identified a developing national characteristic. As colonial power and the riches of empire declined, there was an increasing desire to define greatness as something other than wealth and territory. Britain wanted to believe it was, intrinsically, special. “People yield a deference to what we may call the theatrical show of society,” he wrote. “The climax of the play is the Queen.”

Wind the clock forward to 1952 and plans were being made for the Coronation of the new Elizabeth II. Despite post-war austerity, it was decided the event should be a fabulous, flamboyant, extravagant affair with all the pomp and pageantry they could muster. There would be feathers and fur, gold and jewels, anthems and trumpets.

It was a giant gamble. Britain was re-evaluating many of the traditional power structures that had shaped society in the 1930s. How would a population still subject to food rationing react to a ceremony that almost rubbed its nose in the wealth and privilege of the hereditary monarch?

Two sociologists, Michael Young and Ed Shils, had joined the crowds in the East End of London, dropping in on street parties to find out. Their thesis, entitled *The Meaning of the Coronation*, accepted that there were some who had dismissed the whole affair as a ridiculous waste of money.

But overall, they concluded: “The Coronation provided at one time and for practically the entire society such an intensive contact with the sacred that we believe we are justified in interpreting it as we have done in this essay, as a great act of national communion.”

Britain — battered, bruised and broke — appeared determined to embrace its monarchy and hang the cost. The paradox is that austerity was positively comfortable with ostentation; institutional challenge spawned a passion for hereditary authority.

It wasn't just that Britain wanted a distraction from hardship and uncertainty. Enthusiastic support for monarchy seemed to run counter to the new liberalism which was guiding the politics of post-war Britain.

The explanation, I think, is that the 1950s were also a period in which the country was anxious about how global, institutional and social change might threaten its identity.

The impact of Americanisation as well as colonial and European immigration upon British life were a source of great concern. Despite winning the war, it appeared that national power and influence were being lost. Institutional authority was being questioned.

There were fears, too, that the values and traditions which underpinned family and community life were also changing rapidly. War and financial hardship had combined to shake up and challenge ancient orthodoxies.

Monarchy represented a bulwark against rapid and scary change.

Sixty years after our Queen assumed the throne, many of those same anxieties remain. Concerns about how globalisation and immigration are changing Britain continue to trouble us. Respect for institutions has declined as the global financial crisis has ushered in a new era of austerity.

In Accrington earlier this month, I watched a down-to-earth, no-nonsense town go slightly mad for the Queen. Thousands lined the streets, hung out of windows, climbed lamp-posts to catch a glimpse of their monarch.

They stood for hours in a chilly wind wearing daft hats — a metaphor for the attitude of their country. Times are tough, the challenges are great and we respond by cheering an aspect of our culture that, for all its irrationality, is uniquely ours.

The British have always chosen the quirks of our history against foreign rationalism. The Romans brought us straight roads and decimalisation. As soon as they left, we reverted to impossibly complicated Imperial measures and winding country lanes.

“Start Quote

The Normans commissioned the Domesday Book to try and impose order on bureaucratic chaos but had to compromise at every turn. That is how we ended up with something called Worcestershire — a place that foreigners find impossible to pronounce, never mind spell.

The British don't like straight lines. When we look at those maps of the United States with ruler-straight state boundaries, we feel pity. Walter Bagehot understood that our identity is found in the twists and turns of a rural B-road, not in the pragmatism of a highway.

It is the same with our system of governance. Logic is not the most important factor. We are happy to accept eccentricity and quirkiness because they reflect an important part of our national character.

So in trying to explain the unlikely success of the monarchy, we shouldn't expect the answer to be based on reason.

It is not a pocket-book calculation of profit and loss — how much does the Queen cost compared to what she brings in for the tourist trade?

It is not a question of prevailing political attitudes — how can a liberal democracy justify power and privilege based on an accident of birth?

The British monarchy is valued because it is the British monarchy. We are an old and complicated society that yields a deference to the theatrical show of society.

IT'S THE QUEEN'S 60TH ANNIVERSARY: WHY IS BRITAIN STILL A MONARCHY?

Heather Horn, Feb 6 2012

THE ATLANTIC

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/its-the-queens-60th-anniversary-why-is-britain-still-a-monarchy/252608/>

The British royal family is an expensive anachronism and little more.

Today is the sixtieth anniversary of Queen Elizabeth II's ascension to the British throne, which occurred upon her father's death in 1952. Happy anniversary — or Diamond Jubilee, as it is known — Your Majesty. Now: what exactly are you still doing there, anyway?

Nostalgia and the royals' tourist appeal aside, there's something a bit jarring both to logic and to liberal democratic sensibilities about what the queen stands for. After all, British "citizens" are still at least nominally, and arguably legally, considered "subjects." The United Kingdom's Home Office and the passports it issues reflect the country's switch in 1949 from the language of subjecthood to citizenship, and thus make a distinction between "citizens of the United Kingdom" and "British subjects." That's not a particularly pretty distinction, since the latter is mostly a leftover of the country's imperial era.

But as plenty of experts have pointed out, there is no piece of paper that officially designates Brits as "citizens." And if a magazine-length article can be written under the headline "Are we subjects or citizens?" as the BBC did in 2005, whatever scraps of citizenship clinging to Britons can't be all that substantial.

The financial side of the British monarchy is no less quirky. Governing for payment is standard, but the queen reigns, which appears mostly to mean visiting things. Strange as this looks from a practical standpoint, it's even stranger in theory. In 2012, why would the people of a Western state *pay* someone to subjugate them? That Britain is Western matters here not so much because of values but because of history. The British state was arguably the first in the region to be organized along the principles of an explicit social contract; it's the heir to the English Magna Carta in 1215 as well as the Glorious Revolution, where, for the first time, monarchs — King William and Queen Mary — were brought in to accept a crown on the subjects' own terms. Yet, in a twist that continues to fascinate historians, William and Mary paved the way for remarkably conservative stability in the ensuing centuries. France, as the trope goes, had a political revolution, Britain had an industrial one. And here the two countries are today, France heading into the final stretch of a presidential election, while a not insignificant portion of the British economy gets poured into preparations for a June-weekend Diamond Jubilee of a figurehead queen, who Britons never explicitly agreed to support.

Though the March 2011 financial report on royal finances proudly announced a 19% decrease in the Queen's official expenditure over the course of five years, is this really much solace? Her family will still spend £32.1 million, quite a lot of money. Remarkably, UK education secretary Michael Gove reportedly also wanted the public to donate a £60 million royal yacht to Her Majesty for the 2012 celebrations, although the details of that proposal are disputed, and private donations were mentioned as well.

Downing Street nixed the public funding idea, fortunately. Prime Minister David Cameron did declare early Monday, though, that "Today is a day to pay tribute to the magnificent service of Her

Majesty the Queen.” Her “experience, dignity, and quiet authority,” he also mentioned are indisputable, but “pay tribute” seems a bit too atavistically close to home for comfort, and Brits don’t have as much tribute to give up as they used to. And “magnificent service”? No one doubts the queen keeps a pretty punishing schedule of standing in formal ceremonies and visiting schools for a lady her age — but there *are* a few palaces and a lifetime source of income in the deal.

The royal wedding is over. Kate’s and Pippa’s dresses were fantastic, and the hats were fun. No argument there. As a privately funded theme park, the royals have real potential. The monarchy, so the crown defenders’ argument goes, does indeed bring in cash for the country through tourism and from the Crown Estate. But the current set-up is bizarre, and the frenzied yearning for a U.S. equivalent among so many of my American countrymen and women last spring was puzzling. In the cold, clear light of this less glamorous royal event, the monarchy looks like exactly what it is: a major anachronism. Nothing more.

THE ROYAL FAMILY IS A BARGAIN FOR BRITAIN

The repeated freezing of the Civil List merely adds to the monarchy’s value, says Gerald Warner.

By **Gerald Warner**, the Telegraph

23 Jun 2010

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/7850335/The-Royal-family-is-a-bargain-for-Britain.html>

Among the mind-boggling macroeconomic statistics rattled off by George Osborne in his Budget statement, one figure stood out in its extreme modesty: the £7.9 million Civil List payment to the Queen, frozen for the 21st year in succession. Allocated by John Major, as chancellor, in 1990, it has since lost 76 per cent of its value. The Queen must be alone among public-sector workers in accepting such a real terms reduction in income over so long a period. She is also unique in continuing to work aged 84.

The official Treasury announcement stated: “Royal Household spending on support of The Queen in Her duties as Monarch in 2011 will fall from £15.1 million to £14.9 million. The £7 million difference will be financed from the Civil List Reserve.” Because the Queen prudently set aside savings in the earlier years, when the £7.9 million payment was worth more, now that the proverbial rainy day has arrived she has reserves to draw upon. Gordon Brown, at his weekly audiences, might profitably have taken advice from her majesty on the prudent management of public funds.

The Civil List was established in 1760, when George III surrendered the income from the Crown Estate to the government in exchange for a fixed annual payment from the Treasury. The taxpayer gained an exceptional bargain from that arrangement: last year, total government spending on all functions of the monarchy amounted to £7.9 million from the Civil List, £22.6 million in grants-in-aid for communications, travel and property from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and £4.6 million from other departments. That total of £35.1 million is dwarfed by the £226.5 million profit passed to the Treasury by the Crown Estate.

Critics of the royal finances have no real case. Last year, Norman Baker, the Liberal Democrat MP, claimed: “If the Royal family are convinced they are offering value for money, they should subject themselves to the Freedom of Information Act like every other part of the public sector. Until there

is that level of transparency, any rise should be resisted." Clearly, he was heedless of Walter Bagehot's maxim regarding the monarchy: "We must not let daylight in upon the magic."

In any case, daylight is flooding in: from 2012, the Civil List will be audited by the National Audit Office, which will lay its findings before Parliament to be scrutinised if it wishes.

The monarchy costs 69p a year for every person in Britain, or £1.33 per taxpayer. In return, besides the Crown Estate profits, there is the unquantifiable, but enormous, tourist revenue it generates. Claims that a republican head of state would be less costly are absurd. The German presidency costs about the same as the Queen, but how many tourists line the streets of Berlin to catch a glimpse of — er — what is his name?

In France, Nicolas Sarkozy set an annual budget for his establishment at the Elysée of 110 million euros (£90 million). Last year, the French head of state's expenses were audited for the first time since the reign of Louis XVI; it revealed a flower bill of 275,809 euros and 3,000 euros in fines for late payment of electricity and gas.

Although the monarchy undoubtedly represents value for money, its true worth cannot be expressed in financial terms. It is the personification of the nation, the embodiment of our national identity. The monarchy is living history, a pageant of our past that remains relevant in the present and will continue to do so in the future. Constitutionally, it is the guarantor of stability: during the political impasse that followed the general election and the protracted negotiations, our governmental process did not miss a beat, since the Queen remained as the constitutional authority, ensuring continuity.

She also gives authority a human face. In other countries, how many hospital wards are significantly cheered by the visit of a republican head of state, usually a political retreat with partisan baggage? The additional advantage of a royal family, with several members carrying out official duties, is that many more engagements can be accommodated than any single president could ever perform. Bagehot also recognised that a family at the apex of society generated more interest than a solitary individual.

In 2012, the Queen will celebrate her diamond jubilee. As a nation, we shall have much to give thanks for on that occasion. In faithful fulfilment of the promise she made on her accession to the throne, the Queen has served her people with total dedication. May she do so for years to come.

THE CHANGING POLITICS OF SOCIAL CLASS

by **Peter Kellner**

June 9, 2014

<http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/06/09/changing-politics-social-class/>

British comedy can tell us a thing or two about social class in modern Britain

As so often, some of the sharpest political insights come not from the sage columnists of our upmarket papers but from comedy writers. They have noticed — and exploited — some of the social class cross-currents that conventional analysis has tended to overlook.

Fifty years ago, things were so much simpler. The working classes voted Labour while the middle classes voted Conservative. In 1967 Peter Pulzer, a distinguished political scientist, wrote: "Class is the basis of British politics. All else is embellishment and detail." He had good reason to

say this. Labour had won the general election a year earlier by winning more than 60% of working class votes. It secured the votes of only one in four middle class voters, who preferred the Tories by more than two-to-one.

Today, Britain's economic and social structure is completely different; and so is the nature of party loyalties. Using the same yardstick as in the 1960s — whether the job of the head of each voter's household is essentially manual ("C2DE") or non-manual ("ABC1") — the class gap is far narrower. In YouGov's survey for Prospect of more than 3,000 electors, Labour enjoyed a 1% lead among ABC1 voters, and a 6% lead among C2DE voters — a class gap of five points.

However, these figures fail to tell the full story. Social class may no longer affect votes as powerfully as it used to — but its influence is still far greater than conventional polls suggest.

As well as ascertaining their conventional class position, we asked people whether they regarded themselves as "working class", "middle class" or "upper class". It turns out that almost one adult in three gives the "wrong" answer: nine million ABC1 adults consider themselves working class, while five million C2DE adults say they are middle class. (Only 1% called themselves upper class.) As far as I know, no equivalent data exists for the Fifties or Sixties, but it is hard to believe that the equivalent cross-over figures would have been anything like as high.

Does this matter? Isn't social class a relic from the era of factories, coal mines, shipyards and steelworks, of little relevance today? One reason why it deserves attention concerns people's party loyalties. When we analyse party support by the social class people give themselves, we find a much larger gulf between "middle" and "working" class voters than between ABC1 and C2DE voters.

Among "middle class" voters, the Tories lead Labour by 16 — while Labour is 21% ahead among "working class" voters. This time the class gap is a huge 37 points. The link between occupation and politics may have fractured, but that between people's self-perception and party support still matters.

To dig deeper into this, we combined "objective" and "subjective" social class data, to create four groups, represented here (and with admittedly insulting stereotypes) by characters from British comedy:

The first two represent people whose objective and subjective status are the same:

"Captain Mainwaring", the banker from *Dad's Army* who seeks to assert his superior status: ABC1 and middle class;

"Alf Garnett", the central character from *Till Death Do US Part*: working class and proud of it.

The other two represent the crossover groups:

"Dave Spart" — *Private Eye*'s middle-class revolutionary, who regards himself as working class;

"Hyacinth Bucket" — the snob with working class roots in *Keeping Up Appearances*, forever trying to inflate her social status. (**See the notes for more details on the characters**)

We find that the politics of the two crossover groups are driven far more by their "subjective" than their "objective" social class. Indeed, if anything, their attachment to their favoured party is slightly stronger than those whose "subjective" and "objective" locations are the same. Thus the Tory lead among Britain's Hyacinth Buckets is higher than among its Captain Mainwarings, while Labour does slightly better among the Dave Sparts than the Alf Garnetts — which, I suspect is precisely what the creators of these characters would predict if they all got together. And it will come as no surprise to them that Britain's Alf Garnetts — the C2DE folk who regard themselves as working class — provide more fertile ground for Ukip than any other group.

So: social class still plays a significant role in British politics; but how? Half a century ago, class experiences, loyalties and attitudes were rooted in ideology. Most working-class voters wanted

more nationalisation, strong trade union, ambitious public spending programmes and higher income taxes (which largely came from people with middle-class jobs). That was why they voted Labour. The middle classes generally had little enthusiasm for any of these things (although, until Margaret Thatcher, few wanted to turn the clock back to small-government *laissez-faire*) and voted Conservative.

What are today's political dividing lines between the classes? We listed seventeen policy ideas and asked people whether they agreed or disagreed with each. We were looking not so much for the overall balance of support for each policy, but for the extent to which "middle class" and "working class" voters differ.

The widest gulf concerns immigration. A big majority of "working class" voters want it stopped completely; "middle class" voters are evenly divided. Working class voters are also significantly more likely than middle class voters to distrust MPs as a whole, to think that Britain has changed for the worse in the past 20–30 years and to want the death penalty for those who kill police officers.

The notable thing about those dividing-line issues is that they are all cultural rather than ideological. On these, class divisions are far narrower. Big majorities on both sides of the class divide support renationalization of Britain's railways — and oppose a bigger role for private companies in the NHS. Both groups are divided on the trade-off between taxes and public spending, on whether trade unions have done more harm than good, and on whether most recipients of welfare benefits really need the money.

There are bigger differences on the more specific issue of business leaders. Working class voters are far more critical of their motives and their ability to command million-plus salaries. Concerns for equity (or, if you prefer, the politics of envy) still have a class dimension. But even these can be regarded as cultural more than ideological matters.

However, on two other cultural issues, there is no class gap at all: middle and working class voters are equally divided on the decriminalising the possession of small amounts of cannabis — and majorities of both groups want to keep the new law permitting gay marriage.

This analysis helps to explain one of the big political trends of the past sixty years — the declining dominance of the two big, ideologically-rooted, parties, and the rise of the Liberal Democrats, the Greens, the Scottish National Party — and, now, Ukip.

At the time of writing, the votes in the European Parliament elections have yet to be cast; but, for second successive election, it looks as if the combined Labour and Conservative vote will be less than 50% of all votes cast. True, this is a second-order, low-turnout election in which people feel able to cast a protest vote without risk. But it does underline how both Labour and the Tories have struggled to keep pace with the changes in British society.

Those who believe that either social class still matters in the traditional way, or doesn't matter at all, are both wrong. Social class is still a significant factor in British politics, but the nature of that factor has changed utterly. In this, as in so much else, the past is truly another country.

Notes:

1. **Captain George Mainwaring** (/ˈmæɪnəriŋ/) is the bank manager and Home Guard company commander portrayed by Arthur Lowe on the BBC television sitcom *Dad's Army*, set in the fictional seaside town of Walmington-on-Sea during the Second World War. He has become widely accepted and regarded as a classic British comic character owing to both the popularity of *Dad's Army* and Lowe's portrayal of him in this show. George Mainwaring is a pompous, blustering figure with overdeveloped sense of his importance, fuelled by his social status.

2. **Alf Garnett** is a fictional character from the 1960s & 1970s British sitcom *Till Death Us Do Part* and its follow-on and spin-off series in the 1980s and early 1990s *Till Death... and In Sickness and in Health*. Alf was a working class man, forever complaining that he worked and worked and yet lived somewhere near the poverty line, and was a staunch supporter of the Conservative Party, although he didn't support one-time leader Margaret Thatcher, because he believed that a woman's place was at home "chained to the bloody kitchen sink!"
3. **Private Eye** is a fortnightly British satirical and current affairs magazine, edited by Ian Hislop. **Dave Spart** — ultra-left wing activist, always representing a ridiculous-sounding union (such as the National Amalgamated Union of Sixth-Form Operatives and Allied Trades), collective or magazine. Spart's views attempt to highlight alleged misconduct, prejudice or general wrongdoing, but often end up being contradictory and illogical.
4. **Keeping Up Appearances** is a BBC television sitcom created and written by Roy Clarke for the BBC. Centred on the life of eccentric social climber Hyacinth Bucket (who insists that her surname is pronounced "Bouquet"), the sitcom follows the obsessive and determined snobbish middle class woman who desperately and continually looks for opportunities to climb the social ladder by attempting to impress people (particularly rich people) and portray herself as more affluent than she truly is, despite being wedged between a working class background and upper class aspirations.

THE RETURN OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

By **Russel Berman**

September 18, 2013

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/09/18/the_return_of_anti-americanism_119974.html

A major selling point of the Obama campaign in 2008 was the promise to improve the U.S. image overseas, heal the rifts with traditional allies in Western Europe, and eliminate the anti-Americanism that had burgeoned during the Bush years. In his first term, President Obama undoubtedly began to keep this promise, thanks to his personal charisma, but thanks as well to a fundamental change of course in foreign policy.

Yet his second term has begun with sudden eruptions of precisely that political hostility to the United States that he had promised to end. At stake are not the usual suspects — ideological regimes such as North Korea or Venezuela — but, worrisomely, countries with strong histories of cooperation with the U.S. and in which America has deep investments. Both in Germany and in Egypt — two very different cases, to be sure — politicians and parties have chosen to decry Washington. Anti-Americanism is back.

For Germany, the NSA affair touched raw nerves. Contemporary Germans have a strong sense of privacy rights, and the memories of the East German Stasi, not to mention the Gestapo, makes them particularly allergic to suggestions of government snooping. In addition, the Snowden revelations hit the news during the lead up to the September elections.

The underdog Social Democrats (SPD) made a calculated decision to attack Chancellor Merkel and the Christian Democrats (CDU) for betraying German interests through collaboration with U.S. intelligence gathering. A hostile press has portrayed America as a demonic surveillance state that combines unlimited spying with targeted killings. Demonstrators directed their animosity toward

the U.S. President, with bitterly ironic slogans (in English) like “Yes, We Scan.” Poster’s juxtaposed Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I have a dream” with an image of Obama tagged with “I have a drone.” The CDU has hit back hard, pointing out that cooperation between German and American intelligence services dates back to agreements reached when a coalition of the SPD and the Greens was in power.

In this pre-election scramble, association with the U.S. counts as a negative. It turns out, however, that most of the impugned cooperation has involved information sharing in Afghanistan regarding terrorists, not harmless phone calls in Germany. Even though the accusation may have been defused, the past month of political mudslinging in Germany points to a potent anti-American reservoir in the political culture that politicians can tap into at will.

In Egypt, the upheavals began with the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its political miscalculations, that led in turn to massive popular opposition and the intervention of the military with the subsequent bloodshed. In these complex currents, U.S. policy has succeeded only in antagonizing all significant political actors. Mubarak loyalists feel betrayed of course, but so does the Muslim Brotherhood, which believes that America instigated the military coup.

At the same time, the Brotherhood’s opponents, the liberals who seemingly benefited from the military’s actions, resent the continued American advocacy for Morsi and the Brotherhood. The press abounds with conspiracy theories that denounce Obama, as well as Senator John McCain, outing both as clandestine Brotherhood members. Less bizarrely, but even more worrisome, is the warning by Egyptian novelist Mohamed Salmawy, writing in *al-Ahram*, that the American image in Egypt is worse than it’s ever been.

In many ways, Germany and Egypt could not be more different. Germany is a profoundly stable liberal democracy, while Egypt is anything but that. Germany can boast a strong free-market economy (despite some current softening), while Egypt’s economy is in free-fall and is going to need enormous support from the IMF. Both, however, have enjoyed strong and positive ties to Washington over decades, and both are of considerable strategic importance in their respective regions: Germany as the bedrock of the European Union and Egypt as the most populous state in the Middle East and the genuine foundation of the Arab world. It is therefore especially urgent to understand these sudden anti-American turns in the two political landscapes.

Public opinion offers a partial explanation. While recent Pew Research polling data show that the U.S. enjoys high favorability ratings in most of Europe, the picture is in fact quite mixed. In the UK, 58 percent view the United States favorably, but a significant minority, 30 percent, holds negative views. Matters are worse in Germany, with only 53 percent holding favorable views of America (the lowest rate in western Europe), and 40 percent negative. To put that in context, America’s negative ratings are as high in our long-standing ally Germany as they are in our Cold-War competitor Russia. German politicians who care more about votes than about principles could well be tempted to play the anti-American card in order to fuel an election campaign.

The Arab countries of the Middle East are the region in which the United States is viewed most negatively, and in the midst of that animosity, Egypt is the country that gives America the worst scores: 81 percent negative, which is even worse than the 79 percent in the Palestinian territories, the 70 percent in Turkey, and the 53 percent in Lebanon that view America negatively. For all of the foreign aid support that the U.S. has supplied to changing Egyptian governments, the impact on public opinion has been negligible.

Yet public opinion does not just fall from the sky; it responds to the words and deeds of politicians. Why has Obama apparently failed to deliver on his promise to fix the American brand, particularly in these two strategic allies? His resonant speech in Berlin during the 2008 campaign

and his famous address at Cairo University in 2009 each seemed to set the stage for repairing the tarnished American image overseas, but now we face an upsurge in anti-Americanism precisely in Germany and Egypt. Do the presidential speeches make matters worse?

Of course there are, as with all politics, local reasons: the Bundestag election in September and the standoff between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood each invite incendiary formulations. In addition, the suggestion of government surveillance has a particular potency in Germany, while a predisposition to conspiratorial thinking continues to poison the Egyptian public sphere.

Yet these local factors do not explain the coincidence of anti-Americanism erupting in two very different places at the same time.

Something else must be going on. Something coming out of Obama's Washington is making the American image toxic again.

The anti-Americanism of the George W. Bush era had multiple causes: elections in France and Germany, the echoes of contentious domestic U.S. politics overseas, and, above all, the ambitious nature of the Bush administration's foreign policy. In the wake of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ensued, followed later by an agenda to spread democracy. That was an administration that put a lot of pressure on the world, and parts of the world pushed back.

The Obama administration has defined itself with a very different program: a consistent pull-back and a programmatic reduction in the projection of American power abroad. Its underlying logic has involved the wager that a less confrontational agenda will diminish the sort of hostility that feeds into anti-Americanism.

By now it is clear, that America has lost that wager. The outstretched hand to Moscow has been slapped. The appeal to Tehran has been dismissed. A great power with a foreign policy of weakness reaps neither respect nor affection. And, for Germany and Egypt, confused messages from Washington have hurt U.S. interests.

The genuine rationale for NSA activity, including cooperation with German intelligence services, has been the challenge of fighting Islamist terrorism. U.S. intelligence has prevented attacks in Germany, most notably the Sauerland plot. Yet because the administration claims, for political reasons, that al-Qaeda has already been defeated and the terror threat is over, it has not been able to mount a convincing and robust defense against Snowden's whistle-blowing.

Meanwhile, Washington has never developed a compelling response to the Arab spring — leading from behind in Libya, passively watching the slaughter in Syria, and lacking a sense of direction in Egypt. When the U.S. lacks a clear voice on vital topics, we can be sure that our enemies will speak up against us.

For now, all signs point to a Merkel victory in Germany, but the tone of the campaign reminds us of a continued anti-American potential. Sooner or later the SPD and the Greens will be back in power, perhaps in a coalition with the former Communists in the Left Party. Relations with the U.S. will suffer. Predicting the future of Egypt is a fool's errand, but since nearly all of the political parties rely on denouncing the U.S., it's a sure bet that relations between Washington and Cairo will face strains, to say the least. The administration's clumsiness may even manage to break the decades-old relationship with Egypt and force the Egyptian leadership to seek a protector with deep pockets elsewhere.

Instead of healing the rifts of the past, the administration's foreign policy of weakness has bequeathed a legacy that has emerged vividly in the past months: The return of anti-Americanism.

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AMERICA'S COSTLY FOREIGN-POLICY FOLLIES

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-costly-foreign-policy-follies-11522>

By **Robert W. Merry**

October 22, 2014

The United States has suffered through thirteen years of foreign-policy incompetence in the Oval Office, with little likelihood that the pattern will change before the next president is inaugurated. The country desperately needs salvation from such consistent blundering, but there's no particular reason to believe the next president will be any better. And thus, the gnawing question is: What accounts for so many years under two presidents when foreign policy turned out to be one fiasco after another?

Is it possible that we just had the bad luck of having two stupid presidents in a row? The problem with that thesis is that neither George W. Bush, nor Barack Obama lacks serious native intelligence. It doesn't take a stupid man to pursue a stupid policy; it merely takes a misguided man. And that raises a question as to how it happened that we had two misguided presidents in a row.

The only compelling answer is that there is something amiss in the general outlook of the country — or at least the general outlook of the country as perceived by its foreign-policy elite. The general outlook of the country, on foreign-policy matters today, seems to be made up of two fundamental philosophical concepts, both hopeless illusions.

One flows from what might be called the ameliorative impulse — the idea that mankind can be improved, that human nature can be altered, that we can find a way to spread amity and light through the world if we just work at it hard enough. This is the philosophical foundation of Wilsonism, Woodrow Wilson's fond conviction that the application of American power in behalf of all mankind can spread democracy; and the spread of democracy will foster peace. It didn't work for Woodrow Wilson, and it hasn't worked since.

But it won't die. George W. Bush was peddling distilled Wilsonism when he declared, in his second inaugural address, that his aim was to eradicate tyranny in our world, in every nation and culture. He hadn't yet realized that his plan to create a true democracy in Iraq by invading the country and eradicating its tyranny wasn't exactly working as planned. Where do people get such ideas? Have they never heard of human nature?

But, even after the failure of Bush's foreign-policy efforts in behalf of the ameliorative impulse, Obama walked into the same trap. He said we just wouldn't be true Americans if we didn't jump on the bandwagon bent on destroying the tyranny of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. So we led the bombing campaign, eradicated the old regime, and generated a sump of chaos that is proving impossible to control. He then instinctively concluded, seemingly on the basis of the ameliorative impulse, that Syria's Bashar al-Assad had to go. So now we are the sworn adversary of Assad at the same time that we are fighting those who are fighting Assad.

The ameliorative impulse is driving the liberal interventionism of the Obama administration. Like Wilson himself, Obama's Wilsonian officials believe that good things will follow if America maintains an expansive global presence in behalf of the good guys and against the bad guys. If we can just get rid of the tyrants, democracy and stability will follow. It never seems to do so, but that hardly constitutes a cause for any second thoughts on the part of these true believers.

The opposite of the ameliorative impulse is the tragic sense of life — the idea that mankind is flawed, that tyranny will always be with us, that human nature is fixed, and that utopian dreams centered on the ameliorative impulse will always come a cropper. A foreign policy emanating from this view of life focuses on the necessity of balancing power with power and rejects the idea that there is any culmination point in human development.

The other philosophical concept driving American foreign policy is the idea that America's post-Cold War mandate is to operate in the twenty-first-century world pretty much as it operated on the North American continent in the nineteenth century or as it burst onto the world scene at the dawn of the twentieth century. In a famous late-1990s article in the *Weekly Standard*, William Kristol and David Brooks promoted what they called "national greatness conservatism," the central tenet of which seemed to be that the country didn't rise to sufficient grandeur to satisfy national aspirations. They called for a heightened sense of national purpose and, in its behalf, invoked the memory of Theodore Roosevelt, that brilliant and irrepressible warmonger of the day when America undertook to become an empire.

Since then, Brooks has retreated to a certain circumspection on America's role in the world, but Kristol has indeed been a consistent latter-day TR, extolling every real and proposed American intervention since the morning of 9/11. His "national greatness conservatism" seems to have no governor on it.

But there is a flaw in equating such misadventures as the Iraq invasion with America's audacious actions in consolidating power upon the North American midsection or in kicking a corrupt and fading Spain out of the Caribbean and East Asia. The North American consolidation came at a considerable price, but the payoff was immense — a transcontinental nation facing two oceans and positioned to project power into both. The Spanish conflict carried hardly any price at all, but greatly enhanced America's global position. It's difficult to argue that those actions didn't further the country's national interest.

But how did America enhance its global position when it invaded Iraq...or contributed to the overthrow and death of Qaddafi...or got itself committed against both sides in the Syrian civil war?

So it isn't just Bush and Obama, or their minions, who have perpetrated so much foreign-policy incompetence over nearly a decade and a half. A major contributor has been a flawed outlook made up of two hopeless illusions — the ameliorative impulse and national greatness conservatism. So long as the American people permit their leaders to fashion the country's foreign policy based on those two illusions, the incompetence will continue.

AMERICA'S PERPETUAL WAR ON TERROR BY ANY OTHER NAME

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8f850056-38ee-11e4-a53b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3MjIMJ7V7>

By **Edward Luce**

September 14, 2014/*The Financial Times*

If you embark on something with your eyes half-open, you are likely to lose sight of reality

Few have given as much thought as Barack Obama to the pitfalls of waging open-ended war on an abstract noun. On top of its impracticalities — how can you ever declare victory? — fighting a nebulous enemy exacts an insidious toll. Mr Obama built much of his presidential appeal

on such a critique — the global war on terror was eroding America's legal rights at home and its moral capital abroad. The term "GWOT" was purged the moment he took over from George W Bush. In his pledge last week to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, known as Isis, he has travelled almost full circle. It is precisely because Mr Obama is a reluctant warrior that his legacy will be enduring.

The reality is the US war on terror has succeeded where it was supposed to. Mr Bush's biggest innovation was to set up the Department of Homeland Security. If you chart domestic terror attempts in the US since September 11 2001, they have become increasingly low-tech and ineffectual. From the foiled Detroit airliner attack in Mr Obama's first year to the Boston marathon bombings in his fifth, each attempt has been more amateur than the last. The same is true of America's allies. There has been no significant attack in Europe since London's July 7 bombings nine years ago. Western publics have acclimatised to an era of tighter security.

If this is the balance sheet of the US war on terror, why lose sleep? Chiefly because it understates the costs. The biggest of these is the damage an undeclared war is doing to the west's grasp on reality. Myopic thinking leads to bad decisions. Mr Obama pointedly avoided using the word "war" last week. Although there are more than 1,000 US military personnel in Iraq, and more than 160 US air strikes in the past month, he insisted on calling his plan to destroy Isis a "campaign". Likewise, the US uniforms are those of "advisers" and "trainers". These kinds of euphemism lead to mission creep. If you embark on something with your eyes half-open, you are likelier to lose your way.

In 2011 Mr Obama inadvertently helped to lay the ground for today's vicious insurgency by withdrawing US forces from Iraq too soon. He left a vacuum and called it peace. Now he is tiptoeing back with his fingers crossed. The same reluctance to look down the road may well be repeating itself in Afghanistan. Mr Obama went out of his way last week to say that the Isis campaign would have no impact on his timetable to end the US combat mission in Afghanistan. The only difference between Iraq in 2011 and Afghanistan today is that you can see the Taliban coming. Nor does it take great insight to picture the destabilisation of Pakistan. In contrast to the Isis insurgency, which very few predicted, full-blown crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan are easy to imagine. So too is the gradual escalation of America's re-engagement in Iraq.

Mr Obama's detractors on both right and left want him to come clean — the US has declared war on Isis. Why else would his administration vow to follow it "to the gates of hell", in the words of Joe Biden, the vice-president? Last year, Mr Obama called on Congress to repeal the law authorising military action against al-Qaeda that was passed just after 9/11. "Unless we discipline our thinking... we may be drawn into more wars we don't need to fight," he said. Mr Obama is already vulnerable to what he warned against. His administration is basing its authority to attack Isis on the same unrepealed 2001 law.

Why does America need to destroy Isis? The case for containment — as opposed to war — has received little airing. But it is persuasive. The main objection is that destroying Isis will be impossible without a far larger US land force, which would be a cure worse than the disease. Fewer than 1,000 Isis insurgents were able to banish an Iraqi army force of 30,000 from Mosul in June — and they were welcomed by its inhabitants. Last week Mr Obama hailed the formation of a more inclusive Iraqi government under Haider al-Abadi. But it has fewer Sunni members than the last one. Nouri al-Maliki, the former prime minister, has been kept on in government.

The task of conjuring a legitimate Iraqi government looks like child's play against that of building up a friendly Syrian army. Mr Obama has asked Congress for money to train 3,000 Syrian rebels — a goal that will take months to bear fruit. Isis now commands at least 20,000 fighters. Then there are America's reluctant allies. Turkey does not want to help in any serious way.

Saudi Arabia's support is lukewarm. Israel is sceptical. Iran, whose partnership Mr Obama has not sought, is waiting for whatever windfalls drop in its lap. The same applies to Bashar al-Assad, Syria's president.

Whose army — if not America's — will chase Isis to the "gates of hell"? Which takes us back to where we started. Mr Obama wants to destroy an entity he says does not yet pose a direct threat to the US. Mr Bush called that pre-emptive war. Mr Obama's administration calls it a counterinsurgency campaign. Is it a distinction without a difference?

The US president's aim is to stop Isis before it becomes a threat to the homeland. History suggests the bigger risk is the severe downside of another Middle Eastern adventure.

It is hard to doubt Mr Obama's sincerity. It is his capacity to wade through the fog of war that is in question.

COULD IS BRING RUSSIA AND THE U.S. TOGETHER?

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/could-is-bring-russia-and-the-us-together/506711.html>

By **Roland Dannreuther**

Sep. 09 2014

The start of a fragile cease-fire in Ukraine opens up the potential for some limitation of the dangerous escalation in tensions between Russia and the West. Yet even as U.S. President Barack Obama is directly accusing Russia of intervention in support of the separatists in eastern Ukraine, the meteoric rise of the Islamic State (IS) in the Middle East presents a serious threat to both countries.

The U.S. and Russia have been equally committed and determined to counter militant Islamist terrorism; both have been directly threatened by the group; both have an interest in a sovereign and unified Iraq; and there are growing voices in Washington suggesting that an accommodation with the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad will be needed if IS is to be repelled.

Unsurprisingly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has enthusiastically supported any potential favorable U.S. shift toward the Syrian regime.

Might Russia again play the role of interlocutor and mediator for Washington in the Middle East? The resonance here is with the deal struck by Russia in September last year over the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons stock.

The political context then in terms of U.S.-Russian relations had some similarities to the current situation. U.S.-Russian relations were similarly at a low ebb as there was a fundamental difference of opinion about what should be done about the Assad regime.

The U.S. demanded Assad's unconditional removal, while Russia insisted that this could not be a pre-condition for a resolution of the crisis. Both countries blamed the other for the intensity and bloodshed of the Syrian civil war. Russia argued that U.S. policy had only radicalized the opposition, breeding new extremist Islamist groups. The U.S. blamed Russia for undermining the moderate claims of the opposition through its unbending support for the criminal Syrian regime.

However, in the end, a convergence of interests between Russia and the U.S. emerged. As Obama faced the prospect of being compelled to intervene militarily — an extremely unattractive prospect — Russia offered a way out; securing the commitment of the Syrian regime to dismantle all of its chemical weapons.

Having engineered this diplomatic coup, Russia then made sure it was true to its word and, a year later, almost all of Syria's chemical weapons have been destroyed. The Russian leadership was also careful not to use this diplomatic gain to 'humiliate' the U.S. This restraint meant that there was a chance that this could have been the foundation for a pragmatic improvement in relations between the two countries.

The crisis in Ukraine extinguished any such hopes. Hawks on both sides have heralded a return to Cold War confrontation and zero-sum competition. Both countries have seen in Ukraine the crossing of 'red lines' that cannot be accepted.

The red line for Russia was the move toward the U.S. and the imposition of a pro-Western 'democracy' in a country directly neighboring Russia. For the U.S., the Russian annexation of Crimea undermined the post-Cold War European agreement to respect the new European territorial boundaries.

The question is, thus, whether the current state of U.S.-Russian relations is at such a depressed and destructive level that no real cooperation is possible, even in other less politically contested regions of the world. Clearly, the answer to this question depends significantly on what happens in Ukraine.

The resolve to impose a cease-fire on the pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine suggests that President Vladimir Putin might not see escalation as the only way to resolve the crisis in Ukraine in Russia's favor. The historic record of Putin's period at the apex of Russian power has been a pattern of oscillation between an ambition for improving relations with the West and a subsequent disillusionment and deterioration in such relations, leading again to an attempted renewal or 'resetting' of those relations.

It cannot be excluded that the cycles might move again and U.S.-Russian relations will start to be mended by the cease-fire in Ukraine.

In this scenario, the Middle East actually offers many areas for mutual cooperation. It is not like the Cold War period when the U.S. and Soviet Union ritualistically supported different camps in the region.

Nowadays, the U.S. and Russia have a common strategic interest in combatting international terrorism, the reason being that this represents a serious threat to the citizens of both countries, as seen in the recent threats from IS to Russia following those to the U.S.

While the US suffered from the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Russia has had to endure numerous terrorist attacks, mainly emanating from the Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus. For both countries, there is a shared sense of the gravity of the threat of international terrorism to their core national interests.

For these reasons, the U.S. and Russia view IS as a common enemy. As the apocalyptic language emanating out of Washington demonstrates, the U.S. actually views the threat from IS as strategically more important than that of Ukraine in the sense that direct national interests are involved.

For the American public, Ukraine appears as an obscure conflict in a distant land, while the execution of American journalist James Foley by IS has a shocking immediacy. If the conflict in Iraq and Syria escalates, and the U.S. becomes more involved, it might very well be that the Ukrainian conflict becomes marginalized. And any Russian support in the battle against IS, undoubtedly of a more indirect nature, would be welcomed by Washington.

If one looks at the Middle East more broadly, Russian and U.S. interests are actually closer than often suggested. Although there has been continued disagreement about Iran, both Russia and the U.S. are committed to seeing that Iran does not obtain nuclear weapons and the U.S. posture toward Iran has moved closer to that of Russia.

With the escalation of the crisis in Iraq, Russia can potentially play an important role in facilitating the coordination between Iran, the Iraqi government and Syria, which will be critical if IS is to be defeated.

Russia is also no longer the unconditional supporter for radical forces in the Middle East. Russia's major economic partners in the region are Turkey and Israel, and the economic and cultural links between Russia and Israel have never been stronger.

In fact, it could be argued that it is Russia which is the more conservative force supporting the regional status quo, while it is the U.S. which is the more radical actor seeking to overturn the regional order. Obama's much more realist and non-interventionist convictions actually represent a shift toward the Russian position.

There is, therefore, considerable potential for Russia and the U.S. to work together in the Middle East. However, this is clearly conditional on no further escalation in Ukraine. In that context, the likelihood is for conflict and confrontation to extend to other parts of the world, including the Middle East, even when in practice there is such mutual interest for cooperation.

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FOUR SCENARIOS FOR THE REINVENTION OF EUROPE

http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR43_REINVENTION_OF_EUROPE_ESSAY_AW1.pdf

Mark Leonard¹

November 2011

Looming behind the euro crisis is a larger and more fundamental challenge: the near-collapse of the EU's political system. The markets have now forced Silvio Berlusconi and George Papandreou out of office, and their impatience with the slow pace of decision-making has moved the crisis from the periphery to the core economies of the eurozone. While the traders rage, European leaders have been inching towards agreement on the steps that are needed to save the euro. But while they see the need for "more Europe", they do not know how to persuade their citizens, markets, parliaments or courts to accept it. This is the root of Europe's political crisis: the necessity and impossibility of integration.

The economic necessity is easy to grasp. In order to deal with the imbalances in the eurozone that led to insolvent banks, excessive sovereign debt and real estate bubbles, there is a growing consensus that the single currency area needs greater integration. Many people are now calling for fiscal union to be complemented by economic and even political union. There is still disagreement among member states about the details, but most economists point to five key elements: a quasi-finance ministry to set and enforce fiscal rules; the ability to raise its own resources; common banking supervision, regulation and deposit insurance; common representation in international institutions; and a mechanism for ensuring the democratic legitimacy of these processes.

However, what is economically necessary is politically impossible. The steps needed to save the euro could be blocked by any one of a number of forces: a taxpayers' revolt in creditor nations such as Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Slovakia; a revolt against austerity in debtor

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countries such as Ireland or even France; the rulings of judiciaries such as the German Constitutional Court; or the collapse of markets or re-grading of rating agencies. Meanwhile, a weakened David Cameron has promised his Eurosceptic backbenchers that he will make British support for any treaty change contingent on a renegotiation of British membership of the EU.

While elites across Europe are aware of these dangers and are generally committed to finding a European-level solution, they continue to see the root causes of the crisis differently in different countries. Because leaders have been slow to accept the legitimacy of other countries' concerns and positions, the EU still lacks a deep-seated consensus on what needs to be done that both creditor and debtor countries can support. The lack of a common understanding of the causes and responsibility for the crisis has made it harder for the eurozone countries and the EU to get ahead of the crisis and persuade markets that they are really prepared to do what it will take to stop the contagion.

In fact, the crisis is driving European countries even further apart and creating a perception of a "European 'clash of civilizations'". In particular, three blocs are emerging within Europe: a Germanic bloc that wants austerity and rules, a Latin bloc that wants growth, and an Anglo-Saxon tendency that wants to loosen ties with the EU altogether. Of course, these blocs are based on hypocrisy and misinformation: for example, the country that broke the Stability and Growth Pact most dramatically was Germany; Spain met all of the Maastricht criteria well into the crisis; and Italians have very low levels of personal debt. Nevertheless, based on these perceptions, northern creditors are resisting a "transfer union"; Eastern Europeans are insisting that others should accept painful reforms as they did; and debtors are resisting the austerity measures that are being imposed on them.

Thus European leaders find themselves caught between global markets that have lost patience with multilateral decision-making on the one hand and voters who have lost patience with globalisation on the other. As they explore various different scenarios to integrate the Eurozone, they are struggling to find a zone of the possible between these two extremes. Europe must develop institutional arrangements for a two-speed Europe that will strengthen rather than weaken Europe's ability to play a role in the world and to rethink Europe's political agenda to win back the consent of its citizens. Former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has distinguished between two crises that Europe faces: an acute euro crisis, which requires Europe to strengthen its core; and a chronic crisis of a power transition to the east, which requires Europe to integrate its periphery. In solving the acute crisis, Europe must also avoid exacerbating the chronic crisis.

Jean Monnet vs. Marine Le Pen: technocracy and populism

If the eurozone's core economic problem boils down to the creation of a common currency without a common treasury, its political dilemma lies in the development of common policymaking without a common politics. The EU was built at a time when citizens were deferential and relations between states were seen as being above politics. Thus shielded from the cut and thrust of political debate, national leaders had the space to pursue visionary foreign policies. But this "permissive consensus" began to erode with the signature of the Maastricht Treaty 20 years ago when the EU entered domestic politics. Since then, rather than developing a continental politics, European integration has been defined by two contradictory but mutually reinforcing forces that operate on both the European and national level: technocracy and populism.

On the one hand, the EU has been the ultimate technocratic sphere. It is true that European integration has been driven by larger-than-life politicians such as Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi at the beginning of the European project and Giscard and Schmidt and Kohl and Mitterrand later on.

But the EU's day-to-day agenda has always been driven by practical steps rather than grand political visions. The "Monnet method" named after the key architect of European integration, the French official Jean Monnet — was designed to generate a consensus among European diplomats for limited projects of practical cross-border integration. The idea was that each of these projects would lead to the integration of further policy areas — from Europe's single market to its foreign policy.

By building the EU in an incremental way, the technocrats managed to lower political temperatures in national capitals and find agreement among bureaucrats who were more interested in negotiating deals than grandstanding for the national media. They first created a coal and steel community, then a customs union, then a single market and finally a single currency. But, as the EU matured as a political project, its very success as a bureaucratic phenomenon fuelled a populist backlash at a national level.

It started in Britain in the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher famously wielded her handbag around Europe. But what began as a localised phenomenon gradually grew following Maastricht into a pan-European force embodied today by such disparate forces as Geert Wilders, the True Finns, Umberto Bossi and Marine Le Pen. There are now populists from the north, south, east and west as well as from the left and right. But although they have different ideologies, they all share a sense that politics has become the preserve of elites who are serving themselves rather than common people. In particular, they portray the EU as a conspiracy to build "Europe against the people". In its place, the populists aim to mobilise the "people against Europe" — leading, in the words of one senior Dutch diplomat, to the "democratic destruction of the EU".

For many populists, the EU looks after the welfare of big business and banks; removes border controls and protects minorities at home; while promoting globalisation abroad. According to Le Pen, this is leading to a new split between so-called mainstream parties and the new populist movements: "Both left and right are for the EU, the euro, free trade and immigration," she has said. "For 30 years, [they] have been the same; the real fracture is now between those who support globalisation and nationalists."¹

Technocracy and populism are mirror images: one is managerial, the other charismatic; one seeks incremental change, the other is attracted by grandiose rhetoric; one is about problem solving, the other about the politics of identity. They also have different models of legitimacy. The technocrats have sought to build legitimacy for the EU by trying to deliver positive outcomes for different interest groups — businesses, farmers, students, etc. Populism, on the other hand, has emerged during a period in which politics is organised not in factories or party meetings but on the internet. Its claims about distribution centre around identity.

However, although European technocracy and national populism are opposites, they are also mutually reinforcing. At a European level we can see this in the saga of the Lisbon Treaty. In 2005, the people of France and the Netherlands rejected the European constitution; Europe's leaders responded with a technocratic solution that sidestepped public opinion. Thus, on the one hand, as EU leaders try to remove European integration from national politics, the EU's legitimacy becomes more brittle, which in turn means that policymakers want to evade public opinion even more. On the other hand, as the EU becomes even more technocratic, the calls for democracy and referendums become stronger, which in turn creates a space for populist parties to emerge. The situation in Italy and Greece shows the reverse: that national populism can lead to a technocratic backlash. Here, European markets, following a signal from Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, forced

¹ Charles Grant, "Marine Le Pen and the rise of populism", Centre for European Reform, 20 July 2011, available at <http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2011/07/marine-le-pen-and-rise-of-populism.html>.

Berlusconi and Papandreou out of office. Berlusconi was being punished for his populism and Papandreou for failing to develop the power to govern. [...]

Thus, from Athens to Helsinki, besieged elites are now caught between the destructive power of feral markets and Eurosceptic populists. Germany seems to be bucking the trend as its political class rediscovers its traditional pro-European rhetoric while its technocrats in the ECB and the Constitutional Court make common cause with the tabloids to set a Eurosceptic agenda. Across the rest of Europe the populists define the political options for all parties. In Slovakia, the ultimate cosmopolitan, European-minded government found itself opposing the bailout of Greece (although it claimed that it was anti-European to expect a poor country like Slovakia to bail out the richer debtor-nations). In Finland, a coalition of passionate pro-European politicians signed a deal on collateral that nearly sank the EU's entire plan to save the euro.

As a result, there is a gulf between what many pro-European mainstream politicians think they should do and what they think they can sell to the public. Consequently, they have hastily roped together inadequate solutions: stress tests lacking credibility; a credit facility hampered by stringent rules; and the emission of bonds that aren't quite Eurobonds. These solutions fell far short of what was needed to provide a solution to the crisis, but because they were the most that could be forced through loopholes in the Lisbon Treaty, they were all that was politically possible.

Given the political constraints they face at home, European leaders have focused on fixing the institutional crisis that lies behind the euro's travails rather than grasping the political challenges. Four routes towards a solution are emerging, based on four distinct procedural approaches: asymmetric integration by working around the existing treaties; a smaller, more integrated eurozone based on the existing treaties; political union through treaty change; and a deal among a new vanguard through a Schengen-style treaty. All four will fundamentally change the political and institutional settlement that today's Europe has inherited from Maastricht. Each has advantages and disadvantages. But whichever of the four options Europe ultimately chooses, the challenge will be to solve the acute euro crisis without at the same time exacerbating the chronic crisis of declining European power.

MAKING THE BREAK

How Britain could fall out of the European Union, and what it would mean

<http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21567914-how-britain-could-fall-out-european-union-and-what-it-would-mean-making-break>

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BRITAIN has never been too keen on tying the knot with Europe. It sat aside in the 1950s as Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries forged a single market in coal and steel, which became a broader common market. It eventually joined, in 1973, largely because Europe seemed to be where the money was. Britons still think of their relationship with Europe as a transaction. But their feelings about the costs and benefits of membership have changed utterly.

Europe is no longer the thriving economic club that Britain joined 40 years ago. The euro-zone crisis has exposed the lack of dynamism in much of Europe (though Britain itself is hardly booming) and the British also feel sidelined, as countries that use the single currency are pulled more tightly together. Britons have come to associate the EU with the uncontrolled immigration of

Poles and other east Europeans, seemingly to every village. Although many political leaders are determined to stop it happening, a British exit from Europe is coming to seem ever more possible.

If Britain falls out of the EU, it may find itself completely outside the single market. It might try to stay in the European Economic Area (EEA), a free-trade club that also includes Iceland and Norway. Or it could leave both the EU and the single market, but attempt to recreate a free-trade relationship through bilateral agreements. In this article we explain what each would mean for British business and the economy. But, first, how could an exit happen?

Almost by accident

The likeliest trigger is a referendum. David Cameron, Britain's prime minister, is under enormous pressure to call one from his own Conservative Party, which dominates Britain's coalition government. Last year 81 Tory MPs voted for a referendum on Britain's EU membership. "It's moved very fast," says John Redwood, a veteran critic of the EU. "People used to call me an extreme Eurosceptic. Now I'm a moderate."

Truly fervent Eurosceptics seek a referendum because they want to quit the EU. Other Tories want one to spike the guns of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which campaigns for an exit. UKIP, a once-minor party that came second to Labour in two by-elections on November 29th, takes votes from all parties but most terrifies Conservative MPs. If the party does well in the next European Parliament elections, due in 2014, the pressure on Mr Cameron will increase.

He is already bending. In September the prime minister hinted that Britons might have an opportunity to give "fresh consent" to their country's place in a looser union — a rather fuzzy suggestion that is unlikely to dampen calls for a starker question. Some Tory cabinet ministers now expect the party to include a promise of an "In-Out" referendum on Europe in its 2015 general-election manifesto.

That might persuade Labour to follow suit — which is the second referendum scenario. Although the party is broadly pro-European, some Labour strategists have been urging Ed Miliband, its leader, to promise a referendum all the same, chiefly to pile pressure on Mr Cameron but also to stay on the right side of public opinion. "Whatever our position on Europe, we cannot be seen as the anti-referendum party," a senior Labour figure says.

The third scenario is already in play, thanks to the 2011 European Union Act. Passed by the coalition, this dictates that a referendum must be held on any new EU treaty that shifts power from Westminster to Brussels. The EU is acutely aware of this obstacle, so where treaty change is envisaged, it is trying to focus it as narrowly as possible on the euro zone, of which Britain is not a member. But the EU's creeping claim on its constituents' sovereign powers suggests that this "referendum lock" could be activated. The next treaty change, which could take place in 2015 or 2016, will be the moment for Mr Cameron (if he is re-elected) to try to repatriate some powers from Brussels in the "new settlement" he seeks with Europe. If Britons voted to reject the revised treaty there would be redoubled pressure for a second referendum, on their membership of the European club.

There is a fourth scenario: simple diplomatic miscalculation. A year ago, at a summit where they agreed on a fiscal compact, almost all other EU leaders banded together to sidestep a British veto. If that were to happen again on an issue that Britons care more deeply about, Mr Cameron may face irresistible pressure to call an early referendum.

The early signs are that Britons would opt to push off. YouGov's latest poll on the issue suggests that 49% would vote to leave, whereas only 32% would choose to stay (the rest are unsure). One senior Tory, who wants Britain to stay in, says blankly that it would be impossible to win a referendum at the moment.

The leaders of all three main parties, backed by business and trade unions, could try to woo Britons to Europe. But they would have plenty of opposition, and not just from other MPs. When Britain last voted on Europe, in 1975, every national newspaper except the *Morning Star* campaigned for an “In” vote. That will not be repeated. Britain’s two biggest-selling dailies, the *Daily Mail* and the *Sun* — combined circulation, 4.5m — are deeply Eurosceptic.

What would make the vote unpredictable is that Britons cannot have what they really want. If offered a “detached relationship that is little more than a free-trade agreement”, according to the same YouGov poll, only 26% would still opt for the exit. The biggest group of respondents, 46%, would accept those looser terms. But continental leaders are unwilling to grant Britain full access to the single market without the costly bits. Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, says she dearly wants to keep Britain in the EU — but “as a good partner”. In the run-up to a promised referendum, Mr Cameron could win only trifling concessions. That might convince some Britons that life outside the EU would be difficult; but it might equally inflame Eurosceptic opinion and make an “out” vote more likely.

Very well, alone

If Britain walked away entirely — the most extreme scenario — it would quickly see some benefits. The country would no longer have to transfer funds to the EU to subsidise farm incomes or poorer regions. Treasury figures suggest it would be £8 billion (\$13 billion) better off each year. Food could become cheaper. Under WTO rules, countries may slash import barriers unilaterally as long as they do not favour some countries over others. Britain could do this for agricultural produce. It would regain control over fishing rights around its coast.

Some irksome regulations could be ditched, too. First to go (if the Tories are in power when Britain leaves) would be the working-time directive. This limits how long people can be at work without a break or a holiday and caps the working week at 48 hours. The scrapping of the EU’s agency-worker directive, which gives temporary staff the same rights as regular employees, would be cheered by business, too. Britain would be free to set itself a less exacting target for green-power generation than it is bound to under the EU’s renewable-energy directive. That could mean cheaper power.

London’s financial district would look to past glories. It thrived as an offshore centre for deposit-taking and loan-making in dollars long before Britain joined the EU. Outside the club, it would be freer to market itself as a freewheeling hub for emerging-market finance — a sort of Singapore on steroids. Free of the obligation to abide by ever-changing EU rules on alternative investments, hedge funds that have left London might be lured back. The burden of impending European Solvency 2 regulations on the insurance industry would become less onerous.

Yet a bonfire of regulations would smoulder rather than blaze. Domestic and global commitments to greenery constrain Britain’s energy policy, for example. And EU regulations bite less hard than is commonly supposed. Britain already has one of the most flexible labour markets in the rich world (employees can opt out of the 48-hour week). This helps to explain why the unemployment rate is as low as in America or Canada, despite a more sluggish economy.

Product regulations would be harder to junk than labour laws. The British suppliers to Airbus, the Franco-German aircraft manufacturer, have to comply with exacting standards. But these exist not because of meddling by Brussels, but to ensure aircraft are safe. Similarly, a minimum standard of food safety stops a race to the bottom by competing firms. British ones would still have to observe Europe’s product regulations in order to export there. A separate set of regulations tailored for the home market would only add to red tape.

That goes for the City, too. Global finance favours common standards, such as the Basel accords on bank capital. And, far from racing to the bottom, countries with large financial sectors are now as likely to create even tougher rules. The Bank of England has hinted that Basel is not strong enough.

And some immediate gains would evaporate as special-interest groups redirected their attention from Brussels to Westminster. British farmers would lose £2.7 billion in EU subsidies once Britain left. They are a noisy lobby group, and it is unlikely that the government would hang on to all that cash. The farming lobby would also try to stand in the way of lowering tariffs on food imported from beyond Europe, potentially depriving the government of a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with big emerging markets such as Brazil and India.

If the benefits of leaving the single market are qualified, what of the costs? The price of exclusion is much smaller than when Britain joined in 1973. Tariff barriers across the world have been steadily lowered in trade deals brokered by GATT and its successor, the WTO. If import tariffs are weighted by the volume of trade in each product, the average faced by exporters from outside the EU into the single market has fallen to around 3%. Exporters routinely have to absorb cost increases of this size caused by a surge in the oil price or a jump in the exchange rate.

Even so, the impact on industries such as food and textiles, where tariffs are much higher than the average, would be far from mild. British dairy exports would incur an import tax of 55% to reach the EU market, with tariffs on some items of more than 200%. Cheddar cheese would face a tariff of €167 per 100kg; the mark-up on Stilton would be €141. Average tariffs on clothing would push up their price in European markets by 12%.

Parts of Britain's car industry would move out. British-based producers would face a 4% tariff on car-equipment sales to the EU, and there would be pressure to impose tariffs on components imported from it. Factories owned by carmakers with plants and supply chains in other parts of the EU would be most at risk. Vital car components might be held up by customs as they leave the continent. A cheap pound and a flexible workforce may not be enough to keep GM in Britain, for instance, even though it sells many cars there.

The calculation would be slightly different for other carmakers. Only a small fraction of the 300,000 cars Jaguar Land Rover makes in Britain are destined for the EU market. A lot of Minis, made in Britain by BMW, are also sold outside Europe, where they attract an import tariff anyway. Much of what distinguishes a Jaguar from a Mercedes is that it is designed and made in Britain (as are lots of components). There would be little benefit, but huge costs to the brand, in shifting production elsewhere. Japanese carmakers would suffer: most of their British output is sold in the EU, says John Leech of KPMG, a consultancy. But they cannot easily switch production to continental factories, and many of their supplies come from Japan. They would stick around longer than many think.

Over time, though, the general drift of business investment would be away from Britain and towards the continent. That goes for finance, too. If London wants to be the regional hub for trading China's currency, it will need to retain its position as the main centre for settling trades of cash and derivatives in euros. Some in Europe resent this: the governor of France's central bank complained this week that euro deals should be done in euroland. Without the shield of single-market rules, London could lose out to rival EU centres.

Financiers from today's rising economic powers, in Asia and Latin America, are keener on access to a European market of 500m than on the light regulation that drew American banks to London in the 1950s and 1960s. TheCityUK, a lobby group, studied 147 siting decisions between 2006 and 2012. It found that more than two-fifths of finance firms gave access to European markets as a core reason for choosing London. Although the single market in financial services is still

a work in progress, “passporting rights” entitle investment firms, banks and insurers based in Britain to establish branches or provide services throughout the EEA.

Aerospace is another industry that relies on frictionless trade with the rest of the continent. Britain has the world’s largest industry outside America, but it would lose ground to France. The high-tech bits of production, such as the making of carbon-fibre wing spars, could not speedily be replicated elsewhere. But suppliers of basic parts, such as metal brackets, would be vulnerable. Big manufacturers like Airbus prefer to keep supply chains simple. They might sponsor entry by new suppliers in the EU to avoid a customs barrier.

These reallocations of fixed capital would take years or decades. By contrast, Britain and its erstwhile EU partners would have to decide quickly how people on the wrong side of newly erected barriers to the free movement of labour should be treated. Around 2.3m people from EU countries were living in Britain in 2011, up from 1.1m in 2004; around 1.7m Britons have gone the other way. The rights of residency for such migrants would no longer be automatic. Forced repatriation would be damaging to all countries.

The simplest solution would be to offer citizenship to all those resident in Britain at a particular date, in return for a similar offer to Britons living in other parts of Europe. Anticipation of such an amnesty would spur a rush to and from Britain in the run-up to its exit. As the drawbridge eventually rose, businesses would suffer. London’s growing tech cluster, as well as the City, relies heavily on the free flow of young workers from other parts of Europe.

Another huge disruption would be to trade beyond Europe. Britain would swiftly have to negotiate bilateral deals with dozens of countries. The experience of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, which make up the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a club of European refusers loosely linked to the EU, suggests it is usually possible to obtain similar terms to those won by EU negotiators. The EFTA countries tend to rush in behind the EU, though in some cases — South Korea, for example — they go first. But the bigger club can win slightly better terms. “The EU is more powerful than we are,” says Didier Chambovey of Switzerland’s state secretariat for foreign affairs. A deal with Britain would be top of few countries’ priorities.

Britain would have less diplomatic and military clout, too. For the Americans, a Britain that is disengaged from the rest of Europe would be a much less useful and influential ally. For NATO, a Britain that is semi-detached from Europe would weaken the ties that bind the continent and its defence to the United States at a time when those ties are already under strain because of slashed defence budgets and America’s strategic “rebalancing” towards Asia. Another likely casualty would be the budding Anglo-French defence treaty, seen by both countries as a way to help themselves continue to punch above their weight.

Viking spirit, or Swiss rules?

Although a complete exit from Europe is certainly possible, few British Eurosceptics want it. They view the common market as a pearl surrounded by a dismal encrustation of European bureaucracy and regulation. What they would really like to do is pull back until Britain’s relationship with Europe becomes one based on free trade, with the minimum necessary regulation. In effect, they want to create the kind of Europe that British Conservatives fought to join in the 1970s. Once it became clear that Britain was falling out of the EU, they could grab at two halfway options: a Norwegian one and a Swiss one.

Together with Iceland and Liechtenstein, oil-rich Norway is about as close to the EU as it is possible to be without actually becoming a member. It simply belongs to the EEA. The EU is broadly

happy with the arrangement, partly because Norway pays into its coffers (indeed, it pays slightly more per head than Britain). A similar arrangement might well be obtained.

Many businesses would hardly notice the difference. But a few would suffer minor irritation. Although EEA countries are part of the single market, businesses must complete customs and VAT forms when goods are shipped into and out of the EU. For big companies serving big customers, this is no problem. For smaller ones it can be a nuisance. Moods of Norway, an *echt*-Norwegian fashion company (its logo is a tractor), has solved the problem by setting up a small subsidiary in Sweden, which is a member of the EU. The subsidiary handles customs clearance for the European boutiques that carry Moods of Norway's clothes. Small, export-oriented British businesses would end up doing the same.

If Britain were to join the Norwegian club, though, it would remain bound by virtually all EU regulations, including the working-time directive and almost everything dreamed up in Brussels in future. Once out of the EU, the country would have little say in the regulations and laws that would continue to bind its industry. It would be consulted by the European Commission but would have no voice in the increasingly powerful European Parliament, and no vote. In Euro-jargon, it would be a decision-shaper, but not a decision-maker.

Officials and lobbyists would frequently be unaware of discussions about legislation that could affect British industry, except at second hand, through officials in a friendly nation. "We take our Scandinavian colleagues out to lunch and ask them what happened," explains Petter Brubakk of NHO, Norway's main business lobby. It would depend on other countries to fight its corner, as Norway now relies on Britain to resist proposed EU legislation on offshore oil-drilling. It would be as though Britain maintained a golden fax machine linked to Brussels, which cost billions of pounds a year to run and from which regulations issued ceaselessly. It could ignore the faxes about farming and fishing: members of the EEA are allowed to run their own agriculture policies. But it would have to obey the others.

The Norwegian option could well fail for domestic reasons. As soon as British MPs learn that Norway has to swallow almost every regulation that comes out of Brussels, despite having virtually no power to shape them, they will waver. When they also learn that Norway has to pay for the privilege, they may reject it outright.

Britain might, however, seek a more distant relationship. It could steer clear of the EEA but join EFTA, which it helped to set up in 1960. Optimistically, it could come to look rather like Switzerland.

Switzerland does business with EU countries through bilateral deals, and by routinely aligning its regulations with those made in Brussels. To an extent, it can pick and choose. In the same position, Britain could drop some irksome labour rules. It could also move to co-operate more, and trade more freely, in some areas than in others. Switzerland has a comprehensive bilateral agreement with the EU covering trade in goods, but no equivalent agreement for financial services.

Switzerland has got into the occasional trade dispute with the EU, over Gruyère cheese for example. Still, for the most part it has secured good access to European markets so far. Its firms have subsidiaries in EU countries through which they can trade freely. And non-membership of the EEA means Switzerland has remained partly aloof from financial regulations emanating from Brussels. But the Swiss have come up with their own, often extremely stringent, financial regulations, partly in fear of losing access to EU customers.

And the country is not beyond the reach of Brussels. The Swiss are currently exercised over several European directives, including those covering finance, chemical factories and the movement of labour. Switzerland is hampered by the lack of an accord with the EU on financial services and

by its lack of representation in Brussels. In the broader fight against protectionism and financial over-regulation in Europe, it relies on an informal alliance with another country that also has a big financial-services industry, as well as a valuable seat at the negotiating table: Britain.

In any case, it is unlikely that Britain could get similar treatment. The EU is already trying to muscle Switzerland out of its special niche and into an arrangement more like Norway's, where EU legislation would be speedily taken up by the country. Relations have become more fraught since the EU expanded eastward. The EU used to be a club of Western nations which share a broad culture with Switzerland (many share a border with it, too) and tolerated its peculiarities. The club is now bigger and more bureaucratic, and includes east European countries which were forced to swallow much unpalatable stuff as the price of entry to the club. There is little chance that Britain, a far bigger country with a history of being difficult, would be allowed to squeeze in alongside Switzerland.

And don't come back

No country has ever left the European Union (though Greenland, an autonomous dependency of Denmark's, voted to leave in 1982). The halfway options of Norway and Switzerland were offered largely in hopes of tempting both to become full members one day. Britain would be travelling in the opposite direction, without a map. In this, as in so many other ways, leaving the EU would be a colossal gamble.

The British would doubtless try to negotiate a special deal with their former partners, using the argument that trade benefits both sides and that Britain is itself a large market for many. But the process could take many years (it took a decade for the much smaller Switzerland). Europe might well be more of a fortress with Britain outside. And even the country's closest friends, who would rather keep Britain in to bolster liberal voices inside the EU, would be unlikely to be generous to a country that had chosen to leave.

The most likely outcome would be that Britain would find itself as a scratchy outsider with somewhat limited access to the single market, almost no influence and few friends. And one certainty: that having once departed, it would be all but impossible to get back in again.

HOW THE EU SLEEPWALKED INTO A CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA

<http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/07/10/how-eu-sleepwalked-into-conflict-with-russia>

By **Ulrich Speck**¹

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Summary

The EU and Russia are fighting over their joint neighborhood, and the stakes are too high for either side to back down. Can they bridge their divides?

The EU and Russia are engaged in an open conflict over their joint neighborhood. Yet, curiously, the EU never intended to get into a geopolitical confrontation with Russia. Quite the opposite — it sleepwalked into it.

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But now the stakes are too high for both sides to back down. Both sides see the conflict as vital, and it is shattering fragile relations between Russia and the West. How did they stumble into a confrontation that the EU, at least, wanted to avoid? Why is this conflict so intense? And what have both sides learned so far from the confrontation?

The EU has two vital interests at stake in the current conflict with Russia. First is a stable and prosperous neighborhood in the East. The second is Russia's respect for the ultimate taboo of Europe's peace order — the prohibition against changing borders by force. For a bloc that is founded on accords between states, upholding the rule of law in international agreements is vital. And to see a powerful country invading and annexing the territory of a weaker neighbor for Europeans brings back memories of a darker age of ruthless competition.

In addition, the longer the open confrontation lasts, the more not losing becomes an important goal in itself, as the EU's credibility as a united and powerful actor on the international scene is on the line.

What is at stake for Russia is its position as a great power, which in the Russian view implies dominance over the post-Soviet space. A state that cannot even control smaller and weaker neighbors is, from the perspective of classical power politics, not even a regional power. Losing in Ukraine would be seen in Russia as a humiliation, especially after Kremlin-controlled Russian media have strongly beaten the drums of war. And without Ukraine, Moscow's Eurasian Union project is unlikely to gain traction.

Both sides have unique instruments at their disposal in the struggle over their joint neighborhood. Russia can attract states mainly by offering low energy prices in return for closer relations. It can also threaten states with trade restrictions and bans as well as with military force (in traditional and "hybrid" forms, as it did in Crimea). And it uses a sophisticated propaganda apparatus to paint the EU and, even more, the United States as enemies who are threatening Russia.

The EU, meanwhile, attracts its neighborhood mainly by offering access to its huge common market and a joint space defined by principles of liberal democracy. The bloc has, however, long been hesitant to develop forceful instruments to bring its Eastern neighborhood into closer association. It was not until 2009 that the EU — reluctantly — agreed to put a bit more energy into its European Neighborhood Policy by adopting the Eastern Partnership initiative.

The eastern partnership

The Eastern Partnership, in which partner states are meant to eventually sign a free trade agreement and a wide-ranging association agreement with the EU, was conceived of by Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in 2008. It was built as an offer of closer relations with six countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine — following the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008.

Sikorski had proposed the Eastern Partnership to Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German foreign minister from 2005 to 2009 in a grand coalition led by Chancellor Angela Merkel (and in the same position again since December 2013), but Steinmeier declined to make it a joint initiative. Sikorski then decided to launch the initiative with Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. Together they managed to convince the EU to give the project the green light.

But the Eastern Partnership never had the full support of the strongest member states. They were reluctant to engage because of various fears — of increasing their financial burden and the perspective of opening up markets (especially the labor market) to new and economically very weak entrants, of another heated debate within the EU over further enlargement, and of a confrontation with Russia.

Indeed, one reason Steinmeier declined to join Sikorski was that he had just proposed a modernization partnership to Moscow. Engaging with EU neighbors in the post-Soviet space appeared to threaten the German attempt to deepen relations with Moscow.

Germany's support for the Eastern Partnership was always halfhearted at best. Merkel provided some rhetorical backing before the November 2013 Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, calling on Russia to accept Ukraine's sovereign right to choose its alliances. But neither Berlin nor other big member-state capitals sent clear signals to the Kremlin that the EU was ready to confront Russia over the right of countries in the post-Soviet space to associate themselves more closely with the EU.

When Moscow began to put pressure on Ukraine and Moldova in summer 2013 using embargoes and bans, the EU failed to respond in a resolute way that might have convinced Russia that the union and its powerful member states were ready to make Russia pay a price for sabotaging the Eastern Partnership. When Armenia suddenly stopped its process of EU association in September 2013, apparently under pressure from Moscow, EU leaders just shrugged; no EU government made an effort to change Yerevan's mind. And the promise of EU accession — the strongest carrot — has never explicitly been offered to Eastern Partnership states (it hasn't been excluded either, though).

Meanwhile, Central European EU member states were much more eager than their Western neighbors to move ahead with the Eastern Partnership. Poland was the main driver. Warsaw found a strong ally in the European Commission, especially in the person of Štefan Füle, a Czech diplomat and European commissioner for enlargement and neighborhood policy. And Germany was willing to support Polish initiatives to a certain extent in the context of the Polish-German rapprochement that has taken place in the last year.

The maidan as the trigger

From a "postmodern" EU perspective the Eastern Partnership looked like a win-win project to all sides concerned. For years, the EU hoped that it could indeed have both: a closer association with the Eastern neighbors and unshaken relations with Russia. Moscow would profit as well from a stabilized neighborhood. And Eastern countries could continue to engage with both sides equally, becoming a kind of bridge between the EU and Russia.

Yet, Russia has never shared this view. For Moscow, the Eastern Partnership always looked like a hostile takeover. It set up a counterinitiative, a Eurasian customs union — later to become the Eurasian Union — and confronted the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus with an either-or choice. Membership in the customs union is per definition incompatible with the deep and comprehensive free trade agreements that the EU has sought to sign with Eastern states.

Still, the conflict between Russia and the EU over the neighborhood seemed to be avoidable, as Russian President Vladimir Putin's attempts to undermine the Eastern Partnership appeared to be successful. Armenia was brought into the Russian camp, apparently balking in the face of significant pressure from Russia. (One of the country's pressure points is its fear of losing Russian support in the struggle with energy-rich Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.) And in Ukraine Putin managed to push then President Viktor Yanukovich to make a U-turn in November 2013 and cancel his country's process of EU association shortly before the Vilnius summit began.

At that point it looked as if Russia had won what it defined as a geopolitical struggle. Of the six Eastern Partnership countries originally in line to sign association agreements and free trade

agreements with the EU, only Georgia and Moldova would have remained on track. Whether Moscow would have interfered to prevent the signing of the agreements or would have taken a longer-term approach to undermine the Western course was an open question. Both countries are vulnerable, especially because they have breakaway regions on their territory (Transnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia) that Russia supports. The governments' struggles with these regions suck up enormous political energy and give Moscow plenty of leverage and potential to destabilize these countries.

But then came what nobody had expected: the popular movement on the Maidan in Kiev, a huge and powerful pro-EU demonstration, pushing the country back into the Western sphere. To many Ukrainians, association with the EU held the double promise of getting rid of both predatory, corrupt elites and Russia's stranglehold. They were not ready to accept that their country's turn westward had been suddenly stopped.

This bottom-up movement set off a chain of events that ended with an open and sharp confrontation between Russia and the EU. Yanukovich was forced to leave the country. Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, then started to destabilize Ukraine's east by using proxies. The EU, massively challenged, had no choice but to take sides against Russia in a struggle for European values, provoked by a Russia that was undermining core principles of Europe's peace order. Germany acted as the primary interlocutor for the EU in a conflict that drew in both the bloc and the United States, which agreed to jointly put diplomatic pressure on the Kremlin and threaten Russia with massive economic sanctions.

Limits of confrontation

Still, the EU remains very reluctant to move with full steam toward a confrontation with Russia, for a number of reasons: economic ties are strong, especially in energy, finance, and the arms industry. Western European countries are less concerned about Russian aggression and want EU attention to instead move toward the Southern neighborhood. Some EU members fear being confronted with a Russia that appears to be driven more by emotion than by rational considerations. And European governments cannot ignore sections of the public that sympathize with Russian action (partly driven by values that they feel are supported by Russia, partly driven by the wish to balance U.S. influence by moving closer to Russia).

While leaders on the EU side face the challenge of mobilizing support for a more confrontational stance toward Russia, Moscow must recognize that its means are limited and that it cannot win against an EU even if the bloc is reluctant to engage in the competition. It has had to repeatedly lower its goals, from full control of Ukraine to spreading instability in some Ukrainian regions. Now it seems that Moscow's aim in Ukraine is to prevent the emergence of a stable liberal democracy that is firmly anchored in the EU, an outcome that would minimize Moscow's ability to influence Ukraine's political course and that would call into question Russia's own model of governance.

Beyond Ukraine, Russia has Georgia and Moldova to think about. In both countries it is unclear to what extent the Kremlin is going to use its leverage to block or undermine their attempts to build closer ties with the EU; both signed agreements with the EU on June 27.

The EU is locked into a difficult geopolitical conflict with Russia that it absolutely wanted to avoid. While a new iron curtain has not descended across the continent, it is clear now that the EU and Russia live in different worlds, a divide that is becoming ever harder to bridge.

In the struggle over Ukraine, both sides have lost illusions, about themselves and about the other. The EU understands now that it has to back up foreign policy with substantial power — in

a world that is much less “postmodern” than Europeans have hoped for in the past, a world that still largely looks at the international system in the terms of classical power politics. It also understands that Russia is not interested in the kind of partnership Europeans — guided largely by Germans — have proposed for two decades.

Russia, meanwhile, has found out that it is much less attractive to states in the neighborhood, especially in Ukraine, than it had hoped. And it has learned that when faced with a vital challenge, the EU can be a much tougher opponent than the Kremlin might have expected: EU member states, under German leadership, have managed to uphold a credible threat with massive economic sanctions for months, and they have built and upheld a common approach with the United States.

This more realistic understanding of strengths and weaknesses may over time open up the possibility for Russia and the EU of new forms of cooperation on some issues, with the two powers at the same time confronting one another on other issues. Instead of taking the form of a broad partnership and a comprehensive inclusion of Russia into Western structures, this cooperation is likely to be limited to clearly defined areas.

EUROPE'S CULTURE CLASH

Has Multiculturalism Failed?

<http://realtruth.org/articles/110610-001-europe.html>

By Robert R. Farrell and Samuel C. Baxter

The experiment of Europeans and immigrants living side by side strains under the weight of age-old problems.

They just keep coming. Tired, hungry, poor and desperate. Wearing only the clothes on their backs, often in tiny fishing vessels crammed with 300 or more people — all seeking the kind of refuge and better lives their home countries cannot provide.

Since the beginning of 2011, more than 26,000 immigrants from North Africa have reached Lampedusa, a tiny Mediterranean island off Italy's coast, tripling its population. So many have arrived that overwhelmed authorities have allowed them to set up refugee camps along the water's edge, rather than detaining them in immigration centers.

The exodus has sparked tension between displaced immigrants and locals who are dismayed by the intrusion into their once-sleepy island. Residents have posted signs and formed human blockades in an attempt to stop the flow of new arrivals — sometimes more than 1,000 daily. Those who fled have protested the Italians' treatment of them once they arrive.

Standard operating procedure is to transport immigrants to the Italian mainland, where some are granted temporary visas and handed a 150 euro train pass. With these documents, migrants can then set out for other nations within the European Union, which has had open borders since 1985.

Many immigrants granted temporary residency head to a specific destination. A large number travel to France, where they connect with family or friends already living there.

Large enclaves of immigrants are present in virtually every large European city. These ethnic neighborhoods have their own culture, language, and often their own set of rules. This is the case

in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Brussels and Oslo — where immigrants are a substantial part of populations.

For a long time, their presence was tolerated, even welcomed, adhering to the “melting pot” standard favored by democratic societies. This gave way to the concept of multiculturalism — or two distinct cultures living side-by-side within a nation.

Time has shown, however, that many immigrants have not assimilated into European cultures, thus threatening the unity EU member-states have worked hard to cultivate.

What has blocked the concept of multiculturalism from being successful?

Division from Within

The growing number of immigrants, combined with religious and cultural tensions, concerns about crime, slowing economies, and even the threat of terrorism, have worried natural-born EU citizens, and strained relations between countries that believe the problem should be addressed by the entirety of Europe.

“From the start the Italian government set out to make this a European problem,” a *BBC* editorial stated. “...the Italian government issued the migrants with temporary visas, knowing only too well that with no border checks a majority of them would head to France. The Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, created open borders among 25 countries. The UK and Republic of Ireland did not sign.

“The French saw the Italian move as cynical. They responded by stepping up border patrols and briefly stopped trains running between the two countries. The Italians were outraged. They accused France of violating one of the basic EU agreements. Then on 22 April the Elysee Palace hinted at a ‘suspension’ of the Schengen agreement. Later that was qualified to mean reviewing some of the exemption clauses. The French say Europe is not about the free movement of illegal migrants.”

Over the last year, certain government leaders have spoken against the concept of multiculturalism as a whole.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy said during a television interview: “Of course we must respect differences, but we do not want...a society where communities coexist side by side.”

“If you come to France, you accept melting into a single community, which is the national community, and if you do not want to accept that you cannot be welcome in France.”

British Prime Minister David Cameron said, “The doctrine of multiculturalism has encouraged different cultures to live separate lives apart from each other and apart from the mainstream.”

Last October, German Chancellor Angela Merkel addressed problems with the “multikulti” concept and immigrants not assimilating: “We kidded ourselves a while...We said: ‘they won’t stay, sometime they will be gone,’ but this isn’t reality...The approach to build a multicultural society and to live side by side and to enjoy each other...has failed, utterly failed.”

Key Issue

Immigrants coming to Europe are often viewed as political refugees fleeing harsh governments, or as victims of environmental catastrophes, and even called the downtrodden who are looking for a better life. These statements are generally accurate. But, afraid to be politically incorrect, government leaders and news outlets usually will not mention a common characteristic of these immigrants: they are Muslim. Political discussions on “multicultural” woes become a thinly veiled way of discussing Muslims in Europe.

■ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

Look at Libya, Tunisia and Turkey — all main sources of migration for Europe. The *CIA World Factbook* places Libya at 97 percent Sunni Muslim, Tunisia at 98 percent Muslim, and Turkey at 99.8 percent Muslim. In addition, many immigrants also come from other majority-Muslim nations in the Middle East and South Asia.

“Europe’s Muslim population has more than doubled in the past 30 years and will have doubled again by 2015,” an article by the *Telegraph* stated. “In Brussels, the top seven baby boys’ names recently were Mohamed, Adam, Rayan, Ayoub, Mehdi, Amine and Hamza.”

While Muslims constitute only about 4.6 percent of the total population, cities generally have higher numbers. For instance, the *International Business Times* noted that Austria’s Muslim population is only 2.2 percent, while its capital, Vienna, is estimated at 10 percent.

A Pew Research study called “The Future of the Global Muslim Population” revealed, “France had an expected net influx of 66,000 Muslim immigrants in 2010, primarily from North Africa. Muslims comprised an estimated two-thirds (68.5%) of all new immigrants to France in the past year. Spain was expected to see a net gain of 70,000 Muslim immigrants in 2010, but they account for a much smaller portion of all new immigrants to Spain (13.1%). The U.K.’s net inflow of Muslim immigrants in the past year (nearly 64,000) was forecast to be nearly as large as France’s. More than a quarter (28.1%) of all new immigrants to the U.K. in 2010 are estimated to be Muslim.”

The study estimated that Muslims will account for 8.2 percent of the EU population in 2030, up from approximately 4.6 percent today.

Many native Europeans are wary of continuous waves of immigrants. A poll showed that 60 percent of Britons feel immigration is bad for the country. Eighty percent feel the government needs to impose stricter controls. A 2010 study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation published by the *BBC* showed that 30 percent of Germans believe foreigners are overrunning the country.

While public apprehension can be fed to some degree by prejudice, it is understandable. One only has to recall a number of extremist attacks. Britain’s government reports that as many as 20 Britons are in Pakistan training to launch suicide attacks on England’s capital city.

In addition, news articles have detailed two UK residents who were linked to a terrorist group planning shooting sprees in Britain, France and Germany. And French citizens fear their country will be overrun when they see hundreds of Muslims blocking public streets while praying.

European governments are responding to public sentiment: French authorities banned women from wearing a full-cover veil, called a burqa, and cut the number of immigrants entering the country by 10 percent. Italy passed a law making illegal immigration a crime punishable with fines as high as 10,000 euros. The British government proposed a permanent cap on immigrants from outside the EU.

Speaking in Munich, Prime Minister David Cameron said Britain needs to build a stronger national identity. He warned Muslim groups they would lose government funding if they do not endorse women’s rights or promote integration.

Parallel Societies

Why should Europe, which has long promoted religious freedom, fear an influx from Muslim nations? The answer runs deeper than the “terror” stigma Islam has gained since the United States September 11 attacks.

The current wave of European immigration started just after the Second World War, as the economies of devastated nations began to bounce back in the 1950s and 60s.

To meet the growing demand for workers, Europeans recruited immigrants to do jobs they

were unwilling to do. These were deemed “guest workers.” Most people expected they would eventually return home after working several years.

After the OPEC oil crisis of 1973 triggered an economic slowdown, many European governments stopped issuing work visas — but by then it was too late. Having settled into life in their adopted countries, most temporary migrants never returned home, and instead convinced family members to come live with them in Europe.

Natural disasters, weak economies, and abject poverty spurred another migration wave in the 1990s, this time by refugees primarily from North and sub-Saharan Africa, and the Indian subcontinent. As more arrived, Europeans permitted them to receive welfare benefits, even if they had never worked in the EU. This was especially true of those who claimed refugee status.

Because many immigrants did not know the language of their new countries, they began to congregate in specific neighborhoods with others from their home countries. This gave rise to the large immigrant neighborhoods now characteristic of European cities.

This has caused numerous problems. Immigrant communities tend to be poorer, and have higher crime and unemployment statistics. They often cite harassment from law enforcement as the reason for their troubles with the law and non-acceptance by the indigenous population for the reason they have not integrated. This has created a generation of young people who do not identify with the European countries in which they were born.

“As morally indignant young Muslims turn away from what they view as decadent German culture, some are cultivating feelings of superiority,” a *Der Spiegel* article stated. “While their immigrant parents and grandparents tried to assimilate, at least on the surface, some young Muslims deliberately flaunt the fact that they are different by wearing strict Islamic clothing in public.” According to a survey by the newspaper, 71 percent of Muslims believe “sexual morals in Western society are totally degenerate” and 65.6 percent believe “Islam is the only true religion.” These ideas clash with the relaxed approach many Europeans take toward lifestyle choices, including the way they view religion.

Although the two cultures believe they possess completely different mindsets, they actually have more in common than they realize, according to *Der Spiegel*: “Ironically, many Muslims in Germany ‘tend to be lax when it comes to religion,’ says Katajun Amirpur, a Berlin expert on Islamic studies. According to Amirpur, religion ‘doesn’t play a very dominant role’ in their daily life, and yet they would characterize themselves as devout Muslims — even if they ‘occasionally drink a glass of Arrak or Raki’ [liquor] and ‘sometimes forget one prayer or another.’ They are easily their Christian fellow citizens’ equals when it comes to disobeying the commandments of their faith.”

Why then are they not able to co-exist?

Two Sides

Just as “multiculturalism” is generally a codeword for tensions between Europeans and immigrant Muslims, *Europe* is a codeword for Christendom. The continent’s historical roots are steeped in traditional Christian culture, teachings, morals, values. Put simply, multicultural problems are a result of tensions between two religions: Christianity and Islam.

In a forum sponsored by Pew Research, Bernard Lewis, Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, said the source of the Islam and Christendom conflict comes not from the two religions’ differences but from their *similarities*.

“These two religions, and as far as I am aware, no others in the world, believe that their truths are not only universal but also exclusive,” Mr. Lewis said. “They believe that they are the fortunate

recipients of God's final message to humanity, which it is their duty not to keep selfishly to themselves...but to bring to the rest of mankind, removing whatever barriers there may be in the way."

Because both believe they hold the key to human salvation, Mr. Lewis said tensions between Christendom and Islam occur because each have "aspired to the same role" — bringing God's message to the whole world — "each seeing it as a divinely ordained mission."

How does this apply to today, a time in which many people call Europe a "post-Christian" continent? Even though Europe is not dominated by religion as it once was, centuries of Christianity's fingerprints are still found across the continent.

"In order to understand what is going on, one has to see the ongoing struggle within this larger perspective of the millennial struggle between the rival religions..." Mr. Lewis said.

The scars from the competing religions can be found most easily on Jerusalem's Temple Mount, which switched hands repeatedly during the Crusades. Muslims took the mount in AD 700 and built a wooden Al-Aqsa Mosque on the foundation of a Roman temple. Christian crusaders then violently seized the Holy Land and, in the early 12th century, reconstructed an earthquake-damaged Al-Aqsa Mosque as the Temple Solomonis and the Dome of the Rock, renamed the Temple Domini. Crusaders revamped both buildings, adding altars, icons, new mosaics, and Christian inscriptions — crosses replaced all crescent moons. Muslims recaptured the area in 1187, reclaiming the mount's two mosques. Islamic followers purged the Catholic icons and renovated the marble mosaics and inscriptions. These two mosques remain standing today.

During that time, Christian Europe clashed with the Islamic caliphate, constantly shifting control of the land. The caliphate, an Islamic empire established after Muhammad's death and ruled by a caliph, clashed with the Byzantine Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, and then Western European empires. It was not until 1924, when the creation of the Turkish Empire deposed the last caliph, that this religious rivalry faded from view.

Since that time, entire generations of Europeans have grown up not understanding the constant battles that once took place between the rival belief systems. Therefore, when they were presented with the idealistic option of a multicultural society, it seemed a good idea. Indeed, the concept was born out of a desire for tolerance and peace.

But history makes one point clear: these two religions do not get along. In fact, they *cannot*. Today, when EU Christendom and Muslim immigrants alike refuse to give up their respective cultures, it should come as no surprise. These two religions have never budged.

Demographic Time-bomb

Historical tensions shed new light on the multicultural woes in Europe. Without substantial change, the increasing Muslim presence in Europe could bring back violent clashes of religion.

Europe's changing demographics make this clear. According to *Newsweek*, the number of deaths is expected to outnumber births in 10 of the 27 member-states in 2015. The article stated that this means, starting in 2015, Europe's population will experience negative natural population growth, and by 2050 the population is projected to decrease by as much as 52 million from its present level. The United Nations has said that Europe needs as many as 1.6 million immigrants per year just to maintain the current population level through to 2050. This represents at least 60 million new residents.

On the other hand, the Muslim population is predicted to soar to 20 percent of the European population by 2050, with countries such as Spain, the United Kingdom and Holland showing even higher increases.

Clearly, for Europe to emerge as an economic superpower, it appears to have one choice — Muslims and Christians must learn to get along.

Making Multiculturalism Work

European policymakers have a tough road ahead of them. How can they find concessions in a millennia-old rivalry between Islam and Christianity? The prospect seems as insurmountable as bringing peace to the Middle East.

Take a step back, and remove Islam from the equation. Despite sharing a similar government, history, culture and religion, the common mode for the 27 European Union member-states is to disagree — about everything. On an international scale, the United Nations attempts to bring peace between countless combinations of ideologies, cultures and government styles. In fact, any two different governments (say communist China and the democratic United States) likely have vastly differing ideas for mankind's future. Despite his best intentions, man cannot find peace.

It seems hopeless. History foreshadows that European Muslims *will* clash with European Christians, EU member-states *will* disagree, and peace *will* elude mankind.

While the ability to bring world peace lies in reconciling all belief systems and governments, it will not happen as most expect.

THE MANUAL

The Manual aims at helping you to master speaking (making presentations and taking part in a debate) and writing (writing essays, summaries, reviews, survey reports) skills.

READ IT!

SPEAKING

TERM PRESENTATION

Useful tips

When making a presentation you, first of all, present yourself. Therefore, making an effective presentation is a vital skill.

1. Choose a topic which is challenging and off the beaten track.
2. Doing research for your presentation bear in mind that the content should be both educational and professionally relevant.
3. Structure your presentation carefully:
 - In the introduction tell the audience what your presentation is about and what points you want to make. A slide with an outline of your presentation is a big help.
 - Make sure each part of your presentation logically follows from another.
 - End with a summary of your points.
4. Rehearse your presentation several times: speak out loud to yourself in the shower, in front of the mirror, your family member, your friend, or your dog. Make sure you can keep to the time limit (10 minutes). Think of parts you can leave out if you feel you exceed the time limit.
5. When preparing a power point presentation, follow these suggestions:
 - Use big enough typeface to be seen from the back of the room– font 20 to 24.
 - Avoid white printing on dark background.
 - Do **not** use too many fancy visual effects or use these as background for text.
 - Avoid putting too much text into one slide (5 lines of short phrases).
 - Have the title of the presentation, your name and group number on the 1st slide.
 - Conclude with a thank-you slide.
6. When making the presentation:
 - Stand rather than sit when speaking.
 - Do not read your notes or slides, speak.
 - Do not speak too fast, make pauses.
 - Make eye contact with various members of the audience.
 - Move from slide to slide as you deal with a particular point, move on when you've finished talking about it.
 - Remain calm, composed and confident in your delivery.

NB: Copying other people's presentations is a serious offence!

Useful language for presentations

To introduce the topic:

Today I'm going to talk about

In this talk I will deal with the topic...;

To emphasise its importance:

I would like to start by saying/ let me begin by saying that

this is a significant issue at the moment in many ways...

this is a really important topic today because...

this issue is particularly significant in this country/ the world at large at the moment because...

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To present /outline the structure/plan of your talk:

I'm going to look at this issue from different angles. Firstly, I will talk about Then, I will deal with... Finally, I will try to explain the ...

First, I will tell you some facts about the history of..., then I will look into where things stand and finally...

To recap what you have said:

To recap briefly, ...

Let me now summarise what I have said about...

Before I conclude I would like to sum up the most important points once again

A THREE-MINUTE PRESENTATION

Making a short presentation may be even more challenging than making a term presentation: you have to present a compelling case within three minutes!

Useful tips

Preparing:

1. Think over the chosen topic and come up with an idea you feel strongly about.
2. Make up a list of reasons why you are right in defending this idea.
3. Think of convincing up-to-date examples to support your case.
4. Rehearse out loud keeping track of the time.

Presenting:

1. Start with an introductory phrase:

I'm going to talk about...; In my statement I will deal with...

2. Make a clear thesis statement.

3. Produce 2–3 arguments, which you develop and support with examples.

4. Conclude with a sum-up relevant to your thesis statement:

So, all of the above shows that ...

It appears reasonable to conclude that...

So we can conclude beyond reasonable doubt

DEBATE

Debating skills are an essential part of your professional kit.

The main purpose of a debate is to develop critical thinking skills, tolerance for differing viewpoints, ability to communicate in situations of confrontation. To meet these goals, debaters work together in teams, affirmative and negative, and must research both sides of each issue. Each team is given the opportunity to offer arguments and direct questions to the opposing team. At the end of the debate the judge will offer constructive feedback, commenting on logical flaws, insufficient evidence, or arguments that debaters may have overlooked and announce which team has won.

/after Karl Popper Debate/

To win the debate, you should perform to the best of your abilities, no matter what your real attitude to the issue is.

Before engaging in this fascinating and challenging activity read advice from more experienced debaters.

Useful tips

- Research the topic thoroughly; read everything you can. Don't focus on your side of the argument only, read articles relevant to your opposition and try to anticipate what they will attack you with.
- **Remember that debate is a team activity.** Make sure that you and your partners are going over arguments together so that you can help each other to produce the best arguments.
- Know your material — if you have well prepared speeches, a strong command of the facts and ideas surrounding the issue, you will find it far easier to respond to counter-arguments and points from the opposition that you may not have considered.
- If they ask tough questions, take a little time to consider your answer. It is very easy to get wrong footed and say things you later regret. Take your time and address each question without rushing. Make sure you are sticking to the debate topic.

A tip for the judge:

- The judge's decision should be based on the content of the debate. A good question for judges to ask themselves is: "At the end of the debate, was the audience left with a clear impression of the team's arguments?"
Judges should make their decision on which team won or lost the debate based on the performance of the team as a whole.

Debate Format: Team 1 (Affirmative), Team 2 (Negative)

Opening Statements of Two Teams: (1 minute each)

Like an introduction to a formal paper, introduce your team and the topic you will be debating. State what you are going to argue during the debate (like a thesis statement) and say why your position should win.

1. Team 1: Constructive Statement 1 (2–3 minutes)

In this speech, the affirmative team is expected to offer its argument in favour of the proposition.

2. Team 2: Cross-Examination

The negative debater is expected to ask a question rather than make a speech. The affirmative debater is expected to answer this question; he or she should neither make a speech or ask questions in return. Team members should not assist their teammates by answering questions on their behalf.

3. Team 2: Constructive Statement 1 (2–3 minutes)

The negative team is expected to offer its argument against the affirmative position.

4. Team 1: Cross-Examination

Now the Affirmative debater asks questions and the Negative debater is expected to answer them.

The number of constructive statements (i.e. arguments) each team is supposed to present is subject to preliminary agreement between the teams.

5. Team 1: Rebuttal

The affirmative speaker summarizes team's refutations of the negative arguments.

6. **Team 2: Rebuttal**

The negative speaker summarizes team's refutations of the affirmative arguments.

7. **Team 1: Closing Argument**

The affirmative speaker summarizes the key points the team presented concluding with a persuasive argument that will win the debate for the team!

8. **Team 2: Closing Argument**

The negative speaker summarizes the key points the team presented concluding with a persuasive argument that will win the debate for the team!

RULES

- No research is permitted during the discussion. Once the debate begins, the participants may not conduct research via the Internet, nor through electronic or other means.
- No outside assistance is permitted. Debaters, however, are allowed to consult whatever research materials they have brought with them to the debate.
- Debaters should be able to provide sources for direct citations.
- Debaters should practice intellectual honesty. Students should cite arguments and statistics truthfully and never fabricate sources or data.
- As long as the speakers communicate their ideas clearly, it does not matter if they use sheets of paper instead of note cards. No reading the speech is permitted, though.

Find more in www.ideal.forestry.ubc.ca/.../debate_format.pdf (Modified Karl Popper Debate Format)

WRITING

ARGUMENTATIVE ESSAY EXPRESSING OPINION

MAKING USE OF LOGIC AND FACTS TO SUPPORT YOUR VIEW

Structure:

Introduction (Paragraph 1)

The subject or topic. Thesis: a statement of your opinion.

Main body

Paragraph 2

Viewpoint 1 supported by a logical reason and facts/personal experience

Paragraph 3

Viewpoint 2 supported by a logical reason facts/personal experience

Paragraph 3a (optional)

Viewpoint 3 supported by a logical reason and facts/personal experience

Paragraph 4

The opposing viewpoints and reasons

You might include a lead-in opinion to your conclusion

Conclusion (Final paragraph)

A summary of your viewpoints.

Writing a Good Introduction

A strong thesis statement, relevant to the topic:

1. expresses ONE idea
2. is clear and specific
3. justifies discussion.

Apart from making a strong thesis statement a good introduction should “hook” the reader, i.e. make them want to read what you’ve written.

Useful tips

1. Start with an interesting or surprising fact or refer to an unusual situation.
2. Address the reader directly with a question.
3. Give a quotation.
4. Suggest a definition.
5. Supply some important background information

Writing a Good Main Body

Your goal is to make a convincing case for the idea you have expressed in your thesis statement. Make sure your arguments are

1. relevant to your thesis statement
2. consistent
3. clearly presented
4. logical (watch out for logical fallacies, see Student’s Coursebook, EAP Corner units 1&2),
5. supported by reason and evidence (facts)

Writing a Good Conclusion

The main aim of the conclusion is to show the reader that you have fulfilled the task set in the introduction, e.g. have proved your point of view (in an opinion essay). In other words, the conclusion links back to the thesis statement.

Useful tips

1. Restate the thesis statement but do not repeat it!
2. Do not introduce new ideas.
3. Sum up the main points made in the body of the essay.
4. Do not pretend you have proven more than you have.
5. Make it emphatic: use an appropriate quotation or your own punchy¹ comment.

NB! Proofreading. Check your essay for

- opinion essay structure
- thesis statement expressing your opinion
- effective ‘hooking’ technique
- one idea per paragraph to present your opinion
- supporting sentences and examples in each paragraph
- clearly presented opposing point of view in a separate paragraph

¹ having a strong effect due to the use of clear simple language and not too many words.

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- relevant conclusion
- logical connection within and between paragraphs
- use of grammar structures
- use of vocabulary: synonyms, pronouns, etc.
- spelling and punctuation errors

WRITING A SURVEY REPORT

A survey report is a formal piece of writing based on research

Structure:

Introduction

States the purpose / aim of the report, and the source of information (when and how the information was gathered).

Main Body

All the information collected and analysed is presented clearly and in detail.

Beware of the most common mistakes: interpreting data and drawing conclusions in the main body!

Conclusion

Sums up the points mentioned above; summarizes what you think are the main findings of the survey. If necessary a recommendation can be included as well.

Beware: Use cautious language!

Useful tips

1. present the data clearly in detail (use subheadings and numbers if necessary)
2. use Past Tense to describe the survey in the introduction
3. use Present Tenses and Reported Speech to introduce/present the data
4. use Present Tense to draw conclusions and make recommendations
5. write in formal style

Useful language

Writing introduction:

- This survey was carried out/conducted to find out/examine...
- The purpose / aim of this report
- This report presents the findings of the survey...
- This survey aimed to/at + verb/ -ing...
- ... (number) respondents answered the questions on...
- The survey/ questionnaire was concerned/dealt with...

Writing main body:

- It has been found that...
- There is a (slight/big/considerable/etc.) increase/rise/decrease/fall in...

- One-third/Two-thirds/A quarter/Half/About half of respondents/students/etc. said that...
- Twenty-five percent/A large percentage/A small percentage of respondents stated/claimed that...
- Several/A significant number of respondents commented/ agreed/suggested/etc. that

Writing conclusion:

To draw conclusions:

- The findings indicate/reveal/show/suggest that...
- From the results of the survey, we can see that...
- According to the findings, it is clear/evident that...
- It is not easy to reach any definite conclusions...
- If any conclusions can be drawn from the data...
- All things considered...
- To sum up...

To make recommendations:

- It is therefore proposed/advised/recommended that...
- Based on the above findings, there is a clear need for...
- People should be encouraged to...
- The importance of ... must be emphasised

Sample survey report

End of Year Survey of People's Outlook for 2014

During September–December 2013 an annual survey of global opinions was conducted by WIN-Gallup International. National probability samples of around 1,000 people were surveyed in each of the 65 countries polled, a total of 66,806 respondents. The survey was conducted by means of face-to-face (34 countries), telephone (11 countries) or online (20 countries) interviews. As part of the poll people were asked: "Who is the greatest threat to world peace?" and "If there were no barriers to living in any country of the world, which country would you like to live in?"

As to the first question, the U.S. tops the list with an aggregate of 24 percent, the runner-up threat country, Pakistan, is way behind at eight percent. China is third at six percent, followed by North Korea, Iran and Israel at five percent each. Fifty-four percent of Russian respondents and forty-nine of Chinese consider the U.S. to be the greatest threat to peace. This view is also strongly held in some purported U.S. allies — such as NATO partners Greece and Turkey (45 percent each), and Pakistan (44 percent),

Other findings of interest are as follows. American respondents see Iran as the greatest threat to peace (20 percent), followed by Afghanistan (14 percent), North Korea (13 percent) — and the U.S. itself (13 percent). Indian respondents predictably name their Muslim neighbor as posing the greatest danger (25 percent), but for Pakistanis the U.S. easily beats India as the biggest threat (44 percent compared to 15). China is named as the greatest threat to peace by respondents in Japan (38 percent), Vietnam (54 percent) and Philippines (22 percent).

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Answers to the second question reveal an interesting tendency. A majority of people (38%) are happy to live where they currently reside. This figure is the average for Western Europe too; 36% of the UK population opt to stay in the country and a substantial 66% of Australia respondents would not consider relocating. Overall, those in the MENA¹ (47%) and Americas (46%) regions are most likely to stay where they currently live.

For those who would like to move, the survey highlights that the USA (9% of respondents) is the most desirable destination, with Canada and Australia jointly being second choice (7%) and Switzerland third (6%).

The findings of the survey indicate that the USA is seen as representing the greatest threat to peace today. This opinion is evidently shared by the US rivals and allies alike, though by the latter to a lesser extent. Beijing, which makes territorial claims in the East and South China Sea, does not appear to have won many friends either. A near majority of people across the globe apparently prefer to stay where they live now. Those who would like to move, paradoxically, consider the USA the most desired destination. This could show that for many of the people surveyed it appears that the notion of the 'American Dream' is still alive. (491)

READING & WRITING A SUMMARY

STAGES OF WRITING A SUMMARY

Reading	Writing	Editing
— Skim	— write down the main idea of each section in one sentence	— check for accuracy and objectivity
— Read	— write a thesis statement ²	— check if it is written in your own words
— Reread	— write the first draft — write the second /final version	— revise it for style, grammar and punctuation

SAMPLE PRACTICE

a) Read the article and focus on the underlined parts. What do you think they represent? Answer the questions below.

These may serve as an outline of your summary.

Who? When? Where? What? Why? What result?

b) Would you like to suggest a different selection (see the underlined parts again) to write the thesis of a summary?

¹ Middle East and North Africa

² Alternatively: start with the main ideas, then write down the thesis statement that clearly sums up the main idea of the whole text.

c) Write your thesis statement. If you can't do it in your own words, use some from the text and paraphrase later.

The economy: migrant support

The recent arrival of east Europeans into Britain, in order to undertake employment which much of the British population shun, replicates patterns that developed during the Victorian period. For much of the 19th century the Irish formed part of the labour force working on some of the toughest manual jobs, leading some historians to doubt the extent to which industrialisation could have taken place without them.

Similarly, German immigrants in Victorian Britain undertook some of the hardest work in the East End of London, including sugar baking. Russian Jewish immigrants in the late Victorian and Edwardian years found themselves working in East End sweatshops, while postwar British prosperity could not have happened without working-class immigrants from all over the world.

However, migrants have not simply acted as a cheap labour force — as the number of foreign millionaires in contemporary London testifies. Fabulously wealthy businessmen such as Roman Abramovich have predecessors in German tycoons of the 19th century. Some of these may simply have owned bakers and butchers shops, but others helped to establish some of Britain's largest companies. Immigrant Ludwig Mond's son was one of the founders of ICI. Meanwhile, the descendants of the Russian Jewish migrants of the late 19th century have gone on to become major players in British industry and the professions, as have refugees from Nazi Germany.(222)

/from Arriving in Style by Panikos Panayi. History Magazine. July 2010/

When editing your summary answer the questions:

1. Have you accurately represented the author's ideas and key points (the author's emphasis)?
2. Have you written it in your OWN words? If you quoted the author, use quotation marks.
3. Have you mentioned the author periodically?
4. Have you included any minor details or your own ideas?
5. Is it the right length? (normally 1/3 or 1/4 of the original text)
6. Have you included all the necessary information in the introduction? (name of the author, the title of article, the name of magazine, journal, newspaper, date of publication)

Revise it for style, grammar, spelling and punctuation.

MORE ABOUT WRITING A SUMMARY

Focus on the Tone

Tone is the attitude the writer wants to convey,
the emotional colouring of his/her writing

Formal, informal, angry, enthusiastic, detached, humorous, serious, optimistic, pessimistic concerned?

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What makes you think so? How does it affect paraphrasing?

Read the extract and choose appropriate synonyms from the list below.

Mr Bercow's¹ biggest year for Christmas splurging was 2010, when more than £26,000 was spent on Christmas tree maintenance by the Commons authorities he controls. In 2009 it was felt necessary to spend £1,240 on decorations. That's a lot to spend on fairies², even for a man of his delicate aesthetics. Exactly what 'maintenance' of a Christmas tree entails is not explained. Does it mean Hoovering (пылесосить) the pine needles from the carpet?

/from "The Squeaker Decks the Hall with Bags of Money".
The *Daily Mail*. March 24, 2012/

splurging: spending spree/ shopping / money wasting ¹²

It was felt necessary: [the Speaker] thought it a good idea/ decided

a man of his delicate aesthetics: a man of fine taste / artistically minded

entails: implies/ involves/ means

WRITING AN ABSTRACT

An abstract is a short formal original piece of writing which describes a much larger paper (article, chapter of a book or a book). It is similar to a summary but compressed even further. It presents the message and all the main arguments and conclusions (if any) of the complete paper. An abstract contains the key words of the original text; its main function is to give the reader a clear idea if the paper is worth reading.

Useful tips

/from the Writing Center of the University of Northern Carolina at Chapel Hill/

All abstracts include:

- A full citation of the source, preceding the abstract.
- The most important information first.
- The same type and style of language found in the original, including technical language.
- Key words and phrases that quickly identify the content and focus of the work.
- Clear, concise, and powerful language.
- Length ~10% of the original or less.

Abstracts may include:

- The thesis of the work, usually in the first sentence.
- Background information that places the work in the larger body of literature.
- The same chronological structure as the original work.

¹ Speaker of the House of Commons since 2009

² Fairy lights — small lights used for decorating Christmas trees

When writing an abstract:

Identify key terms:

Search through the entire document for key terms that identify the purpose, scope, and methods of the work. Pay close attention to the Introduction and the Conclusion. These sections should contain all the main ideas and key terms in the paper. When writing the abstract, be sure to incorporate the key terms.

Highlight key phrases and sentences:

Instead of cutting and pasting the actual words, try highlighting sentences or phrases that appear to be central to the work. Then, **in a separate document, rewrite the sentences and phrases in your own words.**

Don't look back:

After reading the entire work, put it aside and **write a paragraph about the work without referring to it. In the first draft, you may not remember all the key terms or the results, but you will remember what the main point of the work was.** Remember not to include any information you did not get from the work being abstracted.

SAMPLE ABSTRACT

The Conclusion Chapter from *Empire. How Britain Made the Modern World* by Niall Ferguson. Penguin books LTD, London, 2004 sums up the most important contribution of the British Empire to the modern world. Its impact is seen as mostly positive, with the most remarkable legacy being free trade, free capital movements, free labour and English as the global language. The Empire promoted liberal capitalism, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law throughout its colonies. Though Great Britain is responsible for enslaving, killing and exploiting indigenous population at the beginning of the empire, later it contributed to the economic development of its colonies, particularly those that were at a low stage of development at the time of colonisation. What's more, after the collapse of the empire many of its former colonies benefited from British-style institutions and form of governing, which was cost effective, efficient and uncorrupted. The experience of the British Empire testifies to its overall effectiveness: ultimately, it paved the way for economic, legal and political globalization. (166 words)

/This abstract covers texts A, B and C in the Lead-in of unit 1 British Traditionalism (~ 2300 words)/

For more information go to

<http://writingcenter.unc.edu/handouts/abstracts/>

APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1

INDIVIDUAL PLAN #1 (SAMPLE)

(UK: From Empire to Democracy: 01.09 — 04.10)

Group

Student (name):¹

Section	Activity	Date ¹	Performance
Listening 1 p. 17 Listening 2 p. 30 Listening 3 p. 37	Listening & viewing 1 Listening & viewing 2* Listening & viewing 3*		
Reading & Comprehension #1 p. 18–22, #2 p. 24–28, #3 p. 31–34	Reading the texts and doing comprehension assignments		
EAP Corner Brushing Up Reading Skills p. 41–42	Reading the article in the EAP Corner*		
EAP Corner Developing Logical Thinking Skills p. 45–49	Learning to speak and write logically and to avoid logical fallacies		
Speak Up p. 22, 28, 34	Discussion		
Follow Up p. 22, 28, 34	3-min presentation*		
Integrating Core Skills p. 38	Project Work*		
Term presentation p. 31	Making a term presentation*		
Debate p. 36	Taking part in a debate		
EAP Corner Writing a summary p. 42–44	Practice summary writing		
Writing an essay (Practice in EAP Corner p. 50–51)	Writing an Essay (test)		
Vocabulary Practice 1, 2, 3; Revision p. 38–40	Learning new vocabulary; Revising Active Vocabulary and Grammar		
Follow Up p. 23, 29, 34	Compiling the list of topical vocabulary*		

NB The sections in bold are a MUST.

¹ Fill in the date for activities marked with an asterisk (*)

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A SAMPLE OF THE TIMETABLE TO FOLLOW WHEN FILLING OUT INDIVIDUAL PLANS

UK: From Empire to Democracy: Time Guidelines

Sections & Activities	Dates
Listening	01.09 — 01.10
Reading & Comprehension #1, #2, #3	04.09 — 28.09
EAP Corner Brushing Up Reading Skills	04.09 — 08.09
EAP Corner Developing Logical Thinking Skills	04.09 — 28.09
Discussions	04.09 — 01.10
Short presentation	08.09 — 01.10
Project Work	11.09 — 30.09
Term presentation	11.09 — 04.10
Debate	25.09 — 01.10
Writing a summary	14.09 — 30.09
Writing an essay	29.09 — 01.10
Doing exercises from Vocabulary Practice	Regularly: 04.09 — 01.10
Vocabulary and Grammar Revision	29.09 — 04.10
Compiling the list of topical vocabulary	15.09 — 01.10

APPENDIX 2

КОНТРОЛЬНО-ИЗМЕРИТЕЛЬНЫЕ МАТЕРИАЛЫ

№1 (устный экзамен)

Факультет МО

Английский как второй иностранный, IV курс, 7 семестр

Билет № 1

Время на подготовку 10–15 мин

Время на ответ 3–4 мин

Рассмотрено и утверждено на заседании

кафедры английского языка № 1

Протокол № от

Зав.кафедрой _____

You have 15 minutes to prepare a 3–4 minute speech on the given topic. Make use of the following prompts or any other ideas you can think of. You are to announce your thesis statement and present your speech to your partner and the examiners. When you have finished, your partner will ask you two questions or will give you two counter-arguments which you are to comment on.

SOCIAL CLASS IN THE UK

- growing social divide
- social reforms of the 1950s
- elitism in education
- unequal access to health care
- low social mobility

You will be allowed to use your outline only!

№2 (письменный экзамен)

Write a summary of the article (300–350 words)

SEPTEMBER 22, 2014

Only a Truce in Syria Can Stop ISIS

The Absurdity of US Policy in Syria

by PATRICK COCKBURN

If the United States and its allies want to combat the Islamic State jihadists (IS, formerly known as Isis) successfully, they should arrange a ceasefire between the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the non-IS Syrian opposition. Neither the Syrian army nor the “moderate” Syrian rebels are strong enough to stop IS if they are fighting on two fronts at the same time, going by the outcome of recent battles. A truce between the two main enemies of IS in Syria would be just that, and would not be part of a broader political solution to the Syrian crisis which is not feasible at this stage because mutual hatred is too great. A ceasefire may be possible now, when it was not in the past, because all parties and their foreign backers — the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran — are frightened of the explosive advance of the Islamic State. US Secretary of State John Kerry told the US Security Council on Friday that there is room for everybody “including Iran” in an anti-IS coalition.

President Obama was much criticised for admitting that he had no strategy to cope with IS and, despite his address to the nation on 10 September, he still does not have one. Assuming he is not going to send a large US land army to the region, he lacks a credible and effective local partner in either Syria or Iraq with the necessary military force to take advantage of air strikes, even if they are intensified in Iraq and extended to Syria.

Mr Obama won the assent of the House of Representatives last week to train and equip moderate rebels in Syria who are supposedly going to fight both Assad and IS. This is essentially a PR operation, since IS forces 30 miles from Aleppo are poised¹ to move against the last rebel strongholds, while the Syrian army is close to regaining control of the city itself.

The Syrian army suffered heavy defeats at the hands of IS in July and August, though these were little reported in the West. It has long been clear that the army was short of combat troops and could only fight one front at a time. Mr Assad appears to have calculated that the rise of IS would be to his political advantage because most of the world would prefer him to the fundamentalists. But he underestimated the military strength of IS since they captured Mosul on 10 June.

No truce is likely to happen unless there is pressure on both sides by their outside backers — notably the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Much would depend on how realistic they are: the US and Saudi Arabia still want the departure of Assad, but this has been very unlikely since the second half of 2012. Demanding this at the Geneva II talks in February effectively killed off any diplomatic framework for negotiations to end the conflict. Critics of multilateral ceasefires argue that this would mean accepting that the Assad government stay in place, but the Syrian government is not departing in any case. The Assad government may believe that it is gradually reasserting its authority over the rest of the country, but these advances are at a snail’s pace and

¹ Poised — ready or prepared for something

its grip on ground regained is fragile. The Syrian army might not be able to withstand an all-out offensive by IS.

IS is growing stronger while its opponents in Syria are weakening. It is recruiting fast in all parts of its caliphate. A study by the National Security Adviser's office in Baghdad showed that in the past, where jihadis took over an area with 100 fighters, they could recruit between 500 and 1,000. IS seems prepared for air strikes, evacuating its fighters and heavy weapons from buildings where they are identifiable. US air power did not win the war in Afghanistan and is even less likely to do so in Iraq or Syria.

A ceasefire in Syria would remove one of IS's strongest cards, which is the fear of the Sunnis that, bad though IS may be, the alternative of government re-occupation is even worse. For its part, the government may fear no longer being able to face Syrians with a stark choice between Assad and jihadis who chop off heads.

The restoration of a more normal civilian life in Syria would be an immense advance. Some of the 3 million refugees and 6.5 million internally displaced people out of a total population of 22 million would be able to go home. There might be a re-emergence of more moderate individuals and groups marginalised or driven underground since 2011.

At the moment, the political landscape in Syria must look good from the point of view of IS. Its opponents are divided. The US is backing a group of moderates who barely exist and wants to weaken the Assad government. In the past week some of the heaviest fighting in Syria has been IS's attack on the Kurdish enclave of Kobani, also known as Ayn al-Arab, close to Turkey. It is defended by the fighters of the YPG Kurdish militia who are the Syrian branch of the mainly Turkish Kurd PKK which the US labels as "terrorist".

US policy has an Alice in Wonderland absurdity about it, everything being the opposite of what it appears to be. The so-called "coalition of the willing" is, in practice, very unwilling to fight IS, while those hitherto excluded, such as Iran, the Syrian government, Hezbollah and the PKK, are the ones actually fighting. A truce between the government and moderate rebels in Syria would enable both to devote their resources to fighting IS, as they need to do quickly if they are to avoid defeat.

970 words (abridged)

№3 (образец задания для промежуточного контроля)

UK: FROM EMPIRE TO DEMOCRACY

Write an essay of 300–350 words on one of the following topics:

1. Is the result of the Scottish referendum a missed opportunity?
2. Was the British Empire beneficial to its colonies?
3. Why are Britons disenchanted with politics?

- Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

№4 (образец задания для промежуточного контроля)

Факультет МО

Английский язык, второй иностранный, IV курс, 7 семестр

MID-TERM PAPER

I. Translate the following sentences into English. Use Active Vocabulary words.

1. Несмотря на постоянные перестановки в кабинете, экономика страны по-прежнему **находится в упадке**, и хотя основные проблемы были **определены**, никто из министров так и не разработал стратегию, которая помогла бы сдержать неконтролируемую инфляцию. [5]

2. Не так-то просто **убедить жителей** Германии и Франции, которые на данный момент являются **влиятельными членами ЕС**, в **необходимости расширения союза** дальше на восток. [5]

3. Несмотря на то, что Европейский Союз **принимает на себя новые обязательства во многих политических вопросах**, основополагающие ценности **остаются неизменными**. [5]

4. Активно **взаимодействуя с мировой общественностью**, и **говоря от лица всей Европы**, Европейский Союз **стал образцом для других государств**, а ценности, к которым **стремится ЕС**, **послужили основой для других наций и организаций**. [8]

5. Попытка **избавиться** от улик стала **убедительным** свидетельством в пользу его виновности. [5]

6. Чтобы подкрепить свои аргументы, она **сослалась** на нескольких выдающихся ученых, которые также полагали, что становление **гражданского общества** в России началось намного раньше, чем это принято считать и, следовательно, требуется **коренной переосмотр исторических концепций** в данной области. [6]

7. Они взяли в руки оружие по разным причинам: чтобы выжить, отомстить, защитить свои семьи, **последовать примеру сверстников**, закалить характер, став воином или геро-

ем, преодолеть ощущение беспомощности или же из-за отсутствия лучшей альтернативы. [4]

8. Отчасти причина **непримиримого** сопротивления Турции требованиям курдов заключается в истории конфликта. [4]

9. Своими действиями оппозиция может **спровоцировать** политический кризис в стране, что в свою очередь может **поставить под угрозу** положение страны на мировой арене. [5]

10. **Почтение** и уважение к старшим **занимает важное место** в системе ценностей этой страны. [5]

_____ out of 52

II. Fill in the gaps with prepositions where necessary.

1. ___ worst, they demand ___ more wages and benefits for less work, do the minimum expected ___ them, or function as bland bureaucrats mired _____ standard ___ operating procedures.
2. Liberalism itself (putting _____, ___ the moment, its egalitarian element) is nothing but an effort to struggle free ___ restraints _____ the individual.
3. What motivation does another country have to hold _____ transfers when the US is pumping ___ billions of dollars _____ the region?
4. It seems to be ___ human nature to throw _____ barriers _____ the truth. We are taught _____ a very early age that there can be advantages ___ withholding the truth ___ one's feelings.
5. It wasn't until the weekend that he started to pine _____ some entertainment other than the sight of himself in the bathroom mirror.
6. This collaborative effort is ___ concert _____ the City of Chicago's goals as well as our mission to preserve affordable housing for all Americans.
7. Conscientious citizens fret _____ America's renewed and steadily rising dependence ___ foreign oil and the defense costs required to keep the Persian Gulf open.
8. Ever since then, Labour has been _____ the defensive, both ideologically and demographically.
9. ___ the age of 76 and realising that the lifetime ___ the next Parliament would take him ___ his eighties, he has decided to make way _____ a younger man.
10. Even if you are not a skier, it is worth taking the funicular ___ ___ the slopes just to experience the journey and to marvel _____ the views opening out ___.
11. Most of his work has now been consigned ___ oblivion.
12. _____ careful deliberation it was agreed to abandon the project.
13. Ministers also hoped that employers would root _____ inefficiency, even if this led to a temporary surge ___ unemployment.

■ АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК ДЛЯ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫХ И АКАДЕМИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ

14. ___ Mrs Thatcher, ___ loggerheads _____ many of her own party ___ European issues, this summit was crucial.

_____ out of 10 (0.25 x 40)

III. Fill in the gaps with any appropriate word.

Furthermore, it will be premature to _____ Turkey before its process of _____ reform has taken _____. EU accession has proven a strong _____ for _____ countries to _____ the principles of democracy, rule of _____ and respect of human rights that form the building _____ of European integration. But, _____ how slowly the reform process is _____ in Turkey, the EU has to be _____ with its Anatolian partner. The army's _____ in politics, the economy and the judiciary is still very strong, reminding many in Europe that Turkey has long to _____ before a fully democratic system is _____. The Kurdish issue also remains _____ and many _____ whether the EU wishes to import a problem that has both an internal and external destabilising dimension. Last but not least is the issue of Turkey's refusal to _____ one of the EU's member states, _____ Cyprus.

_____ out of 18

IV. Complete the second sentence so that it has a similar meaning to the first sentence, using the word given. Do not change the word given.

1. You can't just suddenly decide to go on a safari. You need to plan things very carefully. (**SPUR**)
Going on safari isn't a decision you can make _____ moment. You need to plan things very carefully
2. She wants nothing less than to get that job. It would be a dream come true. (**SET**)
She has _____ that job.
3. If they ever discover your role in the incident, you will go to prison. (**LIGHT**)
If your role in the incident _____, you'll go to prison.
4. Harry plays tennis much better than I do. (**NEARLY**)
I am not _____ tennis player as Harry is.
5. This will be my student's first performance in Canada. (**TIME**)
This will be the first _____ in Canada.
6. Both candidates for the job are strong. They are both equally good. (**HARDLY**)
There is _____ the two job candidates.
7. That child is twice as tall as he was two years ago. (**DOUBLED**)
That child's _____ last two years.
8. As soon as I arrived at the pub, a fight started. (**SOONER**)
No _____ a fight broke out in the pub.
9. Sharon will finish her exams. Then she will have more free time. (**ONCE**)
_____ she will have more free time.
10. This course will take us six months to complete. (**TIME**)
In six months' time _____ this course.

_____ out of 10

Total _____ out of 90

Grade	A	B	C	D	E
Score	90–81	80–74	73–68	67–59	58–54

APPENDIX 3

№ 1. Параметры и критерии оценивания устного ответа на экзамене

Параметры	A (90–100%)	B (82–89%)	C (75–81%)	D (68–74%)	E (60–67%)	F (< 60%)
Структура (5–15%)	14–15	12–13	10–11	8–9	5–7	< 5
Содержание (20–40%)	38–40	35–37	30–34	25–29	20–24	< 20
Лексика/ грамматика (15–30%)	27–30	24–26	20–23	17–19	15–16	< 15
Форма (5–15%)	14–15	12–13	10–11	8–9	5–7	< 5

Штрафные баллы

Структура (max. 15%)

- Отсутствие четкой структуры (вступление, основная часть, заключение) — 3–5%
- Отсутствие адекватных средств связи при аргументации — 3–5%

Содержание (max. 40%)

- Тезис не соответствует теме или не требует доказательств, etc. — 10%
- Неубедительная аргументация (аргументы не в полной мере соответствуют тезису и/или отсутствуют конкретные факты и примеры, подкрепляющие аргументы) — 10%
- Нарушения логики (необоснованные аналогии/обобщения) — 10%
- Отсутствие вывода, соответствующего теме, тезису и аргументам — 5%
- Вопрос, заданный собеседнику, не соответствует теме высказывания / нерелевантен — 10%
- Неадекватный ответ на вопрос собеседника — 10%

Лексика/Грамматика (max. 30%)

- Используемая лексика не соответствует этапу обучения — 5–7%
- Неадекватная лексическая сочетаемость — 7–10%
- Неуместно используется активный словарь — 5%
- Используемые грамматические конструкции не соответствуют этапу обучения — 5–7%
- Допускаются грубые грамматические ошибки — 10%

Форма (max/ 15%)

- Медленный темп речи и длительные паузы — 5%
- Несоблюдение официального стиля речи — 5%
- Произношение, затрудняющее понимание — 5%
- Отсутствие визуального контакта с собеседником — 3%
- Сообщение < 3 минут — 3%

- Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

№ 2. Параметры и критерии оценивания письменных работ

SUMMARY

Первая оценка:

Штрафные баллы:

Тип ошибки	Количество штрафных баллов
No topic/no subject matter	2
Thesis statement/ message/ main idea not clearly stated	2
Main idea= supporting ideas	1–2
Division into paragraphs	1–2
No reference to the text	1
Too short/ too long	1
Repetition of ideas	0,5 per each case
Logic	0,5 per each case
Factual (distortion of ideas)	0,5 per each case
Quotation (with/without inverted commas)	0,5 per each case
No connectives	0,5 per each paragraph
Wrong paragraph structure	0,5 per each case

Перевод штрафных баллов в оценку:

Суммарное количество штрафных баллов	Оценка		
0–0,5	5	A	100–90%
1–1,5	4+	B	89–82%
2–2,5	4–	C	81–75%
3–3,5	3+	D	74–67%
4–4,5	3–	E	66–60%
Более 5	2	F	< 60%

Вторая оценка:
Штрафные баллы:

Тип ошибки	Количество штрафных баллов
Sp (орфография)	0,1
P (пунктуация)	0,1
Art (артикли)	0,2
Prep (предлог)	0,2
Ww (выбор слова)	0,5
Wo (порядок слов)	0,5
Gr (грамматика)	0,5
St (стиль)	0,3
M / Sense (смысл) (любая ошибка, которая делает предложение бессмысленным)	1
Primitive language	1

! Однотипная ошибка не учитывается

Суммарное количество штрафных баллов	Оценка		
0–1,1	5	A	100–90%
1,2–2,2	4+	B	89–82%
2,3–3,3	4–	C	81–75%
3,4–4,5	3+	D	74–67%
4,6–6,1	3–	E	66–60%
Более 6,2	2	F	< 60%

■ Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

ESSAY

Первая оценка:

Штрафные баллы:

Тип Ошибки	Количество штрафных баллов
No title	1
Intro: No thesis statement	2
Thesis attempted but not covering same ground as essay	1
Body: Division into paragraphs	1-2
Conclusion: no restatement	1
Too short/ too long	1
Argumentation (relevance)	0,5 per each case
Repetition of ideas	0,5 per each case
Logic	0,5 per each case
Factual (distortion of ideas)	0,5 per each case
No connectives	0,5 per each paragraph
Wrong paragraph structure	0,5 per each case

Перевод штрафных баллов в оценку:

Суммарное количество штрафных баллов	Оценка		
0-0,5	5	A	100-90%
1-1,5	4+	B	89-82%
2-2,5	4-	C	81-75%
3-3,5	3+	D	74-67%
4-4,5	3-	E	66-60%
Более 5	2	F	< 60%

Вторая оценка:**Штрафные баллы:**

Тип ошибки	Количество штрафных баллов
Sp (орфография)	0,1
P (пунктуация)	0,1
Art (артикли)	0,2
Prep (предлог)	0,2
Ww (выбор слова)	0,5
Wo (порядок слов)	0,5
Gr (грамматика)	0,5
St (стиль)	0,3
M / Sense (смысл) (любая ошибка, которая делает предложение бессмысленным)	1
Primitive language	1

Перевод штрафных баллов в оценку:

Суммарное количество штрафных баллов	Оценка		
0–1,1	5	A	100–90%
1,2–2,2	4+	B	89–82%
2,3–3,3	4–	C	81–75%
3,4–4,5	3+	D	74–67%
4,6–6,1	3–	E	66–60%
Более 6,2	2	F	< 60%

- Английский язык для специальных и академических целей

SURVEY REPORT

Первая оценка:

Тип ошибки		Количество штрафных баллов
Str (General) (0. Title; 1. Introduction; 2. Body; 3. Conclusion)		2*
Structure (Introduction)	The purpose of the report (not stated / given vaguely)	2*
	The source of information not specified (when and how the information was gathered)	1
Log (Body)	Clarity	2*
	Necessary detail	2*
Log (Conclusion)	Logical sum up	2*
	Recommendations (if necessary)	(1)
Cohesion (Links)	Less than 1–2 links per paragraph	0,5 per paragraph
	Inappropriate use	0,5 per case
Factual		0,5 per case

Перевод штрафных баллов в оценку:

Суммарное количество штрафных баллов	Оценка		
0–0,5	5	A	100–90%
1–1,5	4+	B	89–82%
2–2,5	4–	C	81–75%
3–3,5	3+	D	74–67%
4–4,5	3–	E	66–60%
Более 5	2	F	< 60%

Вторая оценка:

Тип ошибки	Количество штрафных баллов
орфография (sp)	0,1
пунктуация (p)	0,1
артикуль (art)	0,2
предлог (prep)	0,2
пропуск слова (√)	0,1
лишнее слово (повтор) (/)	0,1
употребление слов (ww) / лексическая ошибка (lex)	0,5
порядок слов (wo)	0,5
грамматическая ошибка (gr)	0,5
стиль (st)	0,3
ошибки, которые делают предложение бессмысленным (sense)	1

Перевод штрафных баллов в оценку:

Суммарное количество штрафных баллов	Оценка	
0–1,1	100–90%	A (5)
1,2–2,2	89–82%	B (4)
2,3–3,3	81–75%	C (4-)
3,4–4,5	74–67%	D (3)
4,6–6,1	66–60%	E (3-)
Более 6,2	< 60%	F (2)



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For students of international relations and regional studies.

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